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Abstract 
This thesis examines the contribution of the Private Military and 
Security Industry (PMSI), as an element of the United States (US) total 
force, to the US military capability in pursuing Phase IV Operations in Iraq 
from 2003 until 2011. In order to do so, the study proposes a typology of 
five types of contribution categories which define the link between the 
ends demanded by the US government (strategic goals) and the use of the 
PMSI as a tool to help achieve them. By incorporating a model from the 
operations management field, the Hayes and Wheelwright's Four-Stage 
model, this thesis identifies the categories of Assistant, Implementer, 
Crucial Supporter, Driver, and Spoiler as distinct forms of engagement, 
constituting a framework for the assessment of the nature of the 
relationship between the contractors’ activities and the strategic goals 
they sought to help achieve.  
Applied to the case studies of armed private security services and 
base support services, this framework reveals that contractors became the 
Crucial Supporter of the US military efforts in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. 
In the aftermath of the ill-planned regime-change, followed by unforeseen 
operational circumstances on the ground, and constrained by the US 
domestic policy reservations towards prolonged nation-building efforts, 
the US government found both armed security contractors and base 
support contractors to be a critical asset of the US military strategy on the 
ground. Through their constructive contribution towards the size of the 
deployable force, the available timeframe, the objectives and the strategic 
goal of these operations, they became a key partner of the US military 
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efforts in Iraq. Utilising a descriptive and exploratory approach, and 
relying on a range of sources, including official documents, semi-
structured interviews and publicly available video testimonies of US 
veterans from Iraq, this thesis highlights the PMSI’s strategic value in a 
complex expeditionary operation while providing a detailed insight in the 
complexity of modern warfare.  
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I. Introduction  
 
The international system has undergone significant changes since 
the end of the Cold War. One of the areas where these changes have 
become most obvious is international security. While previously national 
security had been understood as the sole responsibility of state militaries, 
in the turbulent twilight years of the Cold War, many western capitalist 
governments increasingly approached privatisation, defined as transfer of 
control of activities from a public agency to the private sector, with a new 
confidence, laying the foundations for a major global economic 
phenomenon of the 1990s (Guislain, 1997: 1-6, 10-12). Although 
governments continue to rely on their military to protect borders and 
pursue vital interests, together with privatisation of range of services 
including healthcare, education, telecommunication, transport, banking, 
postal services, and energy, privatisation of military and security services 
(military outsourcing1) has become one example of a much broader trend 
of global privatisation that was introduced within the new international 
system (Savas, 2000).  
                                                        
1 ‘Outsourcing‘ (also known as ‘contracting out‘) refers to obtaining goods or a service by 
contract from an outside supplier (Oxford dictionaries, no date a). ‘Military and security 
privatisation’ (also known as ‘Contingency contracting‘) refers to a process of obtaining 
goods, services, and construction from commercial sources via contracting means in 
support of contingency operations. Contracts used in a contingency are for professional 
services that are directly or indirectly linked to warfare and include theatre support, 
systems support, and external support contracts (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014: I-2-3; 
Krahmann 2010: 1-2). 
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As a body of privately owned companies, Private Military and 
Security Industry (PMSI) 2 provides military and security services, 
including information services, logistics, reconstruction, and security 
services in conflict zones (Thibault et al. 2009: 3; Perlo-Freeman and 
Sköns 2008: 1). Emerging through the diversification of established arms-
producing companies into military services, or as brand new specialist 
military services companies, the PMSI represents a rapidly expanding 
segment of the arms-industry preoccupied with the provision of services 
to meet a wide range of military and non-military needs (Perlo-Freeman 
and Sköns, 2008: 12). For more than three decades now, the US 
Department of Defense (DOD) has delegated a vast variety of its function 
to contractors rather than hire government employees (Bruneau, 2011: 3). 
Nowadays, dominated by the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) 
companies, the security landscape in many countries around the world is 
populated by hundreds of companies working for governments, 
international institutions, corporations and non-governmental 
organizations providing them the assistance they need. 
These companies frequently find their business opportunities 
working with and for states and non-state actors engaged in relief, 
reconstruction and recovery efforts, often in circumstances of weakened 
governance where the rule of law has been undermined due to human 
actions or natural disasters. Having to operate in such unstable and 
                                                        
2 The Private Military and Security Industry comprises of body of privately owned 
companies which provide military and security services that include information services 
(information technology and equipment maintenance), logistics (facilities management 
and operational support logistics),  reconstruction, and  security services in conflict zones.  
(Perlo-Freeman and Sköns, 2008: 4-7) 
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dangerous environments, a small proportion of these companies has 
specialised in providing security services in support of humanitarian, 
diplomatic, and military efforts, and protecting commercial activities 
including rebuilding of infrastructure. Although very few companies are 
willing to engage in any sort of activity resembling actual combat 
operations, they are often seen as problematic and perceived with deep 
suspicion due to their superficial similarities with mercenaries (Kinsey, 
2009; Singer, 2007; Kinsey, 2006; Avant, 2005; Leander, 2005).  
The great political theorist Niccolo Machiavelli famously wrote in 
1513 that mercenaries are dangerous and not to be trusted; a perception 
that is invoked again in current literature on PMSI (Bruneau, 2011: 109). 
Following the 2003 US invasion, these negative perceptions of the industry 
were reinforced by reported instances of wrongful behaviour during the 
occupation in Iraq. The torture of Abu Ghraib prisoners, involving 
contractors from CACI International Inc. and Titan Corporation, and the 
infamous 2007 shooting of 17 innocent Iraqi civilians in Nisour Square, 
Baghdad, have for many become the embodiment of the image of the 
whole industry.  
Nevertheless, the PMSI is a very diverse and complex object of 
analysis encompassing a wide variety of types of services, including base 
support, security, linguist services, construction, transportation, 
logistics/maintenance, communication and training (Schwartz and Swain 
2011: 16; Thibault et al. 2009: 3).  Although often referred to as a 
homogenous unity, it is clear that such an understanding is only 
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theoretical and disregards the important variety within the industry. 
Based on the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) reports, in the 
case of Phase IV Operations3 in Iraq from May 2003-December 2011, the 
multi-billion dollar PMSI supported the US military with services in all of 
these areas. In fact, despite the hype about armed security contactors, the 
CENTCOM reports show that in reality the majority of the assignments 
outsourced by the US military lay in the category of base support, that 
typically involves mundane tasks such as cooking or cleaning for US 
military forces (Thibault et al., 2011: 23).  
In terms of numbers, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 
August 2008 reported that the ratio of contractors to military personnel 
was about one-to-one (Contractors’ Support of US Operations in Iraq, 
2008: 13). Although the deployment of non-military, non-American 
support force along with US troops in military operations is nothing new 
and has been the adopted practice of the US government continuously 
since 1776, the extent of the involvement of the industry as the second 
largest member of the Coalition of the Willing after the US military, and the 
sheer scale of its involvement meant that Iraq was the most extensive 
representation of the military-outsourcing trend in a conflict zone in 
recent decades (Thibault et al., 2009: 3; Sperling, 2009: 187-188; Avant, 
2005: 8). Even using the Pentagon’s lower estimate, contractors provided 
                                                        
3 Phase IV Operations, also known as stability or transition operations, are complex, 
multifaceted, hybrid civilian-military operations, as exemplified in the aftermath of US-led 
invasions in Afghanistan 2001-2014 and Iraq 2003-2011. Defined as activities conducted 
after decisive combat operations, although while significant fighting can still occur, their 
purpose is to stabilize and reconstruct the area of operations (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2014: V-5-9). 
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three times more armed personnel than was the number of British troops, 
the third largest force contribution (Cameron, 2006: 546). 
In addition to bringing more manpower on the ground, contractors 
also constituted over 25 per cent of those killed in action in Iraq, which 
reduced the political resources required to maintain public support for the 
conflict (Hammes, 2011: 28). Indeed, between January and June 2010, 
more contractors died in Iraq and Afghanistan than US military troops 
(Schooner and Swan, 2010: 16-18). In regards to these reports, it is 
important to add that contractors casualties were not reported through 
DOD, but the Department of Labour (DoL), which reported only the deaths 
that resulted in insurance claims. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the 
full number of killed contractors is unknown and most likely higher that 
reported (Hammes, 2011: 28).  Because they bore such a large proportion 
in terms of their support to the US military efforts and the ultimate 
sacrifice, it is not unreasonable to assume that their presence and 
activities made a difference to the US military capability to pursue Phase 
IV Operations in Iraq. Hence, the interest of this thesis is to answer the 
research question: ‘What kind of contribution have the presence and 
activities of the PMSI made to the US military capability to pursue Phase IV 
Operations in Iraq from May 2003-December 2011, from the declaration 
of Mission Accomplished until the withdrawal of the US military from 
Iraq?’ 
There are three main reasons why this issue is worth studying: 
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Firstly, there is the magnitude and versatility of the industry. The 
PMSI comprises hundreds of companies operating worldwide, and 
working for governments, international institutions and corporations to 
provide combat support, including training and intelligence provision, 
operational support, strategic planning and consultancy, technical 
assistance, post-conflict reconstruction and a wide range of security 
provision (Mathieu and Dearden, 2006: 2; Stanger and Williams, 2006: 6-
7). The sheer range of the industry suggests that it is likely to be involved 
across various types of military, humanitarian, non-governmental and 
commercial activities and its presence is to be noted in more than just one 
crisis management situation. Rather, it is fully embedded in how the 
international system works both in times of crises and relative peace.  
Secondly, while there is an increasing trend in military spending of 
most central European and some Nordic countries, in most western 
European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and others), there is 
a growing pressure to use the private sector due to the continuing focus on 
austerity and deficit reduction policies (Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, 2015: 7). With reference to the UK and the US as the 
fore-runners of military and security privatisation, the long term trend of 
reliance on private providers for aspects of their defence policies has 
become deeply embedded in the way both countries operate (Krahmann, 
2010: 84-155; Isenberg, 2009: 43-49). It is sensible to believe that the 
volatile security situation in many parts of the world provides an endless 
number of potential future international crises and, at the same time, 
employment and growth opportunities for the highly flexible and easily 
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adaptable global industry (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, 2015: 7).  
Thirdly, even though the industry has been the focus of an intensive 
media campaign and there have been some excellent books written by 
academics on the subject, there is still a lot that remains unknown about 
the companies and the industry in general. Even some basic questions, 
such as what these companies do, who runs them, how they work 
internally and what impact they create, remains unclear. It is the 
combination of these three reasons that makes the research topic of this 
thesis timely and relevant to the current global security environment.  
This thesis has the ambition to provide an account of the ways in 
which the presence and activities of the PMSI made a difference to the US 
military capability in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. This will help to provide 
realistic expectations as to likely contribution in future endeavours. 
Designed around the assumption that their involvement alongside US 
military troops is based on the DOD contract management process, it is 
believed that through the very same process it can be shaped or altered 
(increased or limited) to suit the aims of a similar operation in the future. 
By highlighting the factors that influence or shape the contribution the 
industry makes, greater certainty about its behaviour and activities would 
provide guidance for policy makers in regards to how to employ them in 
the future to get the desired benefit, harmonize mutual expectations 
between contractors and policy makers and help policymakers make 
informed choices. The ultimate aim of this research is to provide an 
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analytical tool that would help to maximise the degree of conformity 
between the expectations of the benefits of using contractors and their 
actual contribution.  
The rest of the introductory chapter is further divided into the 
following sections. The section entitled ‘Aim and Research Questions’ 
describes the main objectives and identifies the main and subsidiary 
research questions that this thesis seeks to answer. The ‘Methodology’ 
section presents the methodology for conducting the research and 
identifies three data sources to ensure the maximum validity and 
reliability of the research outcome.  The section on data explains the range 
of sources of information, including primary and secondary textual 
resources, interviews, and personal testimonies of Iraq veterans, 
consulted for the purpose of this research project. ‘Contributions of the 
Study’ presents the areas that this research seeks to add to in terms of 
scholarly writing, as well as its practical value as policy advice. Finally, 
‘Thesis outline’ provides a detailed guidance of the thesis content 
highlighting the logical order of the subsequent chapters. 
 
I.I. Aim and Research Questions  
The scholarly literature on the presence and activities of the PMSI 
in modern warfare is rich, but at times also chaotic and difficult to 
navigate. Although the US military has a long history of relying on 
supporting elements in its expeditionary operations, many basic questions 
about the nature of the industry remain unanswered. This research project 
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seeks to build on the available scholarly writings by addressing an 
important but under-investigated aspect of the industry - its contribution 
in Phase IV Operations in Iraq 2003-2011. In order to do so, the thesis 
organizes the overwhelming amount of data from government reports and 
audits in a logical and coherent manner and provides lenses to better 
understand the issues that have been touched on in other studies of 
security contracting. To this end, it designs an original approach to 
determine the contribution of PMSI in Phase IV Operations in Iraq that 
goes beyond a simplistic black-and-white (positive versus negative) 
assessment. Instead, this research project is concerned with the PMSI, as a 
foreign policy tool, and its contribution as a form of engagement within a 
strategy whose achievement it is meant to facilitate. 
 
This thesis comprises three research objectives: 
The primary objective is to problematize the concept of 
contribution and develop a useful framework applicable to the Phase IV 
operations in Iraq from 2003-2011, which would enable a systematic and 
effective evaluation of the PMSI contribution. For this purpose, this thesis 
develops a Conceptual Framework, in chapter 4, offering a range of five 
different contribution categories - Assistant, Implementer, Crucial 
Supporter, Driver and Spoiler - to guide a better understanding of the 
contractors’ involvement on that unique occasion.  
A secondary objective is to investigate and contribute to the 
knowledge and understanding of the military outsourcing trend in modern 
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US strategy. Using the military concept of the Phase IV Operations and 
looking at the US institutional incentives as well as the operational needs 
for the use of contractors in Iraq, this thesis pays close attention to both 
the industry as a whole and the rich variety of contractors and their 
peculiar services found within.  
The tertiary objective is to demonstrate that research on the 
contribution of the PMSI in a particular military operation which must 
take in account the broader context within which it takes place and 
evolves. This analysis seeks to better integrate the areas of modern US 
military capability, the specificities of modern military interventions, and 
abilities and resources the PMSI offers as three interrelated fields for 
understanding not only how, but also why, private actors gained such 
prominence in the US operations in Iraq. To provide a better 
understanding of the recent development towards intensified military 
privatisation in US expeditionary operations, a broader perspective where 
the contribution of PMSI is seen as a reflection of the nature of the 
relationship between the military strategic aims and its available means, is 
placed at the forefront of the investigation. To achieve this aim, the 
following questions will guide the investigation. 
The primary research question is: ‘What kind of contribution have 
the presence and activities of the PMSI made to the US military capability 
to pursue the Phase IV Operations in Iraq from May 2003-December 2011, 
i.e. from the declaration of Mission Accomplished until the withdrawal of 
the US military from Iraq?’ 
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The subsidiary research questions serve to both provide answers 
for the elements of the primary research objective and present detailed 
empirical evidence for a credible contribution story.  
The subsidiary research questions are: 
1) ‘Did contractors provide services that can be considered ‘main 
contribution’ or only ‘additional contribution’’? 
The framework distinguishes between two levels of contribution – 
main contribution and additional contribution. The logic behind this 
distinction is based on the assumption that the additional contributions do 
not have the potential to have a detrimental impact on the US military 
capability to achieve the strategic goal of the mission, but they have both 
positive and negative impacts on the implementation of the strategy how 
to achieve its strategic goal. 
 
Table 1 – Contribution Level 
 
 
2) ‘What was the difference that the presence and activities of the 
contractors have made on the size of the deployable force, mission's 
available timeframe, desired objectives, and strategic goal in the given 
context?’ 
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Through assessment of the significance of a particular type of 
service or a set of services needed for the execution of US military strategy 
in Iraq, the thesis differentiates between  
 ‘optional additional services, which were replaceable with 
no or minor changes to non-core aspects of the strategy ’,  
 ‘essential additional services, which were replaceable with 
major changes to non-core aspects of the strategy’,  
 ‘indispensable additional services, which were replaceable 
with major changes to core aspects of the strategy’  
 ‘indispensable main services, which were irreplaceable 
without changing the whole strategy’. 
 
Table 2 - Significance of the Provided Service 
 
3) ‘What was the prevailing value of the service provider's 
contribution in the given context? Did the provider advance or undermine 
the US military capability to achieve its strategic goal?’ 
In this regard the thesis differentiates between a constructive 
contribution (advancing the US strategy) and a destructive contribution 
(undermining the US strategy). 
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Table 3 - Prevailing Value of Provider’s Contribution 
 
Based on the analysis framed by the above mentioned research 
questions, this thesis argues that the PMSI, through its robust sustainment 
capability, became a major supporting tool in the hands of the US 
administration – ‘Crucial Supporter’ – effectively enabling it to endure an 
eight-years-long mission that was otherwise politically and operationally 
unsustainable. This research explores how the US government took 
advantage of the contractors in order to mitigate the consequences of a 
foreign policy fiasco in Iraq and utilized their support to bring its troops to 
a dignified exit. 
The aim of this research is neither to promote, nor dismiss, the 
private industry or its individual companies. Instead, the goal is to 
demonstrate that the increased reliance and dependence on PMSI in the 
US foreign policy context is by no means inevitable or irreversible. Instead, 
it highlights the inherently political nature of the decision to contract out 
the sustainment of the US Phase IV operations to the private sector to 
avoid the full weight of the consequences of an ill-planned mission.   
In order to provide a complete picture of military outsourcing in 
Iraq, this thesis adopts a simplified approach of looking at the problem 
through three different perspectives – the overall industry view discussed 
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in relation to the Weinberger-Powell4  (WP) doctrine principles to guide a 
successful US military intervention (Private Military and Security 
Industry); the largest group among the types of services (Base Support 
Contractors); and the most controversial type of service (Armed Security 
Contractors). 
Although, the overall industry level does not make part of the 
empirical chapters, it provides a context and an institutional perspective 
onto the many issues discussed in greater detail in the ensuing empirical 
chapters. In particular, it discusses the PMSI and the feasibility of the 
campaign on the whole, and explores the broader strategic implications 
that drove the planning and execution of the campaign. The chapter 
further argues that the industry effectively allowed the US to sustain its 
military presence for eight years without either resorting to the draft or 
leaving Iraq in the midst of a civil war. Using the WP doctrine as a set of 
guiding principles for the use of military force established in wake of the 
Vietnam War, it demonstrates that while failing on each of the WP doctrine 
tenets, the US avoided what would have been an outright fiasco due to the 
extensive reliance on the industry. 
In the empirical chapter on the base support contractors and their 
contribution in Phase IV Operations in Iraq, this thesis explores the variety 
of functions and responsibilities delegated to the industry in the area of 
facilities management that became the backbone of the US operations in 
                                                        
4 The Weinberger-Powell doctrine (known also as Powell doctrine), named after General 
Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1989-1993), is an integrated body of 
thought relying on six elements that extrapolate how and under what circumstances the 
United States ought to commit itself  and its military forces to war (Powell, 1992/93). 
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Iraq.  This chapter concludes that due to the specific requirements of this 
type of operations, base support contractors proved an indispensable and 
irreplaceable asset – Crucial Supporter - of the operations, which allowed 
the US military to devote its available force to other functions, deemed 
more appropriate for military troops. 
In the chapter on Armed Private Security Contractors and their 
contribution, this thesis looks into the most-controversial aspect of the US 
military outsourcing in Iraq - armed contractors. Through the 
examinations of their activities, the chapter discusses the ‘cowboy’ 
stereotype of armed contractors and argues that despite all the 
controversy associated with their presence in Iraq, they were an 
indispensable and irreplaceable asset - Crucial Supporter - of the US 
military efforts.  
 
I.II. Methodology  
The main task of this section is to outline the methodological 
choices behind the empirical part of the thesis. In order to do that, it will 
present the basic techniques employed to collect and analyse the data 
required to answer the research questions. In addition, it will discuss 
potential problems linked to the methodological choices and describe how 
to mitigate them. 
This study addresses the main research question by adopting a 
descriptive and explanatory approach, which are concerned with 
descriptions and explanations of the PMSI’s contribution in the Iraq 
16 
 
context. According to Sandra Halperin and Oliver Heath, a descriptive 
approach serves to describe the characteristics of something or how 
something works or behaves, while an explanatory approach is used to 
explain what factors or conditions are causally connected to a known 
outcome (Halperin and Heath, 2012: 116-117). For the purpose of this 
thesis, the descriptive approach is required to answer the research 
questions enquiring the type of relationship dynamics between the US 
military strategy and the PMSI. Similarly, the explanatory approach is 
required to answer the research questions enquiring why that relationship 
dynamic exists in the first place. The combination of the two approaches 
serves to provide a deeper insight into both the characteristics of the 
nature of the contribution of PMSI in Phase IV Operations in Iraq, and also 
why a certain contribution characterisation is more appropriate than the 
others in a given context.  
In terms of data-gathering strategies, the empirical part of the 
projects relies primarily on a qualitative analysis of textual sources and an 
exploration of central themes and concepts relevant to the issue of 
military and security privatisation through semi-structured elite 
interviews and publicly available video testimonies of US veterans.  The 
qualitative research strategy has been chosen as preferred strategy due to 
the nature of the research topic, the specific aim of the research question 
and the character of the conceptual research framework which rely on 
examination and interpretation of the available data. To explain these 
choices in more detail, the following sections will deal individually with 
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the issues of case selection, data availability and collection, and data 
sources and analysis.  
 
I.II.I. Case Selection  
The empirical part of the thesis is a single-case study of military 
outsourcing by the US administration in Iraq during the Phase IV 
Operations, delineated by the statement of Mission Accomplished by 
President Bush on May 1st 2003 on one side, and the withdrawal of US 
military troops from Iraq in December 2011 on the other. It focuses on the 
issue of the contribution, examining the relationship dynamics between 
the US administration and the PMSI that was to support the US military 
forces on their operations in Iraq.  
There are several arguments that justify the choice of Phase IV 
Operations in Iraq as the sole case of this project. The Iraq War has been 
seen as a pivotal moment for the emerging industry (Kinsey, 2009; 
Alexandra et al., 2008; Perlo-Freeman and Sköns, 2008; Singer, 2007; 
Singer, 2003). The heavy reliance on the private military and security 
industry to provide support to armed forces and enable reconstruction in 
such a complex environment provides a unique insight into the dynamics 
of the relationship between the US administration and the PMSI as 
commercial actors in US foreign policy application. Furthermore, due to its 
notoriety, this case has potential to directly or indirectly influence the 
perception of the desirability, utility and legitimacy of this practice among 
other states and organisations in the future. 
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In addition, the focus on the US approach to military privatisation 
in Iraq makes good sense since the United States is the largest purchaser 
of defence equipment and services and its defence budget associated with 
contractor spending is the largest in the world, accounting for 
approximately 50 percent of global procurement spending (Schwartz et 
al., 2015: 3-11). In respect to the Phase IV Operations in Iraq, many of the 
largest and most successful Private Military and Security Companies 
(PMSCs) engaged there were of British or American origin, and they 
emerged as a response to market demands dictated by the US involvement 
(Singer, 2003: 75, 243-248). Hence, exploring military outsourcing in Iraq 
bears significance beyond the case study itself and uncovers valuable 
insights about military outsourcing as a foreign policy tool, as well as the 
industry as a body of private actors operating in complex security 
environments. 
 On the other hand, a few arguments could be raised against the 
case of Iraq as a strategic choice case study for the purpose of this thesis. It 
may be argued, for instance, that Iraq is an exception and that many 
aspects of military outsourcing are unique to the circumstances of the case 
and therefore unlikely to reoccur in the future. However, this is one of the 
reasons this research focuses on Iraq. It is the adopted view that one case 
cannot be representative and its specific characteristics do not translate 
well to other similar cases. Yet, the choice of Iraq as a unique case study is 
justifiable because developing a general conclusion about the contribution 
of PMSI based on a single one case is not desirable anyway.  
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The debate on military outsourcing is often highly polarised 
between contractors as technical and military experts versus incompetent 
cowboys; professional businessmen versus exploiting war profiteers; 
noble humanitarians versus uncontrolled abusers, or proud patriots 
versus dirty mercenaries (Kruck and Spencer, 2013; Brooks, 2000). 
Images of private contractors often tend towards extremes – military 
outsourcing as either good or bad; either desirable, or undesirable; 
economically effective, or ineffective, clouding a deeper understanding of 
the grey area in between (Avant, 2005: 254). As a result of these simplified 
classifications, many aspects of military outsourcing remain poorly 
understood. The aim of this research is to remedy this deficiency by 
highlighting the versatility and variety within the PMSI, rather than 
offering polarised denominations of it.  
It may be suggested that examining more than one case (e.g. adding 
Afghanistan) would remedy at least some of these drawbacks of a single 
case study, and create a comparative study that would be more revealing 
in terms of how the nature of the contribution changes under different 
circumstances. This is a valid point. A comparative approach might 
provide a different insight into the issue of relationship dynamics between 
the US military strategy and the contribution of PMSI, but it would also 
mean significant time constraints for each case and less detailed analysis 
as a result. As such, a comparative study using a similar approach could be 
the subject of future research building onto the thesis. As a result, 
focussing on the contribution of PMSI within the single case of Iraq is the 
preferred strategy in spite of acknowledging the above shortcomings. It 
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provides an opportunity to build a more comprehensive picture of military 
and security privatisation based on a case that is unique and an important 
instance of a large scale private sector involvement in long-term 
sustainment of US expeditionary operations. 
 
I.II.II. Data Availability and Collection  
There are many obstacles to systematic research on military and 
security privatisation that limit the range of viable methodological choices 
(Berndtsson, 2009: 19-24; Kinsey, 2009: 191; Kinsey, 2006: viii, 1-8, 196; 
Singer, 2003: viii-x). Firstly, secrecy, sensitivity and confidentiality are key 
characteristics of the private military and security industry and PMSCs are 
excluded from the transparency required of government agencies, 
although the vast majority of their income comes from these agencies, who 
are also their main clients. Their internal records, policies and documents 
are considered private property and the Freedom of Information Act does 
not apply to them, unlike government agencies and the US military. In 
consequence, even basic issues such as the number, size and structure of 
companies, as well as the specific contents of business contracts, remain 
often inaccessible (Ibid.).  
Some of these gaps have been seemingly bridged in the recent years 
by extensive reporting of many old as well as newly-created federal 
institutions and mechanisms to carry out audits and investigations into 
this matter. To name just a few, the allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse 
by contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan prompted the Congress to create 
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the Special Inspector General or Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) in late 2003; 
the independent Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
Management in Expeditionary Operations (Gansler Commission), named 
after its chair, Jacques S. Gansler, in 2007; followed by Commission on 
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC) in 2008. In addition, 
other already established research and oversight bodies, including 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 
and Congressional Research Service (CRS), started to focus their attention 
on this issue which resulted in a considerable stream of audits, reports 
and analytical studies.  
Despite all the significant effort, it must be stressed that the 
available data creates more questions than it provides answers. Bruneau 
(2011: 108) pointed out, that the difficulty of getting reliable data and then 
organizing it in a way that facilitates meaningful analysis impedes making 
sense of the contracting phenomenon. As it will be stressed repeatedly 
throughout this thesis, while data appears to be available in abundance at 
least in recent years, its reliability and verifiability is problematic. The 
biggest issues with the available data can be summarised in three points. 
Firstly, contractors are private businesses and government 
transparency rules do not apply to them. As profit-making businesses, to 
succeed, they must be entrepreneurial and hence are very sensitive about 
releasing commercial information into the public domain (Kinsey, 2006: 
2). Secondly, the post-Cold war military privatisation is a fairly recent and 
evolving phenomenon and the nature of the industry, the way it operates 
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and the swift expansion in the past decades has exceeded the available 
mechanisms of oversight (Berndtsson, 2009: 15). In addition, as these 
companies may take on whatever mission they seem fit, it is problematic 
to make comparisons between the companies, their activities, or draw any 
meaningful general conclusions about them (Ibid.). The contractors’ 
business responses to supply and demand of the market and adapts its 
areas of activity accordingly to where and when it sees opportunity. In 
addition, each contractor offers different services, which are diverse and 
extremely dynamic, and whole companies are sold and acquired 
depending on market forces. A single contractor may well have 
programmes in different places around the world, providing different 
services for different customers at the same time. With hundreds of PMSCs 
based both in the United States and around the world, it is extremely 
difficult to keep track of industry trends and developments. 
Even looking at the most prominent ones, such as Olive Security, 
Erinys International, Rubicon, and Control Risks Group, which secured 
large contracts to provide security in Iraq, they represent only the tip of 
the iceberg as most of the companies which acquired large contracts in 
Iraq subcontracted dozens of smaller firms to assist them with completing 
the work. The CBO report, ‘Contractor’s Support of US Operations in Iraq’ 
from August 2008, highlights the complex issue of coordinating the huge 
variety of contractors across a number of different areas. The authors of 
the report, based on the data available to them, conclude that they cannot 
determine the numbers of contractors or classify the functions provided 
by about one-fifth of obligations for contracts performed in the Iraq 
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theatre over the 2003-2007 period (Congressional Budget Office, 2008: 7). 
As they explain, it is due to the fact that hundreds of different firms 
employ tens of thousands of people of various nationalities to work on 
dynamic contract work assignments that continually awarded and 
completed. In addition, many of the prime contractors subcontract 
significant segments of their contracts to other companies and this process 
of subcontracting may run several tiers deep, further decentralizing the 
administration of the contract and obscuring the accurate account of the 
contractor personnel, their whereabouts and responsibilities (Ibid.: 8). 
Although this clearly weakens the reliability and verifiability of the 
collected data in the publically available reports, the Iraq mission was 
after all an expeditionary mission requiring contingency contracting. That 
means that it was given by the circumstances of the mission that the 
contract work took place in problematic, dynamic, and very complicated 
environment that was characterised by high levels of violence and where 
high level of flexibility and adaptability was crucial. The overview of such 
contracts administration is, therefore, by definition an uneasy endeavour 
and as many experts observed, in the case of Iraq, the overall contract 
management process simply failed. 
DoD was severely handicapped at managing oversight by lacking 
both in terms of the required number of personnel and their core 
competencies. The Gansler Commission report highlighted that while the 
workload for the contract management workforce increased sevenfold in 
the workload since 1990s, the actual workforce to handle the huge change 
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remained practically the same (Commission on Army Acquisition and 
Program Management in Expeditionary Operations (Gansler Commission), 
2007: 30). As the report further elaborates, the overwhelming majority of 
contract managers were civilians whose deployment to areas of ongoing 
violence is much more difficult than of the military personnel (Ibid.: 35-
38). According to the Gansler report, this miscalculation resulted in the 
situation that most of the contract managers supposedly overseeing the 
contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where doing so from their offices in the 
United States (Ibid.).  
Thirdly, there is no single source of verifiable data.  As Kinsey 
(2006: 2) points out, accurate statistics in regards to the nature of the 
PMSI is non-existent. This concern has been echoed in many other 
scholarly publications and government papers. This is largely assigned to 
the fact that obtaining information about PMC abroad is difficult and often 
unreliable. Most reported numbers are mere estimates and, therefore all 
the attempts to quantify the market have been tentative at most (Ibid). 
 
I.II.III. Data Sources and Analysis 
Two central concepts in research are validity and reliability. 
Validity means that correct practices have been undertaken in order to 
answers a research question and reliability refers to the quality of such 
practices that enable repeatability and accuracy verification (Halperin and 
Heath 2012: 166-167). As mentioned earlier, hypothesis testing and 
evaluation is difficult due to the current status of limited data availability 
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and quality, and more research into access to valid and reliable data is 
needed. Although many excellent studies on the nature and logic of 
privatisation and its potential consequences have been written in recent 
years, many basic questions remain unanswered. 
This thesis seeks to develop a theoretical and empirical 
understanding of the nature of the contribution of military outsourcing, 
focussing on two different types of services. By this, it seeks to generate 
new insights into basic dynamics of the relationship among the US 
government, US military and contractors, and highlight the factors that 
shape it. Acknowledging the problematic status of data in this field, this 
thesis does not seek to test causality. However, it discusses potential 
impact and effects of military privatisation on stability operations, which 
are acknowledged to be necessarily preliminary and tentative.  
The sources drawn upon in this project may be divided into three 
main types:  documents, interviews, and video testimonies of Iraq 
veterans.  
This project draws on a wide variety primary textual sources: 
 official documents and reports produced by various state 
agencies and nominated authorities, including the Coalition of Provisional 
Authority (CPA), Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), United States Central 
Command (CENTCOM);  
 records from proceedings in the US Congress and its various 
committees; 
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 reports, hearings and analytical studies by a wide range of 
research and oversight bodies, including Commission on Wartime 
Contracting (CWC), Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), Government Accountability Office (GAO), Special 
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), U.S. Department of 
State Office of Inspector General, USAID Office of Inspector General, and 
U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General; 
In addition to these, international legal documents, including the 
Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions, have been used. Also, this study uses information from 
numerous US research institutions, such as the Brookings Institute, 
Federation of American Scientists and RAND Corporation, since they 
provide key insights into the area and most of their publications are 
publicly available online.  
The secondary sources that support the analysis in this thesis, 
include newspaper and magazine articles, material published online and 
reports from NGOs. They often serve to provide the background 
information of particular events in order to offer additional viewpoints 
and to fill in some of the gaps and omissions in the primary documents, 
interviews and video testimony data.  Such sources have been used to 
provide a fuller picture of the background of the Iraq War, its 
development, the US military strategy in Iraq, as well as particular events 
involving contractors on the ground. As such, these sources complement 
the data available in the primary resources by providing further details 
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and offering various alternative perspectives on how to interpret the 
primary data.  
As Kinsey (2006: 6) pointed out, many sources reporting on PMSI 
in a conflict zone are heavily biased and their credibility as sources is 
questionable. Therefore, it has been the utmost priority and adopted 
practice of this research project to carefully select sources and check them 
against each other to avoid biased or untrue information. As such, this 
project relies on multiple sources of data and methods of data collection to 
approach the research problem from different angles. Known as 
‘triangulation’, this approach was adopted primarily to increase the 
reliability of both the data and the process of gathering it (Halperin and 
Heath, 2012: 177-178). Hence, in addition to primary and secondary 
textual sources, data have been collected from different sources such as 
the semi-structured elite-interviews and Iraq Veterans Against the War 
(IVAW) video testimonies. 
In terms of interviews, the basic idea was to conduct a smaller 
number of in-depth interviews with people knowledgeable about PMSI 
and the services it provides.5 The majority of the interviews have been 
with individuals placed in unique positions to provide an elaborate insight 
based on their personal experience. Firstly, these interviews served as 
sources of information on how the companies worked and how the 
process of military privatisation developed on the ground. Secondly, they 
provided insights into how the interviewees themselves viewed and 
                                                        
5 The list of the interviewees consulted for the purpose of this research, including their 
formal affiliation and the date of the interview, can be found in the Appendix A. 
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understood the contribution of PMSI within the US strategy based on their 
unique point of view, often based on a first-hand experience. To avoid 
unethical treatment of interviewees, this project has followed the ethical 
guidelines outlined by the Social Research Association (SRA) (Social 
Research Association, 2003: 52-55). Guided by the four main principles of 
information6, consent7, confidentiality8 and usage9, this research has taken 
the utmost precaution in treating the interviewees in accordance with 
these ethical guidelines (Halperin and Heath 2012: 178-180). 
Another valuable source of data were unedited, video-recorded 
personal testimonies of US veterans who spoke about their experiences 
during the Iraq War and the War in Afghanistan at the three-day event 
Winter Soldier: Iraq & Afghanistan - Iraq Veterans Against the War in 
March 2008.10 In particular, eighteen individual testimonies stand out in 
regards to Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the veterans’ individual 
experiences with how these were understood and upheld during their 
tours in Iraq. 11 These testimonies are used in order to obtain the difficult 
to get hold of personal accounts of the reality of warfare, and are treated 
as substitute for personal interview with Iraq veterans.  
                                                        
6 Prospective interviewees should be given detailed information about the project, its 
purpose and the terms of their participation before they are asked to participate in the 
study (Social Research Association, 2003: 52-55). 
7 Prospective interviewees reserve the right to decline participation in the study. 
Prospective interviewees should also be informed about their right to drop out of the study 
at any point if they wish (Ibid.). 
8 Ethically sensitive information about interviewees should be treated as confidential 
(Ibid.). 
9 The information about persons collected for research may be only used in research and 
not for commercial or other purposes (Ibid.). 
10 Transcripts of the testimonies are available in Iraq Veterans Against the War and Glantz 
(2008). 
11 The list of the Iraq Veterans Against the War, including their formal affiliation, can be 
found in the Appendix B. 
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Although this research project has sought to ensure the best 
methodological approach in terms of compiling and analysing data on the 
issue, it is possible that generating more primary data through extended 
field research during Phase IV Operations in Iraq, including observation 
and more in-depth interviews, would have provided additional insights 
into the matter. Such an approach was not possible as at the time of the 
beginning of the project in autumn 2011, the US military was in the last 
stages of its withdrawal from Iraq. In any case, it is apparent that the 
situation on the ground during the Phase IV Operations in Iraq was 
dangerous and would have made such kind of research extremely risky, if 
not impossible.  
 
I.III. Contributions of the Study  
In academia one of the areas of growing importance is policy 
engagement and practical-impact potential of research (Gerring 2001: 
251). While not every academic study will have direct policy relevance, 
social science research should seek to contribute to provide answers to 
issues of pressing concern that both citizens and policy makers care about 
(Ibid). This research project is driven by such ambition and seeks to 
deliver a timely analysis merging three highly relevant themes of 
international politics in the twenty-first century – military outsourcing, 
Phase IV Operations and the US-led war in Iraq 2003-2011.  
While there are vast resources on contingency contracting, the 
practical challenges and opportunities for the use of PMSI remain a vastly 
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under-developed area.  Building on the research on PMSI in military 
operations, the thesis aims to advance this research and focuses on a more 
specific aspect of modern military operations – Phase IV Operations. It 
seeks to bring attention to PSMI’s contribution in Iraq 2003 – 2011, as 
example of an occasion when stability operations ran simultaneously 
along combat operations and the contracted force represented the second 
largest manpower on the ground (Mandel 2012: 13; Avant 2005: 8).  
In this respect, this work provides leaders, policy planners and 
operational commanders with a practical and innovative contribution to a 
vast, but unsystematic, scholarly field of military privatisation. It seeks to 
provide a coherent picture of what the contribution of PMSI was in the 
Phase IV Operations in Iraq and how the understanding of these entities 
can be further developed. It extends the understanding how theoretically, 
as well as practically, PMSI’s contribution can be shaped, acknowledging 
the threats and opportunities that arise from military outsourcing as a 
foreign policy tool in complex expeditionary operations. 
Since national armies seem no longer capable of independently 
dealing with some of the man-made crises of failed states and large-scale 
civilian violence, a knowledgeable approach to use of PMSI is not only 
desirable, but imperative. As the idea that the key players in the military 
privatisation business (US and UK) would abandon privatisation in the 
near future seems unlikely, academic research is especially important, 
since there is abundant information with little thorough analysis or deeper 
understanding of it. This work has the potential to speak to the military, 
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policy-makers, academics and general public, highlighting the perils and 
benefits of military outsourcing that has already become a widespread 
reality.  
The general applicability of the research findings might be a 
potential limitation. This thesis acknowledges that the focus on a single 
case in order to provide a detailed, in depth-knowledge of military 
outsourcing in Iraq cannot yield conclusions with general applicability to 
other cases. Embracing this potential limitation, this study does not seek 
to provide a formula for complex Phase IV Operations in the future 
acknowledging the uniqueness of each conflict’s dynamics. Instead, it is 
the Conceptual Framework which can serve as a transferable tool to 
provide an insight into the dynamics of the relationship between the PMSI 
and states on an individual basis.  
 
I.IV. Thesis Outline 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters that together form the 
theoretical part (Part I) and the empirical part (Part II). Part I consists of 
the Introduction, Research Context, Literature Review and Conceptual 
Framework. Part II consists of three empirical chapters – The Institutional 
Factors Shaping the PMSI Contribution to Phase IV Operations in Iraq; 
Base Support Contractors and Their Contribution to Phase IV Operations 
in Iraq; and Armed Security Contractors and Their Contribution to Phase 
IV Operations in Iraq – and Conclusion.  
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In Part I, so far, the Introduction chapter has introduced the 
military and security privatisation trend and has outlined the research 
questions that this thesis answers in the following chapters. In addition, it 
has outlined the conceptual basis of the ensuing analysis, the thesis’ 
methodology, case selection, data availability and sources, and, last but not 
least, the contributions of the study. Chapter II, Research Context, places 
the research question at the intersection of three broad areas – military 
outsourcing, Phase IV Operations and US strategy in Iraq. It highlights the 
most important elements of these themes to be brought forward in the 
analysis within the subsequent chapters.  Chapter III reviews the scholarly 
literature on military and security privatisation until today and delineates 
how the issue of the PMSI contribution has been investigated and 
highlights potential weaknesses of prior research. Subsequently, chapter 
IV develops a framework for understanding the contribution of the PMSI 
in the US Phase IV Operations that incorporates observing four critical 
features of how the PMSI could have made a difference to the US capability 
on the ground. These four features, which lie at the core of the proposed 
Conceptual Framework are: the size of deployable force, available 
timeframe, desired objectives, and desired strategic goal of the operations.  
In Part II, Chapter 5, The Institutional Factors Shaping the PMSI 
Contribution to Phase IV Operation in Iraq, traces the origins of the 
political constraints on US military expeditionary operations and how they 
influenced the US operations in Iraq. The Weinberger-Powell doctrine is 
used to highlight some of the most prominent challenges that the US 
military faced as a consequence of the US government ignoring the lessons 
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learned from US foreign policy over the last few decades. The analysis of 
this chapter thus highlights both institutional constraints that govern the 
use of the US military force and how they were circumvent by the heavy 
reliance on the PMSI in support of the PMSI Phase IV Operations.  
Chapter 6, Base Support Contractors and Their Contribution to 
Phase IV Operations in Iraq, examines the contribution made by Base 
Security Contractors to Phase IV Operations in Iraq. It reinforces the 
findings of the previous chapter on US foreign policy constraints and 
assesses in what ways the Base Support Contractors helped to surpass 
them. This chapter breaks away the Base Security Contractors from the 
broad PMSI in order to describe the scope and the explosion in their 
numbers, particularly in Iraq.  
Chapter 7, Armed Security Contractors and Their Contribution to 
Phase IV Operations in Iraq, introduces the category of armed security 
contractors and the specific issues surrounding their presence and 
activities in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. It begins by discussing why their 
category has become so controversial in the context of expeditionary 
operations, and continues by highlighting the scope, causes and 
implications of their presence and activities in Phase IV Operations in Iraq.  
Chapter 8, Conclusion, completes the picture by providing a 
reflection of the conceptual aspects raised in this thesis, along with 
directions for future research in the field of military outsourcing in US 
contingency operations. The evidence, gathered from a rich collection of 
public and private sources, clearly demonstrates that the PMSI has 
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provided the contribution of Crucial Supporter which signifies that it made 
a tremendous difference to the US military capability to pursue Phase IV 
Operations in Iraq following the unexpected unfolding of the events 
following the invasion in 2003. The contention of this thesis is that the 
intensity of the military and security privatisation witnessed in Phase IV 
Operations in Iraq is not an unpredictable instance based on particular 
circumstances of a unique military operation. Instead, it is a 
demonstration of long ongoing developments in the US military capability 
in expeditionary operations that is to become a predominant experience 
rather than rare occasion in the future.   
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II. Research Context 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce three broad themes that 
this research brings together and thus lay the foundations of the empirical 
analysis that is to follow. Sitting at the intersection between Military 
Privatisation in the US, Phase IV Operations and the (Second) Iraq War 
(2003-2011), this research project blends together three highly topical 
themes in the field of international security. Before elaborating on the 
particular details of the individual concepts, a broader overview of how 
they relate to each other is in order. The research question, ‘What kind of 
contribution have the presence and activities of the PMSI made to the US 
military capability to pursue the Phase IV Operations in Iraq from 2003-
2011?’ requires a clear determination of what is understood by the 
individual terms and their mutual interconnectedness. In broad terms, this 
thesis seeks to assess the contribution of a particular instrument (within a 
larger group of instruments) to operations undertaken as part of a broader 
mission. This mission is then defined by its strategic goal whose 
achievement is based on the execution of a strategy based on a strategic 
plan. The following depiction captures the correlations between the 
individual elements of the analysis.  
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Figure 1 – Correlations of the Individual Elements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the depiction above, a strategy, defined as ‘a carefully 
planned method for achieving a particular goal usually over a long period 
of time,’ represents a link between the strategic plan and the strategic goal 
(Merriam-webster.com, no date).  In the military environment, a strategy 
is understood as a sequence of carefully planned actions by military 
command, executed by military forces to meet the enemy in combat under 
advantageous conditions over a period of time to achieve certain 
objectives (Ibid.). As such, a strategy represents the link between the 
strategic plan (the plan of actions) and the strategic goal (the aim of the 
mission), and encompasses the individual operations including their 
particular objectives which seek to contribute jointly to the achievement 
of the mission’s strategic goal. Each operation is then an umbrella term for 
individual activities that have their own objectives and which, ideally, 
indirectly advance the execution of the strategic plan towards the 
achievement of the strategic goal of the mission.  
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Table 4 – Key Concepts and Their Application in This Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Applied to the context of the research question, mission represents 
the Phase IV Operations in Iraq from 2003-2011 providing both the 
context for the strategy and its operations, and setting the character of the 
US military efforts. Strategic goal is the ultimate aim of the US military 
efforts and can be seen as the US leadership expectations translated into a 
militarily achievable outcome. Strategic plan is a plan of steps in order to 
achieve that desired militarily achievable outcome taking into 
consideration relevant obstacles and influencing factors. Strategy is then 
the practical application of the strategic plan which is more flexible and 
adaptable to the operational circumstances on the ground. Operations is 
an umbrella term for all the activities which on their own seek to make an 
indirect contribution to the achievement of the strategic goal of the 
mission. There has been an innumerable range of various military 
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operations taking place in Iraq between 2003 and 2011, from the ones 
lasting a few hours and focused on a particular target to the ones that went 
on for years and sought to bring about a more wide-impact change to the 
environment. One such example was the Operation New Dawn lasting 
from February 2010 until December 2011 seeking to stabilize Iraq prior to 
the US military departure. And lastly, instruments are the available tools of 
the US government to be utilised to execute these operations, including US 
military forces, US civilian force, international partners (allies), 
humanitarian organizations, and the private sector. 
The research goal is based on the DoD military understanding of 
the concept of a force multiplier as key elements employed to increase 
total force capabilities at the decisive time and place in order to achieve 
strategic goals. The concept of force or combat multipliers, defined 
according to the US military is  
‘(a) capability that, when added to and 
employed by a combat force, significantly increases 
the combat potential of that force and thus enhances 
the probability of successful mission 
accomplishment’ (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007: GL-11).  
 
There are many ways to categorise force multipliers, which can 
include human (e.g. leadership, morale, training, and fitness), 
environmental (e.g. terrain), organisational (e.g. force structure), and 
behavioural traits and elements, some of which can be quantified and 
some which cannot. It is assumed that contracting support then can be an 
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effective force multiplier as it seeks to increase the overall capability of a 
military force. 
Alternatively, there also exists an opposite value, a force 
‘demultiplier’, which decreases the total force capabilities of a military and 
is understood as a spoiling factor for potential capability of a force 
(Simpkin, 1985: 85).  Seeking to develop this logic further and apply it to 
this thesis, the research aim is then to examine how PMSI, defined as 
potential sustainment force multiplier, increased the capability of the US 
military and optimised, if at all, specific capabilities to be successful within 
the constraints and restraints of Phase IV Operations in Iraq. If the essence 
of operational art is the concentration of superior capability against the 
enemy to achieve success, then the concept of force multipliers should be 
at the very centre of any operational planning process which aims to 
concentrate such superior capability. Force multipliers are thus useful as 
they provide essential guidelines for what can and must be done to 
optimize force capabilities. It is believed that the analysis along the lines of 
the concept of force multipliers is especially valuable in complex 
expeditionary operations where unique restraints and constraints will 
govern the use of military force. Such operations pose a complex challenge 
for military planners as they require rapid projections of capabilities into a 
hostile environment followed by continuous sustainment of extremely 
diverse mixture of activities where the need is to increase, optimize and 
amplify the capabilities of the often limited forces to achieve the desired 
state of the contingency. The aim of this thesis is then to export this logic 
further and provide a better understanding how PMSI, as sustainment 
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force multiplier, contributed to optimise and enhance US military 
capabilities in Phase IV Operations.  
The remainder of this chapter focuses on the first two themes 
individually – Military Privatisation in the US and Phase IV Operations - 
and then brings them together in the context of the Iraq War to 
demonstrate their relevance to the assessment of the contribution of the 
PMSI in Iraq. Beginning with the theme of Military Privatisation in the US, 
this chapter discusses the economic, military and political factors that 
paved the way for US large-scale military outsourcing as a foreign policy 
tool in Iraq. Next, Phase IV Operations are defined as an inseparable part 
of modern US military operations and their earlier versions are presented 
with the aim of explaining their increasing importance within modern 
warfare. The last section, The US Strategy in Iraq, brings these two themes 
together and discusses them in the context of the Iraq War 2003-2011. Its 
aim is to present the most relevant aspects of the war that intensified the 
reliance of the US government on contractors. Starting with an explanation 
of the Iraq War and the Bush administration's decision to invade the 
country in the context of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), this section 
seeks to highlight how and why the US resorted to relying on contractors 
during the war to such a large extent.   
 
II.I. Military Privatisation in the United States 
The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 marked the establishment of the 
concept of a sovereign state which requires a monopoly on the use of force 
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exercised by the state’s military (Bruneau, 2011: 108-109) This notion 
spread globally during the 20th century and came to include professional 
military, state control intelligence and police organisations (Ibid.). In stark 
contrast, the PMSI has been slowly rising over the last 30 years, prompted 
by changes in political, economic and social structures across the Western 
world. Despite being viewed as an unaccountable scourge by its critics and 
as a great new solve-it-all invention of modern warfare by its proponents, 
offering twice the capability for half the cost, the truth is somewhere in-
between. Although cost savings together with increased effectiveness are 
generally considered the primary justification for outsourcing, the true 
financial implications of hiring contractors versus resourcing capabilities 
from within the US military are still unclear as any conclusive assessment 
of various agencies’ expenses from the last decade remains yet to be seen. 
Although supporters of the privatisation trend argue that hiring 
contractors only when needed is cheaper in the long run, rather than 
maintaining a permanent in-house professional military capability, such 
claims have not been verified yet (Isenberg, 2010). 
Economically viable or not, despite the sudden attention that the 
large scale military outsourcing during the Iraq War brought about, the US 
military has been using private contractors to support its military 
operations since the American Revolution (Thibault et al., 2009: 21; 
Singer, 2003: 19-39; Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, no 
date). Although the process of contracting and contracted responsibilities 
have undergone a significant evolution since the early days, there is no 
major war in the history of the United States that would have not been 
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fought with the support of private contractors (Isenberg, 2009; Kinsey, 
2009; Singer, 2003). The recent observations that PMSI has become such 
an important part of the US way of war that it would struggle to wage a 
war without it, ignore the fact that the US has never waged a war without a 
significant support of contractors in its history. The graphic below 
illustrates the evolution across time from Simple Services, such as medical 
and laundry to Complex Services like construction or security, as part of 
the contracted services in direct support of the US military across its 
history from American Revolution to the Iraq war.  
 
Figure 2 - Evolution of Contracted Support in US Military Operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Thibault et al., 2009: 21; Defense Procurement and Acquisition 
Policy, no date. 
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Therefore, while the extent of involvement of the PMSI in Iraq 
received a lot of attention during the GWOT, it was neither an 
unprecedented nor unexpected development in the history of US 
expeditionary operations.1 According to the figure above contractors have 
been an asset throughout US history and the gradual development of the 
activities that were added to their responsibilities is a reflection of the 
increasing conflict complexity and modernization of warfare (Thibault et 
al., 2009: 21; Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, no date). 
Indeed, the current situation can be seen as a return to the past, when 
western military forces on the battlefield (‘warriors’) used to be supported 
by a large force of ‘camp followers,’ who provided a whole range of 
services including supply, support, medical care, maintenance and 
‘entertainment’ (Miller, 2006).  As Dunigan and Masterson (2014: 201-
202) describe, it was common, in the past, for an army on the march to 
consist of 10 to 20 percent of soldiers while the rest were camp followers 
taking care of the camping equipment and the soldiers and only some of 
the most disciplined and self-sufficient armies were an exception to this 
rule.  
As such, since its founding, the United States has had an intimate 
relationship with contractors in wide range of functions, and the US 
reliance on them has been integral to its historical development. In 
modern era, already during the World War I (WWI) contractors played an 
                                                          
1 During the Revolutionary War, for example, the Continental Army hired wagon drivers 
and contracted  beef suppliers; the support also included clothing, weapons and basic 
engineering services (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, no date) 
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important role by providing large-scale military support as the US military 
became overwhelmed with transporting and supplying the American 
Expeditionary Forces across Europe. Ultimately, over 85,000 American 
and foreign contractors filled the void by crewing ships, constructing 
railroads, administering post offices and providing other general logistical 
support (Fontaine and Nagl, 2010: 8).  
With the new technological revolution in military hardware taking 
place in preparation and during the World War II (WWII), the range of 
potential functions for contractors broadened to other areas, such as 
maintenance of newly designed military aircraft and technologically 
advanced weapons systems (Bokel and Clark, 1997: 97-144). 
Furthermore, the demand for labour outstripped the available uniformed 
personnel supply resulting in some 730,000 civilians supporting the 5.4 
million American soldiers deployed overseas (Fontaine and Nagl, 2010: 
10). The reconstruction of Japan and post-war Europe under the Marshall 
Plan, the largest reconstruction effort until post-2003 Iraq, provided 
additional requirements on the US military that required the involvement 
of large-scale contractors (Conway and Toth, 1997: 193-264).  
Following the demobilization after WWII, the military-to-contractor 
ratio rose to 2.5:1 during the Korean War, where some 156,000 
contractors, mostly in construction and engineering roles, supported 
393,000 US military personnel on the battlefield (Ibid). Furthermore, the 
decision not to mobilize reserve units during the Vietnam War led the US 
military to contract large American companies in order to satisfy a vast 
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demand for physical infrastructure construction in Vietnam. They built 
new, or had refurbished, canals, roads and bridges, residential areas, 
hospitals, port facilities, airfields and more (Carter, 2004: 45). An 
estimated 130,000-150,000 contractors worked on a staggering array of 
construction projects aimed to prepare Vietnam below the 17th parallel 
for a major US military presence (Ibid.: 46). Following the end of the 
Vietnam War and the end of conscription in 1973, the US military 
embarked on consistent efforts to ‘do more with less’. This has led both to 
a dramatic decrease of the size of the US military over the years and to the 
prominence of technology in the way in which the US fights in modern 
warfare. 
Later on, in 1990s, contracting out national security and defence 
functions became especially relevant with the unrelenting drive to 
‘privatize’ government services during the William J. Clinton 
administration, and even more so during the George W. Bush 
administration (Kosar, 2006: 9). Much of it initiated in the early 1990s by 
Dick Cheney, who as the Secretary of Defense under the Presidency of the 
G. W. H. Bush sought to find a way how to comply with US Congressional 
demands to downsize the military and its enormous Cold War budget 
while preserving its bold strategic interests (Chatterjee, 2009: xi).  
During the First Gulf War, the Army employed just 9,200 
contractors in support of US combat units, but it was US operations in the 
Balkans during the mid-1990s which represented a whole new level in 
military contracting in modern history (Fontaine and Nagl, 2010: 10). In 
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1995, Cheney, this time as chief executive officer of Halliburton, oversaw 
the first major deployment of contractors into support services for the 
military in the former Yugoslavia (Chatterjee, 2009: xi). Unlike the First 
Gulf War, the character of the environment in the Balkans called for the 
provision of a large array of logistic and other services with the ratio of 
contractors to military personnel approximately 1:1 (Ibid.). According to 
Pratap Chatterjee, the war in the Balkans was ‘the first time that the 
contractors would allow soldiers to be wholly spared the dreadful 
monotony of cooking and cleaning up after themselves’ (Chatterjee, 2009: 
xi).  
This inclination to military outsourcing was fully embraced by 
Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, with Cheney as Vice-President, 
under the G. W. Bush administration in 2001 (Ibid.). Rumsfeld (2001-
2006) wanted to demonstrate that the Iraq invasion in 2003 could be 
accomplished with a lean fighting force and the most modern military 
technology. In a Department of Defense Briefing in March 2003, he 
famously argued that ‘(o)ur military capabilities are so devastating and 
precise that we can destroy an Iraqi tank under the bridge without 
damaging the bridge’ (Mockaitis, 2012: 115). Encouraged by the vice 
president Cheney, Rumsfeld was convinced that a success in Iraq would 
become the seal of approval for the plans for defence transformation over 
a traditional build-up of forces (Ibid.).   
As Richard N. Haass points out, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a 
‘war of choice’ rather than of necessity, to test this theory and prove 
47 
 
Rumsfeld's point. The relatively low number of American troops together 
with few coalition partners  were not in positon to control the situation 
once the major combat operations concluded and were about two-thirds 
short of the estimated number of personnel required for the war according 
to the plans developed at Central Command in the late 1990s (Haass, 
2009: 253-254). As a result, once the war started and the US found itself 
scrambling for additional man force needed on the ground, more and more 
tasks were contracted out to civilians and the military relied more on 
contractors to provide day-to-day assistance in the zone of conflict 
(Lovewine, 2014: 10; Rostker, 2007: 5-10). 
As a result, it is estimated that during the Global War on Terror 
over 250,000 contractor employees across the Middle East and Southwest 
Asia provided support in a whole range of PMSI services, such as 
information services (information technology and equipment 
maintenance), logistics (facilities management and operational support 
logistics), reconstruction, and security services (including armed security 
services) in conflict zones (Perlo-Freeman and Sköns, 2008: 4-7). This 
provided the US military with operational flexibility to reorganize its 
limited forces and increase its capabilities to pursue its strategy both in 
Iraq and Afghanistan (Lovewine, 2014: 9-11). In this respect, military 
privatisation re-emerged as a solution for bridging the gap between US 
foreign policy aims and means, at least in short term. 
The lack of awareness about how the US historically profited from 
military outsourcing leads to a false impression that the most recent 
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demonstration in Iraq and Afghanistan was unusual, unprecedented or 
even unexpected. The particularities of the military contracting continue 
shifting over time, but recognizing the long-term tradition of an intimate 
relationship between US governments and contractors is imperative to 
inform future debates about the trend and how to respond to it. 
 
II.II. Phase IV Operations 
US military doctrine has been preoccupied with conventional 
warfare, concentrating on overwhelming mass, mobility, and technology. 
World Wars I and II (and even Korea) demonstrated the effectiveness of 
the American ‘way of war’ as a combination of these elements (Taw, 2012: 
12). However, as David Ucko (2011: 16) points out, the understanding of 
war as a conventional and decisive military confrontation taking place on 
an isolated battlefield is nothing but a simplified recollection of single 
historical events. He further explains that such view obscures the fact that 
even predominantly conventional wars have had a less conventional phase 
where the combat achievements consolidation required some form of 
stabilization, political support, capacity-building, or reconstruction (Ibid.).  
As a matter of fact, US troops have been repeatedly employed in 
various roles, including peace operations, counterdrug operations, 
counterinsurgency efforts, and stability and reconstruction missions.  
American armed forces have been involved in hundreds of expeditionary 
operations and only eleven conventional wars (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2008: I-1). Reconstruction entailed extensive nation building in post-
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World War efforts in both Europe and Japan, followed by South Korea and 
Vietnam, not to mention all the stability operations that have been 
conducted as elements of COIN, disaster relief or peacekeeping around the 
world (Dobbins et al., 2008).2 Between 1992 and 1998 the US Army 
conducted twenty-six operations ‘other than war’, and between 1989 and 
2000 the Marine Corps conducted sixty-two contingency operations 
across the world including peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, peace 
enforcement, disaster relief and counterterrorism (Taw, 2012: 18-19). 
Therefore, while the US military has had a preference for conventional 
warfare, it has been extensively involved in operations ‘other than war’ for 
decades.3 
Despite this, the US military’s thinking has been permeated by the 
artificial bifurcation of wars as either conventional or irregular. In the 
American experience, each encounter with counterinsurgency and similar 
missions (peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, 
disaster relief, and counterterrorism) has provoked such false dichotomy, 
where the complexity and difficulty of the non-combat aspect of the 
operations made the US government seek to avoid them and develop a 
different type of military strategy. In the Vietnam War, the US military, 
armed and trained for conventional warfare, realised the limits of 
conventional warfare against both insurgents and conventional forces 
                                                          
2 For details on the US previous experiences, including Panama, Haiti, the Balkans, the 
Philippines, Germany, and Japan, see Crane and Terrill (2003).   
3 In the past, Peace Operations, as precedents to modern Phase IV Ops, were regarded as 
‘someone else’s job’, an unwanted burden, a sideshow that soldiers performed 
exceptionally and under particular circumstances. As Carafano observed, when US military 
forces undertake such missions, they try, as much as possible, to make them mirror 
traditional military warfare (Carafano, 2008: 2-3). 
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operating in impassable jungles and populated areas. Further complicated 
by American political ambiguity, competing strategic and practical 
imperatives, and the complexity of the conflict itself, the Vietnam War 
demonstrated the limitations of the American ‘way of war’.  
Illogically, the civilian and military leadership’s response to 
Vietnam was not to better prepare the army for such operations. Instead, 
it led to a rejection of such operations altogether and a return to a stronger 
preference for conventional warfare relying on high technology as an 
equation for military success. The few post-Vietnam contingency 
operations were, therefore, downplayed, conducted by proxy, justified as 
necessary exceptions or even conducted as conventional operations (Taw, 
2012: 15).  As such, the Vietnam War has particular significance in the 
context of Phase IV Operations as it soured American support for long-
term military non-conventional commitment which lie at the core of Phase 
IV efforts.  
Indeed, the US military has a long history of redefining non-combat 
operations successively as Small Wars, Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC), 
Military Operations Short of War (MOSW), Military Operations Other Than 
War (MOOTW), Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and Irregular 
Warfare (IW) (Taw, 2012: 42; Ucko, 2011: 16; Kagan, 2006: 168-169). 
Throughout all those stages these operations have been distinguished as 
operations ‘other than war’, and even as recent as early 2000s, the US 
military made it clear what type of operation it identifies itself with most. 
According to US Army Field Manual 3.0, Operations, from June 2001,  
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‘Fighting and winning the nation's wars is the 
foundation of Army service - the Army's non-
negotiable contract with the American people and its 
enduring obligation to the nation’ (Department of the 
Army, 2001: 1-2). 
 
The manual adds that although the Army recognises that soldiers 
will perform a wide range of military activities across the spectrum of 
conflict, the institutional emphasis is on fighting wars (Ibid.). As a result, 
two years before the war in Iraq, this doctrine re-stated the understanding 
that despite war’s diversity, ‘real’ war is primarily a conventional type of 
war and the US military has, therefore, always seen its primary mission as 
fighting and defeating the enemy.4 As such, at the start of the 21st century, 
the Army (similarly to other branches of the US military) did not perceive 
Stability operations as integral part of war and, rather they were seen as 
an unnecessary distraction and a diversion of essential resources from the 
principal mission – combat.  
Nevertheless, Iraq and Afghanistan caused the military to re-assess 
its lessons learned from history and formulate a new vision of war which 
is more appropriate to the present circumstances (Linn, 2011: 33). The US 
military has learned that winning wars and consolidating victory and 
                                                          
4 Conventional warfare is not found as a term within Joint Publication 1-02: Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint Publication 1-02 defines the 
term conventional forces as, ‘1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using 
nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces’ (US 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010(2015): 51).  
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preventing the renewal of conflict are two distinct matters. In the wake of 
the unfolding civil war in Iraq, the Army has been criticised for its 
traditional ignorant view and urged to alter its doctrine and training 
programmes so that combat units would have skills both to fight and to 
conduct stability operations.  
As a result of this, in 2005, the US Department of Defense released 
Directive 3000.05, elevating Stability Operations to be on a par with 
offence, defence and civil support, as one of the four equally important 
elements within the new doctrine of full spectrum operations 
(Department of Defense, 2005). Redefined as ‘military and civilian 
activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to 
establish or maintain order in states and regions’, the acknowledged 
importance of Stability Operations signified a dramatic change in the 
military’s perception of its role and responsibilities in 21st century warfare 
(Department of Defense, 2005: 2). Their immediate goal (security, restore 
essential services, a viable market economy, and meet humanitarian 
needs) together with the long-term goal (to create opportunities for 
economic growth, begin the process of rebuilding, and limit the likelihood 
of renewed violence) are far beyond the traditional understanding of what 
the military’s responsibilities in US expeditionary operations are (Ibid.; 
Taw 2012: 3). 
In addition, in 2006, the Army and the Marine Corps published a 
new Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, Joint Publication 3-24, 
emphasizing the importance of stability operations for success in COIN 
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(Department of Army 2006: 1-19, 2-5). 5 Less than two years later, the 
Army published a new version of the capstone doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 
3-0, Operations, and a keystone stability operations manual, FM 3-07, 
Stability Operations, to re-emphasise the importance of full spectrum 
operations including offence, defence, stability and civil support 
operations, which was already stated in DoD Directive 3000.05 from 2005 
(Department of the Army, 2008; Department of the Army, 2008b). Iraq 
and Afghanistan are thus at the roots of the transformation of the 
military’s evolutionary doctrine that reflects the next steps of the 
military’s development in a new strategic environment (Taw, 2012: 5). To 
what extent these changes in approach are truly transformative and long-
lasting is yet to be seen, but at least conceptually the debate has been 
opened. 
In the context of the Iraq War, the Stability Operations Manual 3-07 
and the Counterinsurgency doctrine 3-24,  provided a critical contribution 
to the US military’s understanding of Stability Operations as a transitional 
process to make sustainable peace a possibility. Explicitly stating the 
requirement for building the capacity of a state to function as a necessary 
pre-condition for the elimination of violence, Stability Operations 
developed from an optional addition into a crucial phase that ‘makes or 
brakes’ US expeditionary operations (Department of the Army, 2008b: 3-
14). Although offensive and defensive operations are deemed integral to 
                                                          
5 A number of important books detail the disagreements between civilian and military 
leaders and the struggle to implement the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in Iraq (Jaffe 
and Cloud, 2009; Ricks, 2009; Robinson, 2008; Ricks, 2006).   
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COIN operations according to the 2006 COIN military manual, the 
publication recognizes the necessity of Stability Operations an inseparable 
component of all full spectrum operations executed overseas Department 
of Army 2006: 1-19). 
According to the DOD’s 3000.05 Directive definition, the immediate 
goal of Stability Operations is to ‘provide the local populace with security, 
restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs ‘ (Department of 
Defense 2005: 2). In the long-term, they seek to ‘develop indigenous 
capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy rule of 
law democratic institutions, and a robust civil society’ (Ibid.). The Notional 
Operation Plan Phases versus Level of Military Effort, from Joint 
Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, illustrates where such operations fit 
within a conflict continuum (plan phases).  
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Figure 3 - Notional Operation Plan Phases versus Level of Military 
Effort 
Source: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011: V-6. 
 
This model depicts the importance of coordination and 
collaboration of entities involved in particular phases across the military 
continuum vertically, as well as the Level of Military Effort horizontally. 
Beginning with Phase 0 (Shape), through Phase I (Deter), Phase II (Seize 
Initiative), Phase III  (Dominate), Phase IV (Stabilize) and Phase V (Enable 
Civilian Authority), this model acknowledges that different phases of the 
conflict coexist both horizontally and vertically at all times and the 
individual phases are only characterised by their dominance, not their 
exclusivity. Therefore, Shaping, Deterring, Seizing, Dominating, Stabilizing 
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and Enabling Activities play important roles across the whole spectrum of 
phases, from the beginning until the end of military operations.  
As such, Phase IV Operations are not just one type of operations, 
rather, because of their wide range of possible inputs, they can take any of 
the following forms: security; humanitarian assistance; economic 
stabilization and infrastructure; rule of law; and governance and 
participation (Department of the Army, 2011: III-1-59). The broad range of 
tasks and activities within the group of operations include establishing 
civil security, establishing civil control, restoring essential services, 
supporting governance, supporting economic and infrastructure 
performing information engagement tasks (Ibid.).6 
 
Figure 4 - Essential Stability Tasks 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Department of the Army, 2008: 3-19. 
 
                                                          
6 For detailed outline of Stability Operations activities divided within Essential Stability 
Tasks categories, see Appendix C.   
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As the Army Field Manual 3-07 stipulates the aim of Stability 
operations is to create an environment which enables the host nation to 
begin resolving the root causes of conflict (reconciliation among local or 
regional adversaries) and create conditions for establishing legitimate 
host-nation governance, a functioning civil society, and a viable market 
economy (Department of the Army, 2008: 3-2). Within this broad range 
most important military contribution to stabilization of the environment is 
defined as ‘to protect and defend the population, facilitating the personal 
security of the people and, thus, creating a platform for political, economic, 
and human security’ (US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011b: vii). 
While in theory, the distinction between the phases’ domination 
periods is clear, the war in Iraq highlighted the complexity and difficulty of 
distinguishing between various phases of complex military operations. As 
they do not have a clear beginning or end, they cannot be constrained to a 
specific time period. Thus, when referred to as a specific period in time, it 
must be understood that in that period they featured as significant, not 
pre-dominant or exclusive. Instead, they must be conceptualised more 
broadly and based on their unique focus. 
In this regard, Phase IV Operations can be viewed as a critical step 
away from sustained combat operations towards focus on provision of 
essential government services, reconstruction of emergency 
infrastructure, and humanitarian relief at the centre of the efforts to build 
a safe and secure environment and restore local political, economic, and 
infrastructure stability. Although, in the Iraq context, Phase III and Phase 
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IV were extremely difficult to separate, Stability Operations jumped to the 
forefront following Bush’s declaration of Mission Accomplished in May 
2003 and terminated with the US military’s withdrawal at the end of 2011. 
In this regard, while both phases - Dominate and Stabilize – were 
prominent in the early post-major combat years in Iraq, Stability 
Operations represented the all-important effort to create viable conditions 
for the US military to begin its withdrawal and allow the progress towards 
Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) leading to complete disengagement. The 
US military experience in Iraq is thus one of the most recent 
demonstrations that major combat operations and stability operations 
overlap and must be conducted simultaneously throughout the course of a 
conflict to achieve the desired results.  
Although it became an often repeated cliché that Phase IV 
Operations is where wars are won, it appears to be rather where the 
militaries hope to avoid quagmire by engaging in mission creep, defined as 
‘a gradual shift in objectives during the course of a military campaign, 
often resulting in an unplanned long-term commitment’ to mitigate 
consequences of an ill-plan operation (Cambridge.org, no date).  Phase IV 
Operations, however, cannot avert or change the course of an ill-fated 
mission and to claim the contrary would be to overestimate what they can 
do. As such Phase IV Operations are not a new invention or a cookbook 
solution instant remedy for complex military interventions. Instead they 
represent a structured approach to understand how complex the mosaic of 
every post-conflict situation is and what areas come to the forefront when 
rebuilding a nation.  
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To place stability operations within a broader strategic context, the 
US experience in Iraq clearly constitutes a case study for why the US needs 
an effective Stability Operations doctrine and capabilities. While not a type 
of operation, it is a phase (an element) of each and every operation. 
Ultimately the term refers to the application of operations in support of 
establishing and maintaining order, which are to be shared between the 
military and the civilian component of the intervening state. Whilst 
Stability Operations remain a less preferable type of military engagement, 
in the environment where more security threats are associated with 
failing, rather than aggressive states, Phase IV Operations represent an 
inseparable element of modern military operations and require the US 
military to adapt accordingly. To understand the elevated importance of 
Stability Operations in the US military’s doctrine, one must understand the 
operations in Iraq as being at the heart of the recent conceptual 
transformation.  
 
II.III. The US Military Strategy in Iraq (2003-2011) 
Prior to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Washington's interests in 
the Persian Gulf were long-standing and well known. The Bush 
administration proclaimed that the immediate goal of the invasion of Iraq 
was to remove the oppressive regime of Saddam Hussein, including 
destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them 
available to terrorists, and build ‘a new Iraq that is prosperous and free’ 
(Dale, 2009: 31). Masked behind the official declarations, various strategic 
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and economic incentives to dispose of the regime of Saddam Hussein were 
on the table many years before the iconic terrorist attacks on the Twin 
Towers in the New York City (Office of the Press Secretary, 2003). 
Preoccupied with the security of the region's oil supply and its continued 
free flow of at market prices, the continued freedom of navigation by US 
and Western shipping in the Gulf itself, and maintaining strong allies in the 
region, the Bush administration decided to seize the momentum and order 
the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to begin on March 19, 2003 when the 
US led a multinational effort to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime from 
power.7  
On the second day of the invasion, 21st March 2003, Bush’s Defense 
Secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld, then laid out eight specific objectives by 
which the Bush administration would define victory (Shanker and Schmitt, 
2003). These were: to end the regime; eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction; capture or drive out terrorists; collect intelligence on terrorist 
networks; collect intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction 
activity; secure Iraq’s oil fields; deliver humanitarian relief and end 
sanctions; help Iraq achieve representative self-government and insure its 
territorial integrity (Ibid.). However, there was a more general and 
overarching aim that the US administration sought for Iraq. Not only was 
Iraq going to undergo a democratic transformation, it was also to become 
the first phase of a large mission to reconstruct the Middle East (Office of 
                                                          
7 For analysis of the background of the Iraq war as a war of choice, see Hinnebusch (2006). 
For an overview of evidence regarding the oil factor in the war, see Duffield (2005). For an 
overview of evidence that the neo-cons, intimately connected to the Israeli Likud party, 
were pushing the war on Israel’s behalf, see Bamford (2004), Berber (2003), Farer (2004). 
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the Press Secretary, 2003b). In President Bush’s own words, a new Iraq 
‘would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other 
nations in the region’ (Ibid.). In simple terms, what the US really sought to 
achieve by going to war in Iraq was to create a new regime ‘acceptable to 
the US, if not actually designed by the US government itself’ (Stansfield, 
2005: 131).8   
In terms of the actual planning for the war, the responsibility for 
the campaign fell on the shoulders of the DoD, which adopted a narrow 
vision of a swift military operation from the start (Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2008: 7-8). The whole  planning for the 
operation was based on the principles of Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA), emphasizing speed, lethality, accuracy, flexibility, and information 
dominance, all rooted in modern technology (Shimko 2010: 1-24). Officials 
at the highest levels of the decision making process, including President 
George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, and Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, rejected the possibility that the post-invasion 
transfer of power and responsibility to Iraqis could present a major issue 
(Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2008: 31-45)9. 
According to their vision the US would be welcomed as liberators, and Iraq 
would naturally develop into an exemplar democratic regime in the 
Middle East (Metz 2008: 132; Rice, 2011: 90-97; Rumsfeld, 2011: 479-
485).  
                                                          
8 Also see Klein (2008: 331); Wimmer (2003: 111); Byman (2003: 47-48). 
9 For an insight into the planning for the Iraq War from the perspective of its architects, see 
Cheney (2011), Rice (2011), Rumsfeld (2011) Bush (2010), Haas (2009) and Franks and 
McConnell (2004). 
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The reality on the ground turned out to be very different to what 
had been expected, and despite the relatively easy victory against the Iraqi 
military, Iraq plunged into civil war. The start of 2004 was marked by a 
relative lull in violence as insurgent forces reorganised during this time, 
studying the tactics of the multinational forces and planning a renewed 
offensive (Franks and McConnell, 2004: 432-477). During the spring of 
2004, the violence began to rise and the insurgency slowly grew into a full-
blown civil war causing a large number of casualties among Iraqi civilians 
(Dodge, 2012: 53-74). Below, Figure 5 - Documented Civilian Deaths from 
Violence Perpetrated by Anti-Government/Anti-Coalition Forces (All Iraq, 
Any Weapons) illustrates the increased number of violent civilian deaths 
recorded between 2003 and 2005, its steadily high level until the second 
half of 2008, which then significantly decreased  and remained low until 
2011.  
 
Figure 5 - Documented Civilian Deaths from Violence Perpetrated by 
Anti-Government/Anti-Coalition Forces (All Iraq, Any Weapons) 
Source: Iraq Body Count, no date. 
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Following the US military approach of 2003-2004 focussing on 
‘killing or capturing’ insurgents and the development of Iraqi Security 
Forces (ISF) to become capable of fighting insurgents and securing the 
country, in 2005 the US realized the need to change the strategy. In order 
to increase security, US and Iraqi forces established a limited 
counterinsurgency (COIN) approach with the objective of controlling 
movement and access to certain areas (Pirnie and O’Connell, 2008: 35-50). 
Using a system of vehicle searches and security passes for residents within 
and around cities, the US established a new strategy known as ‘Clear, Hold, 
Build’ which sought to bring Coalition forces among the population and, 
thus, create a greater sense of security (DeFronzo, 2010: 225-249; Dale, 
2009: 67-68). However, by 2005 most coalition forces were pulled back to 
relative large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) – secure and separate from 
the local population (Dale, 2009: 20). 
In terms of military operations during this period, they were 
designed as a close cooperation between the Coalition and the Iraqi 
Security Forces. Under the ‘Operation Together Forward’, the Iraqi forces 
were in the lead, supported by the coalition (Ibid.: 68). The effort included 
clearing operations, as well as a series of new security measures including 
extended curfews, tighter restrictions on weapons ownership, tips 
hotlines, and expanded checkpoints and police patrols (Ibid.). By the end 
of 2006, it became clear that this approach has limited utility as the levels 
of violence were continuing to climb and the US found itself trapped in a 
war it did not want to lose, but was unable to win (Franks and McConnell, 
2004: 432-477). Regardless of whether the original plan of the US was 
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overly ambitious, it became obvious that to leave behind a chaotic Iraq in 
the midst of raging sectarian violence was not an option. As Toby Dodge 
observed, such an outcome would have plunged an already destabilized 
Middle East into deeper instability which would have further undermined 
the US position in the region (Dodge, 2004: 6). 
This sentiment about the necessity to turn the developments in Iraq 
around was shared by many of President Bush’s close advisers. As 
Frederick W. Kagan, one of the intellectual architects of the ‘surge’ strategy 
in Iraq, argued, establishing an enduring relationship with Iraq is a 
strategic imperative for the United States and a lack of thereof will likely 
lead to regional conflict, humanitarian catastrophe, and increased global 
terrorism (Kagan, 2007: 1, 3). As a result, several strategic reviews were 
conducted in parallel, options were considered, and a decision to pursue 
government to take several sharp policy transformations was made 
(Anderson and Stansfield, 2004: 226-32). 
What was perhaps not a vital interest in the first place became 
imperative as the US military did not want to leave humiliated in the midst 
of a civil war (Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro, 2012; Kagan, 2006). Lacking 
the strategy, the manpower, or the domestic support to decisively prevail, 
it sought to find a compromise. The ensuing counterinsurgency strategy 
was an attempt to provide a way for the US military to leave a stabilized, 
but unresolved, Iraq with dignity as opposed to speedy withdrawal 
accompanied by outright humiliation.  
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In January 2007, the Administration established the New Way 
Forward National Strategy as the new US policy toward Iraq. By shifting 
the focus towards providing security for the population instead of fighting 
insurgents, the US military had to adapt the way it used to engage with the 
locals. The new strategy thus relied extensively on the use of concrete 
barriers, checkpoints, curfews, and biometric technologies for 
identification to improve security (Dale, 2008: 71). Previously, the Iraq 
strategy viewed security, political and economic elements as mutually 
reinforcing and sought to implement them simultaneously. The New Way 
Forward agreed that all of these elements, but argued that security was a 
prerequisite for progress in the other areas (National Security Council, 
2007: 12, 18-20). As President Bush stated in his address to the nation in 
January 2007, ‘The most urgent priority for success in Iraq is security’ 
(Office of the Press Secretary, 2007). This focus on population security 
marked an important shift from previous years, when the US priority was 
to quickly transition security responsibilities to Iraqi security forces 
(Katzman, 2009: 37-38). 
‘The New Way Forward’ embodied more robust COIN operations 
that required more troops on the ground. For that purpose, in January 
2007, Bush ordered the deployment of more than 20,000 soldiers into 
Iraq, five additional brigades, the majority of which was sent to Baghdad. 
He also extended the tour of most of the troops in the country and some of 
the Marines already in the Anbar Province area. With the new approach, 
under the command of General Petraeus, the US military attempted to ‘win 
the hearts and minds’ of the Iraqi people through building relationships, 
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preventing civilian casualties and compromising with, and even hiring, 
some former enemies (Office of the Press Secretary, 2007; Office of the 
Press Secretary, 2007b; National Security Council, 2005). 
The major element of the new strategy was a change in focus for 
the US military ‘to help Iraqis clear and secure neighbourhoods, to help 
them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces 
left behind are capable of providing the security’ (Office of the Press 
Secretary, 2007).  The President stated that the surge would then provide 
the time and conditions conducive to reconciliation between communities 
(Ibid.). Petraeus recognised the need for realistic and achievable goals in 
terms of military campaigns in his 2008 testimony to Congress when he 
said that Iraq would not become a Jeffersonian democracy. He 
characterised the Iraq war as follows:  
‘The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq 
is competition among ethnic and sectarian 
communities for power and resources. This 
competition will take place, and its resolution is key 
to producing long-term stability in the new Iraq. The 
question is whether the competition takes place 
more – or less – violently’ (Petraeus, 2007).10  
 
While running for the U.S. presidency in 2008, Obama repeatedly 
criticised foreign policy of his predecessor and drew a link between the 
chaos in Iraq and the neglected original invasion of Afghanistan. Citing the 
                                                          
10 For a detailed analysis of the Iraq socio-political development and the role of Ba‘athism 
in it, see Terrill (2012).  
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human costs of war, the US military overstretch, the financial burden and 
the strain on relationship with US allies that the war caused, he promised 
to reorient the attention and resources from Iraq back to Afghanistan to 
prevent the resurgence of al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan (Gregory, 2011: 2) 
Although Bush signed the Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
and thus set a timetable for withdrawal in December 2008, once Obama 
became elected he introduced a new strategy for the Iraq War in the early 
2009 entitled ‘Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq’ which aimed at 
ensuring the safe withdrawal of US forces from Iraq while maintaining a 
certain level of stability. In the words of Joe Biden, then U.S. Senator from 
Delaware, later Vice President in Obama’s administrations, the aim of the 
United States was to ‘leave Iraq without leaving behind a civil war that 
turns into a regional war, endangering America's interests, not for a year 
or two, but for a generation’ (Biden, 2007). The new approach provided 
the guidance to the new mission under the banner Operation New Dawn 
that was to put in place processes necessary for the US military to be able 
to live up to the tenets of the US-Iraq Security Agreement of 2008 and 
withdraw all its military forces by the end of 2011.  
Operation New Dawn, which started in September 2010, thus 
marked a distinct change in the US mission in Iraq characterised by 
reduced role of US troops in securing the country and the withdrawal of 
those forces from Iraq (Dale, 2009: 25-27). The new military mission, 
reflecting degrading military capabilities to response to a crisis within the 
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country, signified the end of US combat operations and transition of the 
remaining US military forces to an advice and assist roles with Iraq’s 
security forces (Odierno, 2010: 97-98; Obama, 2010). 
Despite the fact that the FM 3-24 acknowledges the high level of 
importance given to the measured application of force, the elevation of the 
protection of the local population as the primary concern in the COIN 
operation further solidifies the significance of the military force as the 
main instrument in COIN (Department of the Army, 2006: 2-1-2). While 
the FM 3-24 promotes the unity of effort by integrating civilian and 
military activities, it stresses that controlling the level of violence is a key 
aspect of the operations and an essential COIN task for military forces 
remains to fight insurgents (Ibid). Referring to COIN as ‘being fought 
among the populace’ or ‘being the battle of ideas,’ the language of the 
manual further highlights the approach adopted by the US military that 
COIN operations are primarily, though not exclusively, a military mission 
(Department of the Army 2006: 2-2). This could be ascribed to the range 
of responsibilities the manual assigns to Counterinsurgents, where 
‘(s)ecurity from insurgent intimidation and coercion, as well as from non-
political violence and crime’ is listed at the top and also appears to be the 
closest to traditional military capabilities (Ibid.).11  
                                                          
11 The remaining responsibilities of Counterinsurgents according to FM 3-24 include the 
following: Security from insurgent intimidation and coercion, as well as from non-political 
violence and crime; Provision for basic economic needs; Provision of essential services, 
such as water, electricity, sanitation, and medical care; Sustainment of key social and 
cultural institutions; Other aspects that contribute to a society’s basic quality of life 
(Department of the Army 2006: 2-2).  
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In the face of the clear demonstration of the limits of conventional 
military power in Iraq, the elevation of Stability Operations to a primary 
mission alongside offence, defence and civil support represents a new 
approach in the US military doctrine for future expeditionary operations. 
Based on inadequate planning reinforced by a poor understanding of the 
challenges accompanying regime change, Stability Operations emerged as 
an avenue for a dignified exit of the US military from an outright fiasco. As 
such, the introduction of the concept of Phase IV operations in the US 
military doctrine with the experience from Iraq represented a swing from 
emphasizing fighting and winning the nation’s wars to the embrace of 
long-term complex civilian-military operations that seek to provide room 
for negotiation, as opposed to straightforward solutions.  
With the all-volunteer force, privatisation of national defence 
became necessary. Rather than an Iraq-war-related revolution, the 
evolution of a long trend of military and security privatisation has been 
underway for decades as force structure reductions greatly reduced the 
service’s ability to support long-term complex expeditionary operations. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the US Army went from 738,000 active 
personnel in 1990 to 481,000 in 2001, to 490,000 in 2015 (Heritage 
foundation, no date). The unanticipated need for large numbers of logistics 
and security personnel accompanied by the serious shortage of troops 
available due to conscious decisions by civilian policy makers and the 
experience with military outsourcing in the Balkans caused the Pentagon 
to turn to contractors to fill the immediate needs (Hammes, 2010: 1-2). 
Contractors were thus employed to fill the vacuum that at least in the case 
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of Iraq appears to be a result of deliberate policy miscalculations rather 
than solely exigency of a very dangerous and violent environment 
(Bruneau, 2011: 123).  
 
II.IV. Conclusion 
The Operation in Iraq is probably the most spectacular recent 
example of a mission creep. While the original intent of the mission was to 
plant a seed for spread of democracy across the Middle East, motivated by 
specific strategic and economic calculations of the US, within few months 
following the invasion the situation on the ground span out of control and 
unleashed a unexpected level of violence and chaos (Bowman, 2007: 1-6). 
Since the late fall of 2004, US forces supported by the Iraqi military 
engaged in counterinsurgency operations with mixed results due to the 
reason that despite the operations were militarily successful, the Iraqi 
security forces were unable to keep the cleared areas under control (Ibid. 
5). The ensuing military surge and intensified counterinsurgency 
campaign focussed on Baghdad, Anbar province, and areas immediately 
north and south of the capital but brought hardly any long-term 
achievement.  
The gradual, evident shift from the nebulously defined goal of 
regime change into an unclear, unplanned and unwanted effort to rush 
plans for Phase IV Operations based on the counterinsurgency strategy as 
the pinpoint of the new redirected objectives is clearly apparent. Shaped 
by innumerable factors, including the US leadership expectations, the 
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dynamics of the operational circumstances on the ground, the dynamics of 
domestic Iraqi politics and the US domestic policy, including Obama's 
presidential campaign based on the promise of the withdrawal of the US 
troops in Iraq and reorientation of the US military efforts on Afghanistan, 
the ultimate strategic goal of the US military became to make Iraq stable 
enough to enable dignified exit for the US military and redirection of 
efforts towards fostering stability in Afghanistan instead (Gregory, 
2011:2-3). 
Taking into account the many contextual factors on the tactical, 
operational, strategic and even institutional level, it would be unfeasible to 
discuss them all in depth in this chapter. Instead, the aim of this chapter 
was to present the three main areas that provide the setting of the 
assessment of the contribution of PMSI in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. The 
combined realities of US experience with military privatisation, the 
demands of the modern US expeditionary operations and the US strategy 
in Iraq are the three determining elements that set the background for the 
US dependency on PMSI within this military campaign. This chapter firstly 
explained the trend of military outsourcing and its relevance to the 
historical development of the United States. Secondly, it looked at the 
conceptualisation of modern expeditionary operations and the US military 
attitude to the MOOTW. Thirdly, the development of the US strategy vis-à-
vis the circumstances on the ground in Iraq was presented as the 
background of the analysis presented in this thesis. 
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III. Literature Review 
 
The body of literature on private military and security companies is 
relatively young and emerged as a distinct sub-field of international 
security in the aftermath of the Cold War in the 1990s. Initially focussed 
on the actions of a few notorious companies, the field grew rapidly, 
reflecting the growing numbers of companies and their involvement in the 
affairs of states, particularly in foreign military interventions. Quickly, the 
emergence of the private military and security industry became a matter 
of a great interest for academics, journalists, and practitioners alike, 
further stimulating the evolution and diversification of the research in this 
area. 
There are various ways to approach the review of the literature.  
The first option is to view it chronologically as an evolutionary process 
which reflects developments within the industry and can be presented in 
three subsequent phases: 1) from the 1990s to 2003, 2) from 2003 to late 
2000, and 3) from late 2000 until today. Alternatively, it can be seen 
through five dominant themes which intertwine across all three periods. 
These are: 1) the nature of the industry, 2) normative and ethical concerns 
of governmental outsourcing (the states’ control of violence, civil-military 
relations, the morality of privatised war), 3) the contribution and impact 
of private military and security contractors on military operations, 4) non-
state contracting, and 5) laws and regulation. As these themes often relate, 
even overlap with each other, this literature review will proceed by 
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outlining past research priorities in chronological order, highlighting 
which issues received most attention and in what context. 
In addition, this chapter seeks to provide a critical reflection on 
how contribution has been understood in the context of the participation 
of PMSI in Phase IV Operations in Iraq from 2003 to 2011.  Identified as a 
gap in the literature, this chapter argues that despite the preoccupation of 
the academic literature with identifying the contribution of contractors 
across various contexts, there is a lack of a deeper understanding of the 
meaning and its full potential in explaining the form of engagement of 
contractors in modern warfare. As this chapter will present, the vast 
majority of the literature identifies contractors’ contribution in a 
superficial and unspecific sense, often black or white, which diminishes 
the utility of such analysis. As a result, although the academic discourse 
about the contribution of contractors is rich, its conclusions provide little 
utility for policy-makers when it comes to decision-making about their 
use. To address this weakness in the academic literature on PMSI, this 
chapter highlights the need to redefine the meaning of contribution and 
broaden the understanding of factors and elements which come into play 
when assessing the contribution of contractors on the ground in various 
contexts of modern warfare. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows.  
First, this chapter begins with definitions and typology of PMSI as 
found in the literature and argues that one of the major obstacles for 
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assessment of the contribution of contractors in various environments is 
the ambiguity surrounding the PMSI’s own conceptualisation. The various 
definitions of different companies under the umbrella of the private 
military and security industry are discussed and, in particular, it is 
highlighted that the often utilised reference to ‘mercenaries’ is not only 
misapplied but stands in the way of effective and objective analysis of 
these international actors.  
Second, the first wave of the scholarly literature will be presented. 
Focussed on the few notorious companies and their involvement in Sierra 
Leone, Angola, Papua New Guinea and former Yugoslavia, empirically, the 
first wave focussed on the negative cases.  These cases reinforced pre-
existing prejudice against these companies based on their predecessors 
from the Middle-Ages. Conceptually, the first wave is based on the 
tremendous changes of the post-1990s where the earlier known individual 
‘soldiers of fortune’ transformed into organised and registered businesses 
with potential impact on state sovereignty and international affairs. 
Third, the chapter proceeds with presentation of the second wave 
of the scholarly literature on the military and security privatisation. In this 
phase the discussion moves from individual acts of mercenary-like 
activities in mostly third world countries to the issue of powerful Western 
capitalist democracies hiring these companies as part of their foreign-
policy military instruments. Empirically, the case studies of Iraq and 
Afghanistan provide the core sources of data on the evolution of the 
industry, while conceptually the scholarly focus lies with the issues how 
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the massive reliance of the Western superpowers on contractors impacts 
on their sovereignty.  
Fourthly, the third wave of the scholarly literature is presented. 
Emerging with the wind down of the US military presence in the Middle 
East and the related limited scope and scale of its activities there, the third 
wave literature broadens its focus to include issues that emerged in the 
aftermath of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as new areas of contractors 
utilization that were previously overlooked. In this regard, issues such as 
the value of contractors’ sacrifice, their mental health and the ugly side of 
importing cheap labour to warzones related with possible human 
trafficking, are only some of the issues that came to light. In regards to 
contractors’ old-new ventures which became more prominent in the 
literature with the fading interest in Iraq and Afghanistan, their use as an 
alternative for police or prison guards domestically, maritime order 
enforcer providing security for shipping cargo through high-risk waters 
and, lastly, private intelligence are just a few examples. Conceptually, the 
third wave can be seen as moving from the idea that military and security 
privatisation is imposed on the state, to the view that the state is an active 
instigator and implementer of the trend. Furthermore, looking at the issue 
from a different perspective than state centrism widens the angle and 
offers more nuanced insights into identifying and managing risks and 
implications for different stakeholders.  
The ensuing section, ‘Contribution’, concerns categories, labels and 
characterisations of private military and security companies across all 
76 
 
three phases of the scholarly literature.  It seeks to highlight the gap that 
this thesis seeks to fill. Going a step further from a discussion on the 
positive and negative impact of contractors in military operations, the 
chapter will identify how the (specific) contributions of PMSI have been 
described in the academic literature. There are four different ways 
observed: 1) Contribution as characteristics of the general trend towards 
military outsourcing, 2) Contribution as an area of activities, 3) 
Contribution as occupations and 4) Contribution as functions. By 
systematising the up-to-date writings on contractors, this section makes 
an argument for a more structured analysis of contractors’ presence and 
involvement in modern operations. 
Finally, the conclusion creates a bridge to the subsequent chapter, 
‘Conceptual Framework’, which serves as lenses for an assessment of 
contribution of contractors, as a form of engagement, in Phase IV 
Operations in Iraq.  
 
III.I. Definition and Typology of PMSI 
During the last four decades, ‘privatisation’ emerged in public 
discussion referring to a wide range of activities which imply a transfer of 
the provision of goods and services from the public to the private sector. 
The breadth of activities covered under the umbrella term ‘privatisation’ 
varies greatly and it is not surprising that government officials, politicians, 
economists, scholars, even journalists tend to understand privatisation 
differently. Privatisation can cover, for example, the sale of public assets to 
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private owners, the contracting out of services formerly provided by state 
organizations to private producers, or the entry by private producers into 
markets that were formerly considered a public monopoly. 
The privatisation of military and security services by the United 
States government, here understood as the use of private firms to provide 
this type of services, emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s. On the 
one side, there were the proponents arguing that privatisation is the 
answer to the purported failures of ‘big government’, while the critics, on 
the other side, opposed that privatisation can have unforeseen and 
undesirable consequences (Kosar, 2006). Already in the early-post-Cold 
War years, several important studies analysing the trend have been 
written and those by Paul C. Light (1999) and John D. Donahue (1989) are 
particularly noteworthy. While Donahue (1989) presents the evidence and 
arguments for and against privatisation while including case studies of 
Pentagon and private prisons, Light (1999) focusses on the extent to 
which the federal government embraced privatisation in the post-Cold 
War years. He argues that the official reported numbers are much lower 
than the reality and that the true head count of non-federal employees 
working under federal contracts remains obscure (Light, 1989: 5-7). Light 
introduces the term ‘shadow government’ to reflect the fact that many 
people employed through federal contracts, grants, or mandates remain 
unaccounted for and he points out that the contractors are consciously 
pushed into the shadows by the government in order to make it appear 
smaller while increasing its productivity (Ibid.: 5-7, 37-44). More recently, 
the metaphor of ‘shadow government’ has been extrapolated onto 
78 
 
contractors in regards to their involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
numerous references to ‘shadow force’, ‘shadow army’ and ‘shadow 
soldiers’ can be found in the literature (Isenberg, 2009; Rosen, 2007; 
Scahill, 2007; Zabci, 2007; Schumacher, 2006) 
The debate on private companies doing business in the area of 
military and security emerged in late 1990s. It brought along distinct focus 
on the procurement and delivery of services, such as training, base 
support, and facility management, rather than production and 
procurement of hardware.1 Although the full range of contractors services 
has been examined only later with the variety and diversity of services 
provided by contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, the change in the focus 
from military hardware to military support services is apparent.  
Although defining the object of enquiry is one of the basic steps 
when proceeding with research, to provide an accurate definition of 
PMSCs is a complex exercise surrounded by numerous obstacles. Firstly, 
the ability of individuals with a range of military skills to move between 
individual companies creates fluidity in the industry and accordingly 
increases or decreases the range of activities a company can offer, which is 
ultimately reflected in the types and quantity of contracts it can undertake. 
Secondly, the blurred line between various activities that a company can 
deliver in a conflict zone stems from the wide range of capabilities the 
companies claim to possess and which they adapt accordingly to business 
opportunities and the risk environments they operate in (Holmqvist, 
                                                          
1 For literature on production and procurement of military hardware, see e.g. Karpoff et al. 
(1999), Ruttan (2006), Hartung (2011). 
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2005: 5). As Moesgaard (2013: 6) argues: ‘The terminology is at best 
imprecise and at worst confusing.’ 
As a result, various terminologies may be encountered in the body 
of literature on private military industry and its subjects: private military 
firms (PMFs), private military companies or private military contractors 
(PMCs), private security companies (PSCs), military service providers 
(MSPs), risk consultancy firms (RCFs), private security and military 
contractors (PSMCs), private military and security companies or private 
military and security contractors (PMSCs). To illustrate some of these 
examples, Wulf (2002: 97-98), for instance, distinguishes between five 
categories of private military actors – private security companies (PSCs), 
defence producers, private military companies (PMCs), non-statutory 
forces, and mercenaries. Singer (2003: 91), on the other hand, uses a 
general label ‘private military firms (PMFs)’ which he further divides into 
Military Provider Firms (MPFs), Military Consultant Firms (MCF) and 
Military Support Firms (MSFs) distinguished according to their proximity 
to the actual fighting (the ‘front line’). Kinsey (2006: 9) proposes four 
categories in his PMSI typology that is based on whether the object to be 
secured lies in the public or private domain and whether the means of 
securing the object are lethal or not. He distinguishes between private 
combat companies (PCCs), private military companies (PMCs), private 
security companies (PSCs) and freelance operators (mercenaries) (Ibid.). 
Isenberg (2009: 11) uses the overarching term ‘private military 
contractors (PMCs)’ which he divides into Military Combatant Companies 
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(MCC), Military Consulting Firms (MCFs) and Military Support Firms 
(MSF) according to the type of services they provide.  
Some authors, such as Lovewine (2014), maintain a distinction 
between PMCs providing military support services related to warfare, and 
PSCs performing security duties. Nevertheless, demarking the limits 
between military companies and security companies is an uneasy task as 
many companies often offer both military and security services or they 
subcontract the services they do not provide in order to appear more 
robust and capable of fulfilling contract responsibilities (Moesgaard, 2013: 
6).  Large companies such as DynCorp, KBR, Military Professional 
Resources Incorporated (MPRI), Aegis and Vinnell have a record of 
fulfilling large, multi-task government contracts across a wide spectrum of 
activities (O’Brien 2007: 39-40). Isenberg observes that it is natural for the 
companies to react to market demands and be as flexible and dynamic as 
possible and win over their tough competition (2007: 82-93). Therefore 
while the heterogeneous and dynamic nature of the industry is a perfect 
businesswise solution, it renders any efforts to categorise the PMSCs 
misleading and generally unhelpful. Nonetheless, as Kinsey (2006: 8) 
points out, ‘not to attempt to categorise companies will leave those who 
want to understand the nature of the business even more confused’.  
While there is no generally accepted all-inclusive definition of 
private military and/or security companies in the PMSI literature and 
different authors use various definitions. The Montreux Document, from 
2008, ratified by seventeen countries including the United States, United 
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Kingdom, and Iraq, is the most comprehensive effort to define PMSCs and 
can serve as an example of a broadly accepted definition (International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 2008). According to the Montreux Document 
PMSCs are: 
‘private business entities that provide military 
and/or security services, irrespective of how they 
describe themselves. Military and security services 
include, in particular, armed guarding and protection 
of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings 
and other places, maintenance and operation of 
weapons systems, prisoner detention, and advice to 
or training of local forces and security personnel.’ 
(UN General Assembly – Security Council, 2008: 6)  
 
As in the Montreux Document, to get around the unclear distinction 
between the PMCs and PSCs definitions, this thesis adopts the term 
‘private military and security companies’ (PMSCs) as an overarching term 
for private companies providing military support services related to 
warfare, including logistical support and technical assistance, and security 
services, including armed security services. Although this thesis uses the 
terms private security contractors (PSC) and armed private security 
contractors (APSC) it acknowledges it as an artificial theoretical 
distinction only to highlight the nature of the services that some 
companies may specialize in temporarily, rather than attempting to create 
any firm categories of the companies.  
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This thesis concentrates on PMSCs which were contracted by the 
United States governmental agencies Department of Defense and 
Department of State to perform various functions on behalf of the United 
States government in its involvement in stability operations in Iraq. PMSI, 
private military and security industry as defined in Chapter I, is 
understood in this thesis as an overarching umbrella term for a type of 
industry which operates internationally and brings together private 
companies providing military and security services to states and non-state 
legitimate actors. 
In this regard, one of the main reasons why the literature on PMSI 
remains ambiguous and full of contradictions is that there is no consensus 
on the PMSI origins, shape or form, and, therefore, its definition. While 
some authors focus on the military privatisation trend (encompassing the 
whole PMSI), others focus only on specific sectors (logistics, security, 
communication and others), specific services (intelligence, armed security, 
translation and interpretation) or even individual companies, such as 
Blackwater USA (Krahmann, 2010; Kinsey, 2009; Pelton, 2006). One of the 
defining features of the literature is then the variety of perspectives on the 
origins and subsequent definitions of the industry, including individual 
PMSCs as its subjects. The various perspectives on the origins of the 
industry and the academic definitions of the PMSI and PMSCs vary 
according to the perspective on the presumed legacy of traditional 
mercenaries as the predecessors of modern PMSCs. Indeed, the over-
arching theme in most publications within the first and second wave is the 
link between traditional mercenaries and modern PMSI. 
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 Many view the recent large-scale employment of contractors 
alongside the US military in Iraq as an unprecedented development and 
the consequence of the political, economic and social structures after the 
end of the Cold War, and the public perception of wars that accompanied 
these changes (Kinsey and Patterson 2012: 3; Isenberg 2009: 1; Singer 
2003: 49-60). At the same time, the available data shows that civilian 
contractors have been a part of every major US military operation since 
1776 (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, no date). Jeffrey 
Herbst (1997: 110) noted already in 1997, ‘(d)espite the claims in dozens 
of repetitive articles... there is, in fact, nothing novel about the 
subcontracting out of violence to private firms.’  
Looking into history, Carafano (2008: 15-16) further explains that  
by the 15th century, mercenaries in Italy were entrenched in the military 
structure of the various Italian city-states, and similar practices can be 
traced to Prussia and Great Britain, who were using mercenary troops well 
into 18th century to strengthen their military force.2 Kinsey (2006: 16) 
supports this assertion and points out that in the eighteenth century, half 
of the Prussian army and one third of the French military forces were 
composed of hired soldiers. The nationalisation and centralisation of 
military force under state authority following the French Revolution at the 
end of 18th century then led to a new phenomenon: the rise of national 
state armies accompanied by a progressive decline of mercenarism as a 
                                                          
2 The history of condonttieri, as they were called in Italy during the Middle Ages, is still 
relevant in the academic discourse about PMSCs and reference to it, as an earlier version of 
PMSCs reappears in numerous contemporary publications on the topic (Krahmann, 2010: 1, 
Isenberg, 2009b: 17, Carafano, 2008: 17, Wolf, 2006: 105, 112, Smith 2002/2003: 320).    
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conventional way to wage war (Ibid.).3 Percy (2007: 68), who traced the 
history of the mercenary norm, explains that with this change states began 
to control the market for force and either engaged in the trade of units 
themselves or permitted the contracting of mercenaries within their 
territory only under strict license. 
However, mercenarism in its traditional form never really ceased to 
exist and reappeared during the 1950s and 1960s, notably in the Congo, 
and in the 1970s and 1980s in Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Benin, Togo, the 
Comoros Islands and the Seychelles (Adams, 2008: 55). It was in the 1960s 
and 1970s that the brutal methods used by the so called ‘soldiers of 
fortune’ earned them the label of les Affreux – the ‘terrible ones’, in French 
(Spearin, 2010: 41). The examples of involvement of Cold War PMSCs, 
such as now defunct Sandline International and Executive Outcomes 
continue to affect the perception of the PMSI today, leading to the 
establishment of an omnipresent association with mercenaries, seeing 
PMSCs as operating inherently outside the law and being motivated 
exclusively by financial gain.4 Although the Middle Ages mercenaries are a 
question of the past, even today the debate on private contractors is still 
overshadowed by the spectre of mercenaries. This is most apparent in 
regards to the questions related to the (re-)entrance of private entities in 
conflict zones, merits and disadvantages of the use of contractors, their 
reliability, legality, and their position in relation to the military and the 
                                                          
3 For more details on the history of mercenarism, see McFate (2014), Hunt and Carson (2013), 
Percy (2007), Kramer (2007b) and Fowler (2001). 
4 For critical accounts of the PMSI industry as descendants of traditional mercenaries, see 
Fainaru (2009), Scahill (2008), Geraghty (2007), Adams (2008). 
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sovereign states. Nevertheless, as the following paragraphs highlight 
‘(l)abelling all private force as mercenarism is not only a simplification, it 
is also a falacy’ (Moesgaard, 2013: 9). 
Among scholarly writings, three major positions can be identified in 
this regard: 1) the negative approach highlighting the negative aspects of 
PMSCs and their similarities with traditional mercenaries; 2) the neutral 
approach acknowledging similarities with traditional mercenaries but 
stressing the modern corporate character of these entities; 3) the 
pragmatic approach accepting vague links to traditional mercenaries but  
emphasizing the merits of PMSCs and their potential as a versatile solution 
for a number of international security issues and an ‘indispensable’ asset 
of many modern Western militaries. 
The amount of academic literature that holds a predominantly 
negative view on PMSCs is rather small. In this group, for instance, Kateri 
Carmola points out ‘they are merely modern versions of the age-old 
mercenary fighter, a throwback to the day of mercenaries and pirates’ and 
recommends an outright ban on any armed private security contractors 
(2010: 12, 156). Mathieu and Dearden (2006: 745-746) see them as 
‘mercenary corporations’ which ‘provide a wider array of services than 
traditional mercenaries and employ better public relations machines’.  
The legal definition of a mercenary serves as a useful guiding 
principle for determining to what extent modern private military 
companies correspond to the legal description of necessary parameters of 
a concept that they are so often associated with. There are two 
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international conventions that specifically aim to criminalize their 
activities. These are the International Convention against the Recruitment, 
Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries and the former Organization of 
African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa 
which are together known as the mercenary conventions (Cameron, 2006: 
577; UN General Assembly, 1989; Organisation of African Unity, 1977). 
Last but not least the Additional Protocol I. of the Geneva Conventions 
deals with mercenaries in international humanitarian law (International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 1977). 
Since most of the later mercenary conventions adopt a definition of 
mercenaries similar to the one established in Article 47 of Protocol I, it 
serves as a universal reference points to the legal definition of a 
mercenary. Article 47.2 of Additional Protocol I (International Committee 
of the Red Cross, 1977) stipulates: 
‘A mercenary is any person who: 
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in 
  an armed conflict; 
 (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by 
  the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by 
  or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material  
  compensation substantially in excess of that  
  promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and 
  functions in the armed forces of that Party; 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a  
  resident of territory controlled by a Party to the  
  conflict; 
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(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the 
  conflict; and 
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the 
  conflict on official duty as a member of its armed 
  forces.‘ 
 
Not only the definition of mercenary, as in Article 47 of Additional 
Protocol I, concerns solely individuals, but even if artificially applied to 
corporate entities, it is widely considered unworkable (Tonkin, 2011: 17-
27, 181-182; Carmola, 2010: 43). Brooks (2000: 132) uses the term of 
‘freelance mercenaries’ in contrast to PMSCs and states that they are ‘very 
different from PMC/PSCs in terms of operations, clients, accountability 
and the capacity of the international community.’ In his view, security 
contractors, as those who are most likely to be seen as ‘mercenaries,’ work 
in organized companies with ‘dependable income, organized support, and 
benefits such as emergency medical care and evacuation’ (Brooks, 2000: 
132). He asserts that most contractors would not deliberately resort to 
becoming freelancers, only when employment in a private company is not 
an option (Ibid.). 
The second approach in the PMSI literature accepts that there are 
some similarities between traditional mercenaries and PMSCs, but 
acknowledges them as new, different entities in the international security 
environment. Brayton (2002: 305) presents four points that distinguish 
PMCSs from mercenaries: 1) clear presentation of business image, 2) open 
defence and propagation of utility and professionalism, 3) using 
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internationally acknowledged legal and financial resources for realisation 
of the business and 4) support only for internationally recognised 
governments avoiding dubious internationally unrecognised communities. 
In a similar way, Singer (2003: 46) contends that the rise of the modern 
corporation has established a different operating context for private 
combatants. As he explains, in this new context it is difficult to label 
PMSCs, whom he calls Private Military Firms, mercenaries:  
 
‘…PMFs (Private Military Firms) are 
considered legal entities bound to their employers by 
recognized contracts and in many cases at least 
nominally to the home states by laws requiring 
registration, periodic reporting, and licensing of 
foreign contracts… This status differentiates them… 
from mercenaries’ (Ibid). 
 
This view that PMSCs employed by governments in Europe and 
North America behave more like typical multinational businesses and less 
as conventional mercenaries is also shared in, for instance, Krahmann 
(2010: 5-6), Kinsey (2007: 585), Krahmann (2005: 248), and Lilly (2000: 
13).   
The underlying dominant attitude in this approach is to move away 
from the emphasis on links to mercenarism in favour of a more 
sophisticated and complex analysis of the ‘new’ entities within various 
contexts. For instance, Kinsey (2009) distinguishes between armed and 
non-armed contractors and highlights the importance of contractors 
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supplying equipment and manpower services to ensure that militaries get 
the supplies they need to go to war. Similarly, Avant (2009) dismisses the 
label of mercenaries and argues that ‘(t)oday’s private security companies 
are corporate endeavours that perform logistics support, training, 
security, intelligence work, risk analysis, and much more.’ This does not 
mean that the authors within this category are supporters of PMSCs, it 
only means that they acknowledge the breadth and depth of the PMSCs 
involvement in all types of settings.  
Finally, the third category that can be distinguished in terms of 
approaches to the industry is the pragmatic (potentialist) approach. This 
approach is the least preoccupied with the arguable links to traditional 
mercenarism and focusses instead on contractors’ future as a versatile 
solution to many problems states may encounter in large scale military 
operations. Its growth has been stimulated by the extent of the US reliance 
on contractors in Iraq (2003-2011) and Afghanistan (2001-2014) and the 
vast amount of government and non-government reporting documenting 
the magnitude of this trend within these interventions. As an illustration, 
despite pointing out a number of serious issues related to the industry, 
David Isenberg (2009: 49) concludes that the US cannot operate without 
contractors and that they are an indispensable part of all US military 
endeavours in the future due to the disconnect between U.S. geopolitical 
ambitions and the resources provided for them. Perceived as the nexus 
between the military needs and its in-house capabilities, the services 
provided by contractors are deemed indispensable to warfighting 
operations (Singer, 2007; Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
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Management in Expeditionary Operations (Gansler Commission), 2007: 3). 
Therefore, although many social scientists, journalists, and members of the 
general public view contracting out functions in national security and 
defence as anomalous, even shady, the US government has slowly fully 
embraced it and has come to view it as a necessary part of policy 
(Bruneau, 2011: 211). 
 
III.II. The First Phase – Notorious Post-Cold War Companies 
The first attempt to open the debate about the emerging trend of 
military and security privatisation can be traced back to 1990s when some 
of the first observations of companies making profit by providing combat 
advisory and security services in the zones of conflict emerged. It was the 
involvement of Executive Outcomes (EO) and Sandline International (SI) 
in Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone and Angola which brought the issue of 
contracting for military and security services to the spotlight. SI was 
contracted in 1997 by the government of Papua New Guinea to train and 
provide logistical support to the government’s defence force and one year 
later, in 1998, in Sierra Leone to help restore the elected president to 
power after he had been ousted in a military coup led by the Sierra Leone 
Army (Hirsch, 2001, Tonkin, 2011: 41-47). EO’s first major contract was to 
protect oil installations in Angola against the rebel group UNITA (The 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and between 1993 
and 1994 it was contracted to train about 4,000 to 5,000 Angolan 
government troops and 30 pilots and ultimately became involved in 
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military operations of the three-year long civil war (Isenberg, 1997; 
Cleary, 1999: 161). 
Although they were hardly a new phenomenon on the international 
stage, preceded by others, such as WatchGuard, KAS Enterprises or 
Saladin Security, they received increased attention as their activities 
became discussed in the context of the concept of ‘corporate mercenarism’ 
and their undermining impact on African security (Francis, 1999). Kinsey 
(2006: 25-28) explained the re-emergence of these business entities on 
the African continent as a consequence of the Western reluctance to get 
involved in bloody civil wars on the continent, which opened the door for a 
market solution. The most notorious companies of this early stage were 
EO, Sandline International, Defense Systems Limited, Gurkha Security 
Guards, and MPRI, which became well-known following its involvement in 
the former Yugoslavia (Mehlum et al., 2002: 447-448). The case studies of 
these prominent companies received attention as the governments of the 
concerned states hired these companies not only to train their military 
forces but occasionally also to support direct offensive operations 
(Avebury, 2000; Francis, 1999; Lock, 1998; Dinnen, 1997). As such, the 
first wave is dominated by writings covering the activities of these most 
prominent companies of this period, the incentives for their re-emergence, 
and problematizing their impact on the understanding of state 
sovereignty.  
In regards to identifying the sources of the re-emerging 
phenomenon, there is a consensus in the literature that many external 
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factors come in play and they reinforce each other towards the same 
direction – large scale military and security privatisation. The end of the 
Cold War and the associated loosened influence over previously controlled 
spheres of influence appears to be the most important structural incentive 
which put in motion many other related developments. One of the 
highlighted issues are then the post-Cold War military downsizing and 
budget cuts which resulted in large numbers of ex-military professionals 
made available to work outside of national military structures (Singer, 
2001: 194, Kinsey, 2006: 28-31). 
In the context of the United States in particular, this labour pool has 
been further enriched by the US government decision to abandon the Draft 
following the Vietnam War and the ensuing gradual professionalization of 
the All-Volunteer US military force (Carafano, 2008: 29-56). The limited 
available force, in addition to other more contentious issues, such as 
possible domestic public political backlash, ‘western’ casualty sensitivity, 
and the reluctance to get involved in potentially risky missions, is then 
often connected to the general unwillingness to deploy military force in 
conflict environments only vaguely related to states national interests 
(Mandel, 2002: 55-71). This lack of western willingness then presumably 
created a security vacuum in many of the instability-prone environments 
which were enthusiastically filled in by the emerging PMSI (Lovewine, 
2014: 2-5).  
Finally, the impact of the early private military and security 
companies on the sovereignty of the state received most attention in the 
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first wave scholarly writing on military and security privatisation. It is 
important to note that the initial focus was on outsourcing by weak, 
mostly African, states which were plagued by violence and lack of military 
capability to establish order on their own territories. Although these early 
private military and security companies demonstrated valuable skills, 
adaptability, and agility in deploying a body of force into unstable 
violence-prone environments, their long-term strategic impact was 
regarded as dubious and most-likely undermining the sovereignty of the 
states. In many cases, they were able to do what the UN peacekeepers 
were unable and unwilling to do: take sides and quickly achieve stability 
(O’Brien, 2000b: 71). However, such externally imposed termination of the 
regional conflict often proved short-lived and counterproductive for 
achieving long-term stability (Ibid.).  
Facing growing domestic problems and increased levels of violence 
in an environment where powerful states and regional or international 
organisations are unable or unwilling to provide outside security 
assistance, many weak states do not have other options than to turn to 
such private security providers as the means of ensuring their own 
stability and, indeed, continuity (Mandel, 2002: 61). As O’Brien (2000: 71) 
summarised:  
  
‘The international community has 
demonstrated time and again its unwillingness to 
become involved in regional conflicts where Western 
foreign policy concerns are not threatened directly; 
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this gap will continue to be filled by private military 
company.’ 
  
This simplified narrative does not capture the complexity and 
variety of the academic literature emerging in its first phase of scholarly 
writings on this topic in the early Post-Cold War. Nevertheless, it 
highlights the main areas that grabbed attention and were to be further 
explored later on in the second and third phase.   
 
III.III. The Second Phase – The Iraq and Afghanistan Boom 
The range of issues raised in the 1990s about the growing trend of 
military and security privatisation was significantly widened and 
deepened with the US intervention in Iraq.  Before then, studies covering 
the emerging military privatisation in developed countries were non-
existent, and if mentioned at all, it was only to establish the background of 
the some of the notorious companies which had headquarters either in the 
US (MPRI) or the UK (Sandline International). The invasion of Iraq 
signified a dramatic shift in the focus, both geographically and 
substantially, of the scholarly literature on military privatisation in the 
Western world and was predominantly concerned with issues 
surrounding the US use of contractors, exploring the breadth and depth of 
their involvement to sustain its military operations across Iraq and 
Afghanistan (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007).  
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In the previous phase the argument for contractors’ deployment in 
civil conflicts of weak and unstable states was discussed by many authors 
as a potential solution to avoid mass-civilian deaths or genocide (Bures, 
2005; Cilliers, 2002; Brayton, 2002; Brooks, 2000; McIvor, 1998). On the 
contrary, the massive contractors’ deployment in support of the US 
military operations in the Middle East became viewed as a strategically 
calculated decision to reduce the military footprint and minimize the 
domestic political costs associated with large long-term military 
deployments against the public approval.  Closely linked to the US invasion 
of Iraq in 2003, the then emerging literature was mostly concerned with 
issues surrounding the US use of contractors, exploring the breadth and 
depth of their involvement to sustain the US military operations across the 
Middle East. Although contractors were employed robustly also in the War 
in Afghanistan, it was the War in Iraq which sparked the debate. The 
monographs of Kinsey (2009), Isenberg (2009), Carafano (2008), Pelton 
(2006), Chatterjee (2004) and Singer (2003) elaborate the growth of the 
PMSI across its three most prominent sectors, including reconstruction, 
logistics and security, and reflect on the US military needs created by the 
invasion of Iraq. 
Representing the two countries with the largest number of private 
military and security companies’ headquarters registered in their 
territories, the US and UK quickly became the prime focus of researchers 
to investigate the development of the trend. The volume of contractors 
involved in the operations on the ground in both Iraq and Afghanistan 
quickly became one of the key features of the scholarly publications. 
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Debates on US military dependency on contractors providing logistics 
support opened the door for a discussion about how much impact 
contractors have on US operations and how much influence they exercise 
(Singer, 2007).  
In addition, a number of highly publicised incidents involving 
armed security contractors came to light in 2003-2004, including the Abu 
Ghraib prisoners’ abuse and the notorious Blackwater-Fallujah ambush. 
Later, in 2007, the infamous Nisour Square massacre which left 14 
civilians dead and at least 17 wounded, spurred interest in military and 
security privatisation by established democratic states and called into 
question the issues in regards to industry regulation, control, and 
accountability.  
As such, the most prominent feature of the literature in this phase 
is the discussion on the issues related to international and domestic law 
and regulation. Most studies point out that the available regulatory 
regimes are insufficient to address the perceived legal void in regards to 
private military and security companies employed along US military forces 
in the zones of conflict and analyse the difficulties in applying them in 
situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most publications address the issues of 
jurisdiction – sending state or host state, legal code – the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) or the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ), or the contractors immunity from prosecution, such as the 
Provisional Authority Order 17 in Iraq, which exempted all Coalition 
personnel from Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to the terms 
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and conditions of their contracts (Rubin, 2007). De Nevers (2009), 
Lehnardt (2008), and Dickinson (2005) provide insightful overviews of 
the position of PMSCs in currently available legal frameworks. Lehnardt 
(2008: 1031) concludes that contrary to the public perception of non-
existence of applicable law, appropriate law is available but applicable 
with great difficulties and therefore, not enforced. A self-regulatory 
framework in the form of corporate social responsibility and required 
industry standards were proposed as an alternative to the currently 
available, unsuitable, legal framework (Kinsey, 2005; Cockayne, 2007: 
205-208). Kinsey (2005) suggested introducing a voluntary code of 
conduct, but points out that while it may encourage companies to perform 
their services in line with collectively agreed standards, it does not 
provide states with real sanctioning options in case of misconduct and, 
therefore its disciplinary value is dubious. Similarly, de Nevers (2009b: 
515-516) concludes that the industry does not exhibit the capacity to 
adopt and implement effective self-regulation on its own due to the nature 
of the industry and the context it mostly operates in, and adds that 
participation in the design and oversight of self-regulation must be 
broadened beyond private security companies alone if it is to have any 
practical value. 
The efforts to design a new regulatory framework can be also 
understood as a major step away from the first-phase condemnation of 
contractors as mercenaries towards a more pragmatic approach which 
views them as legitimate businesses whose activities need to be regulated. 
It is also in this phase when the industry sought to institute itself as a 
98 
 
legitimate and professional business sector by establishing trade 
associations such as the International Stability Operations Association 
(ISOA) formerly known as International Peace Operations Association 
(IPOA) founded in 2001 in Washington D.C., and the British Association of 
Private Security Companies (BAPSC) in 2006 in London (Moesgaard, 2013: 
11). These efforts send a clear message to both scholars and political 
decision makers that the emerging industry is serious about distancing 
itself from the negative associations ingrained in the label ‘mercenary’ by 
promoting its professional corporate character (Ibid.).  
The legal discussion also brought to the front the related questions 
of moral, normative and ethical concerns in regards to the employment of 
PMSCs along state’s military forces. Given the circumstances of the 
stability operations and counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan at that time, the questions on the use, implications and impact 
of contractors in these type of operations became particularly prominent. 
The discussion on the positive and negative aspects, the good and the bad, 
of their involvement are a common trait of many publications from this 
period, including Hammes (2011), Isenberg (2009), Avant and Nevers 
(2013), and Carafano (2008). Following the various incidents contractors 
were involved, it became clear that contractors’ presence and activities on 
the ground in US expeditionary operations is not inconsequential and that 
responsible contractor behaviour makes important contribution to how 
the US-led coalition force is presented and perceived by the host state’s 
population.  
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 The US Armed Forces went through a learning process with the 
COIN strategy in Iraq and the change of strategy in 2007 had profound 
implication for their operations and rules of engagement. At the heart of 
the new strategy for the Surge was the fight for legitimacy, upholding the 
rule of law, and holding its violators accountable.  In this new 
environment, the potential confrontational or threatening image of 
contractors was seen particularly problematic to the overall aims of the 
new strategy. For instance, Fitzsimmons (2013: 707-708) argued that 
‘Blackwater maintained a relatively bellicose military culture that placed 
strong emphasis on norms encouraging its security teams to exercise 
personal initiative, proactive use of force, and an exclusive approach to 
security, which together motivated its personnel to use violence quite 
freely against anyone suspected of posing a threat.’5 
Overall, the preoccupation with the industry regulation, control, 
and accountability, particularly zoomed in on the US-led intervention in 
Iraq and Afghanistan was clearly a shift of the geographical and 
substantial focus. While in the first wave, the debates focussed on the 
involvement of the newly emerged companies in weak African and Balkan 
countries stimulated by the Western reluctance to intervene in their 
conflicts, the second wave, focusses on military outsourcing by Western 
countries with strong armies in their wars of choice. Driven by the 
maturity of the PMSI markets in the two countries and the availability of 
the information on the involvement of the companies with their 
                                                          
5 For further discussion of this topic, see Carafano (2008), Dunigan (2011), Fainaru (2009),  
Scahill (2008), and Isenberg (2009). 
100 
 
headquarters there involved in the US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
89 per cent of the studies on Western military outsourcing between 2003 
and 2012 focus on military and security privatisation in the US and UK. 
Although isolated case studies of Canada, Sweden or Germany also 
emerged, the almost exclusive focus on the US and UK is overwhelming 
(van Meegdenburg, 2015: 332).6 
  
III.IV. The Third Phase – Post-Iraq War  
As the US military official involvement in Iraq was completed in 
2011, with the drawdown of the forces a new phase in the scholarly 
literature emerged. Although the focus on the US and UK remained the 
dominant geographical focus, issues other than regulation, control and 
accountability also emerged. Possibly the most significant trait that 
distinguishes this phase from the previous one is the realization and 
acceptance that the PMSI covers a multitude of services across diverse 
environments and is not simply engaged with armed security services in 
conflict zones. Although the focus on the more controversial type of 
contracting, armed security contracting, has originally sparked the interest 
of both academics and practitioners, today it can be argued that there is a 
better balance between research focussing on the front security functions 
as well as the rear-support functions. This step appears particularly 
pertinent as the largest proportion of the services contracted by the US in 
                                                          
6 For examples of non-UK/US case studies see: Canada – Perry (2009), Sweden – Berndtsson 
(2013), and Germany – Krahmann (2010) and Krahmann (2005b). 
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Iraq fell in the category of support and facility functions (Thibault et al., 
2011: 23). 
This new, re-balanced focus on understanding of the participation 
and its implications of both front and rear-support functions, led to more 
discussion on the involvement and labour conditions of Third Country 
Nationals often from low-wage countries, who represented the majority of 
rear-support functions in Iraq and Afghanistan (Stillman, 2011, Newman, 
2012). As Chisholm (2014), pointed out there was gender and racial 
hierarchy of security contractors in Afghanistan which resulted in vastly 
different possibilities depending on the contractors' histories and 
nationalities. Torture and human rights abuse issues were replaced by 
investigations into possible human trafficking and poor working 
conditions of contractors responsible for services such as food 
preparation, waste disposal, and cleaning based on their race and origin, 
which opened a new, unexplored avenue in this dynamic research field. 
McCoy (2010) pointed out that Third Country Nationals represented the 
majority the PMSI labour force in Iraq and Afghanistan which enabled the 
PMSI to operate low-wage policy in regards to the migrant labour force 
that proved economically efficient for the companies and, by extension, 
the contracting states.  
In close relation to these, a relatively new area of research studies 
focusses on gender studies, represented by the work of Higate (2012), 
Joachim and Schneiker (2012), and Eichler (2015). They address the 
questions of masculinity and race among the contractors workforce, issues 
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of the masculinized ‘othering’ and subordination of TCNs working as 
security guards, as well as, re-examine the stereotypical associations of 
gender and roles (female protected versus male protector) within the 
private military and security industry context. Among these, the issue of 
image, perception and self-perception is particularly interesting. The 
research of Joachim and Schneiker (2012) studies how PMSCs seek to 
create an image of themselves as legitimate and acceptable contract 
parties, while presenting themselves as ‘new humanitarians’ by forging 
alliances with more traditional humanitarian actors and increasingly 
growing their involvement in this field. 
Similarly, Kruck and Spencer (2013) point out the contradiction 
that can be seen in regards to the PMSCs’ image portrayed by the media 
and themselves. While the media portray them as incompetent cowboys, 
mercenaries and human rights abusers, they perceive themselves as, and 
seek to persuade others about being, technical and military experts, 
professional businessman, even humanitarians (Kruck and Spencer, 
2013). Relevant other writings examine not only how contractors are 
viewed by civilians, but also by their counterparts, the national troops. 
Issues of competition, antagonism and lack of trust have been examined in 
great detail by, for instance, Cotton et al. (2010), Petersohn (2011) and 
Petersohn (2013). Kelty and Bierman (2013), another example, study how 
the presence of contractors influences civilian and military personnel and 
conclude that there are mixed results. While flexibility and effectivness are 
marked relatively positive by the men and women working with 
contractors in active theatres of war, the views on efficiency and cost 
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savings are less optimistic (Ibid.: 22). This is certainly a pertinent avenue 
for further research as it is highly relevant to the issue of how contractors 
are perceived not only when employed by nation states in military 
operations abroad, but also domestically and by their counterparts whose 
efforts they ought to complement. 
In regards to issues other than gender, image and perceptions, the 
questions related to the consequences of contractors’ employment 
alongside the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, mental health and post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) syndrome among contractors in 
particular are another new highly pertinent direction. Related to the 
earlier mentioned debates about the varied experiences of contractors 
based on their race, gender, and origin, Dunigan et al. (2013) sheds light 
on how variations in preparation, levels of combat exposure, and living 
conditions can make difference on contractors' deployment experiences. 
Among other things, the study concluded that according to the survey 
completed for the purpose of this study, 25 percent of the contractors 
sample met criteria for probable PTSD, 18 percent screened positive for 
depression, and 50 percent reported alcohol misuse. In addition, it points 
out that transportation contractors ranked on the top of all those affected, 
most likely due to greater combat exposure than other categories 
(Dunigan, 2013). Although PTSD and related mental health issues among 
military troops have been the focus of scholarly research for decades, the 
Dunigan et al. (2013) study clearly marks a new chapter in the research on 
military and security privatisation and the breadth and depth of its 
‘human’ implications.  
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Outsourcing in conflict zones by other entities than nation states is 
another avenue to be more deeply explored in the current scholarly 
literature on the military and security privatisation. Non-state, 
intergovernmental actors as well as private corporations such as oil and 
maritime companies, and state-independent NGOs are one of the potential 
other avenues how to widen the scope of research beyond the usual nation 
states. In particular, international bodies, such as NATO, the European 
Union Police Agency (EUROPOL), and the UN are known to be relying on 
the services provided by a wide range of contractors and they are worth to 
be explored further. Leander and Krahmann’s project on contracting 
during UN, NATO, and EU interventions in Congo, Afghanistan, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina looking at regulatory, operational, and representational 
procedures and the cooperation of these intergovernmental organisations 
with the PMSI, is one of the very few large projects in this area (Research 
Councils UK, no date).  
The main contribution of this phase was placing the concept of 
private force into a wider context and defining PMSCs in military, security 
but also societal dimensions capturing the breadth and depth of the 
phenomenon. Although scholarly writings often claim to present findings 
that concern Western states, North America and Europe, in fact, only the 
US and the UK case studies have been examined to some detail until today. 
The newest stream of research began to expand the view beyond these 
usual suspects by including Germany (Krahmann, 2005b; Krahmann, 
2010; Krahmann, 2013), Sweden (Berndtsson, 2013; Berndtsson and 
Stern, 2013), and France (Olsson, 2013), which confirm that their extent 
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and type of reliance on contractors differs greatly from the US and UK. It is 
then desirable to seek to broaden the insight into the situation in other 
parts of the world to further advance the understanding of the 
implications of defence commercialization globally and gain valuable 
findings for broader set of potential scenarios in the future.  
 
III.V. Contribution 
Despite the inconclusive discussion about the various aspects of 
PMSI in modern warfare, there appears to be widespread agreement, that 
contractors are not inconsequential (Hammes, 2011; Isenberg, 2009; 
Avant and Nevers, 2013; Carafano, 2008). Despite different assessments 
and different characterisations, a large proportion of the up-to-date 
literature agrees that contractors served as enablers in the US War in Iraq, 
but also an enabler of the US global presence while waging a war 
simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan. They enabled the US to fight in 
two theatres simultaneously with a relatively small force against a 
complex insurgency (Ibid.).  
When it comes to assessing the contribution of PMSI to modern 
military operations, the PMSI literature distinguishes four major forms – 
1) Contribution as characteristics of the military outsourcing trend, 2) 
contribution as an area of activities, 3) contribution as occupations and 4) 
contribution as functions. As a result, this chapter attempts to present and 
systematise the up-to-date writings on contractors and make an argument 
for a more structured analysis of their presence and involvement in 
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modern operations. The section presents how different authors 
characterise the contribution of PMSI, why it is considered insufficient and 
how this thesis seeks to address the insufficiency. 
In respect to PMSI literature, while contractors’ contribution is the 
invisible thread across many writings on PMSCs, it is often given scant 
theoretical attention. Most authors refer to it in somewhat unclear and 
undefined manner that has a very limited usefulness for some broader 
understanding of its meaning and its implications. The main issue with 
inconsistent contribution identification is that it can lead to false 
expectations in terms of their potential costs and benefits of using PMSCs 
in various operations. In order to provide a more systematic and in depth 
overview, this chapter identifies four dominant ways how the up-to-date 
discussion on PMSCs’ contribution can be viewed in the PMSI literature: 1) 
contribution as characteristics of the military outsourcing trend, 2) 
contribution as an area of activities, 3) contribution as occupations and 4) 
contribution as functions. 
Description of the characteristics of the outsourcing trend is the 
most basic understanding of contribution that can be identified in the 
academic literature on PMSI. Associating the emergence of the PMSI with 
the end of the Cold War and its establishment as a key component of US 
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the academic literature 
focussing on the contribution of PMSCs is full of terms broadly 
characterising the outsourcing trend. At least two types of characterizing 
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the trend of military and security outsourcing can be distinguished: 
describing the process and describing the state.  
In terms of describing the process, some of the common terms used 
to describe the contribution of PMSCs are captured through describing the 
extent to which they involved in modern military operations. These 
include: larger, increasingly important, emerging, expanding, and 
changing. As this is the most superficial engagement with the 
understanding of contribution, it is also the most common across the PMSI 
literature. For instance, Krahmann (2013: 165, 168, 174) characterises the 
contribution of PMSCs as ‘growing’, Mathieu and Dearden (2007: 748) 
refer to the PMSCs’ contribution as ‘larger,’ Kinsey (2006: 3) notes it is 
‘expanding’, and Avant (2004) points out that the today’s contribution of 
private security firm is ‘changing’. In respect to describing the state of the 
trend, some of the terms used to describe the contribution of PMSCs are: 
vital, decisive, critical, controversial, crucial, substantial, significant, 
prominent, strategic, and instrumental.  Avant (2007: 459) and Isenberg 
(2009: 17, 44) describe the contribution of contractors as ‘significant’, 
Pattison (2014: 21) characterises the contribution of contractors who 
provide security services as ‘controversial’, Cotton et al. (2010: 32) assess 
their contribution as ‘decisive’, and Lovewine (2014: 66, 70, 104, 112, 133, 
149) uses the term ‘substantial’ and ‘prominent’ in reference to their 
contribution in GWOT.  
In terms of contribution as a description of an area of activity, some 
of the common terms used to describe the type of contribution PMSCs 
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make in operations are: combat, civilian, civil-police, logistical/logistics, 
reconstruction, intelligence (gathering), training and security contribution. 
This approach is one step above the most simplistic understanding of 
contribution as a description of the privatisation trend and focusses on the 
breadth of contractors activities, highlighting the variety of their skills and 
abilities in both military and non-military operations. Efflandt (2014: 49, 
55) discusses the post-9/11 use of private security companies in what he 
deems a ‘new combat role’; Hedahl (2009: 24) argues that the use of 
military contractors in ‘security’ roles will be increasingly problematic 
with increasing levels of contractors on the battlefield. Cotton et al. (2010: 
3) contend that the recent dramatic rise in the use of armed private 
security personnel in military and nation-building operations is the result 
of post-Cold War privatisation of many ‘military, security and training 
roles’ that are now performed by contractors.  
Description of the PMSCs occupations is another example of the 
way contribution has been used in the PMSI literature. As a step above a 
description of an area of activity, it attributes a specific meaning to the 
contribution by defining the activities contractors perform. Some of the 
common terms used to describe the contribution of PMSCs as an 
occupation within this category are: interpreter(s), translator(s), 
bodyguard(s), (armed) security contractor(s), and analyst(s). In particular, 
using the term armed security contractor(s) or security contractor as a 
denomination of their contribution is very common in the PMSI literature 
(Isenberg, 2009; Elsea, 2010; Schwartz, 2010). Schumacher (2006: 15) 
provides a number of contributions contractors provide based on their 
109 
 
occupation: ‘construction contractors’, ‘trucking contractors’, ‘training 
contractors’, ‘technical assistance contractors’ and ‘security contractors.’ 
Finally, description of the PMSCs functions as contributions is the 
last distinct example of the way contribution has been used in the PMSI 
literature, and the most advanced in terms of providing understanding of 
their contribution as a characteristic form of engagement. This approach is 
more specific than a mere description of PMSCs area of activities or 
occupations, as it takes into consideration other aspects of the 
contribution such as the purpose of the activity, the quality of performance 
and/or the impact of the activity within a set context. As such, the use of 
contribution to describe the functions of PMSCs is the most advanced 
understanding of contribution within the PMSI literature and reflects an 
expected behaviour pattern within a certain context. Some of the common 
terms used to describe the contribution of PMSCs within this category are: 
(military) competitor(s), force multiplier(s), peacemaker(s), spoiler(s). 
Cotton et al. (2010: 2) investigates whether PMSCs were a ‘force 
multiplier’ in Iraq, characterised ‘by providing skills and services that the 
armed forces lack, and by providing surge capacity and critical security 
services that have made Operation Iraqi Freedom possible.’ Avant (2009: 
104) investigates how PSCs fit in the context of state-building and notes 
that despite the increasing tendency to resort to PSCs for military and 
security training, ‘PSCs pose dilemmas to would be state-builders.’ 
Although she does not provide a specific definition of the function of 
‘peacemaker’ or ‘spoiler’ used in the title, she explains that PSCs can be 
seen both ‘as an avenue to fix broken security institutions in the face of the 
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shortage of western troops (or will)’ or ‘as an option that increases the 
chance for opportunism’ preventing an establishment of effective security 
institutions (Ibid.). Although her analysis reveals that she seeks to 
examine the impact PSCs make on state building through creating the link 
between micro-institutional setting and the strategic action, she does not 
provide any deeper understanding of why she chooses to distinguish only 
between the two polarised types of contribution or what their specific 
attributes are (Ibid.: 106).  
A similar logic can be seen in Brooks (2000: 129), who proposes a 
polarised distinction between ‘messiahs’ and ‘mercenaries’ in reference to 
private companies that provide military services worldwide. Similarly to 
Avant, although his title suggests an analysis distinguishing between two 
different contributions to be associated with contractors, he only provides 
a definition of ‘freelance mercenaries’ as ‘private individual soldiers that 
offer military services on the open market to the highest bidder’ and fails 
to explain why the analysis is limited to two types of contributions, 
supposedly the complete opposites, and what are the traits of those 
contributions in more detail.  
Bruneau (2011) assigns a curious denomination of contribution to 
contractors labelling them ‘patriots for profit’, presumably merging 
together the polarised categories identified by Avant (2009) and Brooks 
(2000), however, without providing any concrete definition of what such 
label entails. Similarly, Singer (2003) uses the term ‘corporate warriors’, 
Mayer (2010) calls them ‘peaceful warriors’, and Prince (2013) labels 
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them ‘civilian warriors’ presumably pointing out the contrast of civilian 
and military nature of responsibilities combined in the activities of PMSCs 
in Iraq. Nevertheless, it remains unclear the specific attributes of such 
denomination and how it could be used effectively in the area of policy-
making.  
 
III. VI. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an insight into how the literature on the 
PMSI has developed and diversified following the end of the Cold War. 
This literature review sought how to present the ongoing academic debate 
on military and security privatisation in terms of its scope, gradual growth 
and relevant circumstances shaping its development. It has offered both a 
chronological and thematic perspective on the major areas and how they 
have been approached in the research of military and security 
privatisation. As to the discussion of the PMSI contribution in various 
contexts, four major categories were identified: contribution as 
characterisation of the outsourcing trend, as an identification of area of 
activities, as an occupation, and as a function. While these approaches are 
certainly useful for conveying the magnitude of the contractors’ 
involvement (breadth and depth) across a wide range of modern military 
and non-military operations, they are limited in their application for 
policy-making seeking to optimize the use of PMSCs to achieve the most 
balanced outcome. As such, this chapter identified a gap in the literature, 
understood as a lack of a systematic framework for contribution 
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assessment in the context of military and security privatisation that would 
be universally applicable to a wide range of different contractors and their 
services within various contexts.  
To circumvent these obstacles and develop a more fitting 
framework to assess the contribution of the PMSI in Phase IV Operations 
in Iraq, this thesis uses the Four-Stage Hayes and Wheelwright model from 
the field of operations management, elaborated in the next chapter, as a 
point of departure. This model: 1) opens a way for a formation of a 
typology that is hierarchically structured based on the significance of the 
subject and the difference it makes towards achieving a defined strategy; 
2) rests on the characterisation of the individual type of contribution by a 
number of clearly defined observable indicators that define each 
contribution and which are common across the typology range, and thus 
3) enables to highlight the diversity within the typology and enables a 
comparison of traits of the individual contribution categories across the 
framework.  
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IV. The Contribution Framework 
 
Before proceeding to analyse the kind of contribution contractors 
made in Iraq from 2003 until 2011, it is vital to clarify basic concepts and 
theories that assist in identifying the research problem and frame its 
analysis. As the literature review (Chapter III) highlighted, there is a 
particular gap in the scholarly literature on military outsourcing that this 
thesis seeks to address: the lack of critical understanding of the kind of 
contribution the PMSI made to the US military’s capability in Phase IV 
Operations in Iraq (2003-2011). In order to fill this gap, this thesis 
proposes a typology of five possible contribution categories – Assistant, 
Implementer, Crucial Supporter, Driver and Spoiler – as a tool to analyse 
the difference contractors made in the US military operations in Iraq 
beyond the usual black or white, good or bad-impact, evaluation.  
The aim of this framework is to argue for an association between 
the presence and activities of the PMSI and a set of relevant observable 
attributes of the Phase IV Operations in Iraq, based on systematic enquiry. 
To do so, this chapter utilizes the logic described in the Hayes and 
Wheelwright Four-Stage Model. This operations management model 
describes a potential evolutionary role of manufacturing within a business 
strategy, going through four stages, from merely ensuring operations are 
coherent with business objectives, all the way to using operations as a 
source of competitive advantage (Wheelwright and Hayes, 1985: 99). This 
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descriptive framework for understanding how manufacturing contributes 
to overall strategic goals of an organisation is then adapted to assess the 
contribution of the PMSI to the US military’s capability in Phase IV 
Operations in Iraq 2003-2011. 
Accordingly, this chapter is organised under the following sections.  
First, the Hayes and Wheelwright Four-Stage Model is introduced. 
This model, from the field of operations management, is used as the basis 
for the Conceptual Framework of this thesis due to its simple logic and 
versatility, which allows to develop it further, broaden it and adapt it to fit 
the purpose of this project. The original model describes four different 
stages for the Operations Function and three possible contribution 
categories which can be deduced from it – to implement, to support, and to 
drive the Operations Strategy. These can be then translated into 
contribution categories of Implementer, Crucial Supporter and Driver. In 
order to provide a more complete range of contribution categories, this 
section proposes to broaden the range by adding the categories of 
Assistant and Spoiler. Assistant represents the category of contribution 
smaller than Implementer and Spoiler is the sole category which permits 
to consider potentially destructive, undesirable contribution, undermining 
the strategy and the potential to achieve the strategic goal. Adding this 
category is particularly pertinent for studying the contribution of PMSI, 
because an often held view is that they are ‘spoilers’ and have a negative 
impact (as discussed in the literature review). Introducing this additional 
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category and comparing it to other possible categories allows to present a 
more well-rounded view on their contributions. 
The following section, the Contribution Framework, introduces the 
three levels of the framework, which consist of assessing the contribution 
level, the significance of the provided service, and the individual 
observable indicators of the significance of the provided services specific 
for each contribution category. In the first instance, the distinction 
between main and additional contribution is explained and how it is 
related to the proposed typology of contributions. Secondly, the 
significance of the provided service to the employed strategy is presented 
and the related characteristic of the significance, according to the 
individual contribution categories, is highlighted. Finally, the indicators of 
significance of the provided service for the strategy are established as the 
key elements of the framework which enable to operationalise the 
empirical analysis in the subsequent chapters. 
The third section of this chapter, Conceptual Framework 
Application, then brings all the elements of the Conceptual Framework 
together and demonstrates how it will be applied in the empirical 
chapters. It takes the two types of services selected for empirical chapter 
analyses and demonstrates how the framework will be applied to each of 
them. It briefly outlines why these two types of services have been 
selected for the empirical analysis, presents the key questions that the 
Conceptual Framework requires to answer and highlights potential issues 
when applying this framework and how to mitigate their impact. 
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Last, the Conclusion completes the chapter by providing an 
overview of the framework elaborated within this chapter, highlighting 
the new insights and benefits for our understanding it provides.   
 
IV.I. The Hayes and Wheelwright Four-Stage Model and Its 
Adaptation 
Operations management is a sub-field of business studies that 
scrutinizes the design and management of products, processes, services 
and supply chains in order to create the highest level of efficiency possible 
within an organization. It is about how organisations create and deliver 
services and products their clients want, considering the acquisition, 
development, and resources application that they need to fulfil that goal 
(Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2010: 89-90)1. In simple terms, the main 
concern of operations management is converting materials and labour into 
goods and services as efficiently as possible to maximize the profit of an 
organization. In order to do so, every organisation has three core 
functions: an Operations Function responsible for the creation and 
delivery of services and products based on customer requests; Marketing 
Function responsible for presenting and promoting the organisation’s 
services and products to its markets in order to generate customer 
requests; and Product/Service Development Function responsible for 
developing new and modified services and products in order to generate 
future customer requests (Ibid).  
                                                          
1 See also Jones and Robinson (2012); Mahadevan (2010); Barnes (2008). 
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In order to assess the contribution of the PMSI in the US Phase IV 
Operations in Iraq 2003-2011, this thesis uses the Hayes and Wheelwright 
Four-Stage Model (Wheelwright and Hayes, 1985; Hayes and 
Wheelwright, 1984) as its point of reference. Based on this model it 
conceptualises the typology of five distinct categories of contribution and 
deduces individual characteristics for each type. Due to its simple logic 
and broad versatility, the original Hayes and Wheelwright model has 
achieved widespread acceptance in the operations management field and 
beyond, as a valuable analytical tool for understanding the ability of any 
operation (or an element, in general) to contribute to organisational aims 
of any type of company. The model traces the progression of the 
Operations Function from an internally-neutral-impact contribution, at the 
stage 1, to an externally-supportive-impact contribution, at the stage 4, 
where it becomes the central (driving) element of the competitive 
Operations Strategy. The model traces the progression of the Operations 
Function within four different stages - from being the main challenge 
(holding the organisation back) to becoming the driver of the Operations 
Strategy (giving an operations advantage) (Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 
2010: 71). The following graph captures the core of the Hayes and 
Wheelwright model. 
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Figure 6 - The Hayes and Wheelwright Four Stage Model 
Source: Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2010: 89-90. 
 
Stage 1 (Internal neutrality) is a very poor level of contribution and 
the function has very little positive to contribute towards competitive 
success of the company (Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2007: 37). 
Paradoxically, its goal is ‘to be ignored’ and improve by ‘avoiding making 
mistakes’ (Ibid). At Stage 2 the Operations Function’s aim is to help the 
company to gain and maintain parity with its competitors by slowly 
improving its performance, trying to implement best practice (‘being 
externally neutral’) (Ibid). By Stage 3, the Operations Function’s 
performance is assessed as ‘internally supportive’ and provides credible 
support to the Operations Strategy (Ibid.: 38). In other words, at this stage 
the Operations Function makes the strategy happen by translating 
strategic decision into operational reality. At Stage 4, by being ‘externally 
supportive’, the Operations Function provides the foundation for the 
competitive success of the company through its innovative, creative and 
proactive approach that drives the company’s strategy (Ibid.). At this 
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stage, the Operations Function provides the means to put the company in a 
favourable or superior business position vis-a-vis its competitors. 
The Hayes and Wheelwright Model provides an insight into how the 
Operations Function can improve its role in a business environment 
through increasing its contribution to Operations Strategy, by increasing 
its strategic impact (vertically) and increasing its operations capabilities 
(horizontally) (Ibid.: 37-38). Based on this logic, the Hayes and 
Wheelwright model suggests that an Operations Function can implement 
strategy, support strategy or drive strategy (Slack, Chambers and 
Johnston, 2010: 89-90).  
  
Figure 7 - The Hayes and Wheelwright Four Stage Model (Main 
Functions) 
Source: Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2010: 89-90. 
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According to the Hayes and Wheelwright model, implementing 
business strategy by adopting best practices is the most basic contribution 
of the Operations Function in an organisation and creates the link between 
Stage 1 and 2 in increasing contribution to the Operations Strategy. The 
next level, supporting strategy, goes beyond simply implementing strategy 
and it links strategy with operations, which allows the organization to 
improve and refine its strategic goals. When an Operations Function is 
supporting strategy it is moving from Stage 2 towards Stage 3 in 
increasing its contribution to the Operations Strategy. Ultimately, driving 
strategy is the most significant contribution of the Operations Function 
and provides a foundation for the success of the Operations Strategy 
(Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2010: 71). The three core abilities of the 
Operations Function and their location in terms of the Hayes and 
Wheelwright Four Stage Model are presented below. 
 
Figure 8 - Increasing Operations Capabilities across Four Stages 
Source: Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2010:89-90. 
 
According to this model, the Operations Function can improve its 
contribution to the Operations Strategy by increasing its strategic impact 
(vertically) and increasing its operations capabilities (horizontally). 
Distinguishing among the various stages of the progression, the model 
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suggests that an Operations Function can ‘implement’, ‘support’ and ‘drive’ 
strategy (Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2010: 89-90). From this model, 
three individual contributions categories can be derived – Implementer, 
Supporter and Driver.  
  
Figure 9 - Increasing Operations Capabilities and Corresponding 
Contributions 
Source: Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 2010: 89-90. 
 
In addition, the model makes it clear that even at Stage 1, the 
Operations Function ‘contributes’ towards the Operations Strategy. 
Although it is viewed as being a very weak contribution, leading to very 
little positive impact on the competitive success of the Operations 
Strategy, it is nevertheless a stage in the process that represents a 
particular category of contribution (Ibid.). This Conceptual Framework, 
therefore, widens the original Hayes and Wheelwright spectrum of 
contribution categories and adds Assistant as a contribution category 
smaller than the one of Implementer. Thus, the scale of contributions 
deduced from the Hayes and Wheelwright Four-Stage Model ranges from 
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no contribution (Stage 0)2 through Assistant, Implementer, Crucial 
Supporter3 to Driver, which is the most significant contribution towards 
advancing a strategy. Below, a depiction of the range of contributions is 
followed by definitions, as well as implications, of those characteristics. 
 
Figure 10 - Range of Contributions across Stages (1) 
 
Assistant is the Stage 1 and it is the least significant contribution, 
where in order to even be a part of the scale it needs to contribute in some, 
however small, way towards the implementation of the overall strategy. 
Once the Assistant acquires the ability to impact on the strategy in 
however small way, it can develop into Implementer (Stage 2) who 
provides more substantial support and who makes strategy happen by 
translating strategic decisions into operational reality. This contribution 
category could be labelled as an Effector, as, in fact, the contribution that is 
made at this stage makes the strategy materialize.  
One step above the Implementer is Crucial Supporter (Stage 3), 
characterised by the ability to support the strategy. Crucial Supporter goes 
beyond simply implementing the strategy and it provides additional 
                                                          
2 ‘No Contribution‘ is characterised by a complete non-involvement and does not exhibit any 
activities that would be considerate in any way linked to the strategy.  
3 The contribution of Supporter is accompanied by the adjective ‘Crucial’ in order to be clearly 
distinguished from the contribution of Assistant and to highlight its superiority. 
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capabilities which allow the strategic planner to refine and broaden its 
strategic goals. Driver (Stage 4) is then a superior stage of the whole 
scheme, with a game-changing significance for the strategy, as it is the 
main instrument for the success of the strategy. The activities performed 
by the Driver project a substantive element of independence and are the 
most significant, underpinning the whole strategy.  This contribution 
category thus could very well be labelled as the Leader, as the contribution 
at this stage drives, or leads, the whole strategy towards its strategic goal.  
While this model provides a wide range of contributions on the 
scale from No contribution to Driver, it is incomplete without a category 
that has the potential to challenge the achievement of the strategy 
(undermine the strategy). In this regard, based on the assessment of the 
prevailing value of the provider's contribution to the US military capability 
in Phase IV Operations in Iraq, this framework provides an opportunity to 
distinguish between a predominantly constructive (advancing) and 
destructive (undermining) type of contribution. The value of the 
provider’s contribution can rarely be solely constructive or destructive. To 
the contrary, the provider’s contribution can be looked at many different 
levels (tactical, operational, strategic) and can be assessed in short-term, 
mid-term, and long-term perspective, giving innumerable combinations of 
how it can be defined and understood. The proposed framework is 
applicable to analysis on any of these levels and any time length 
perspective, provided that only one level of analysis and one perspective 
are applied at one time. In this thesis, the strategic level analysis combined 
with long-term perspective is utilised to answer the research question.  
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In order to provide a complete picture, the category of Spoiler is 
added to the Contribution typology to encompass the whole spectrum. The 
provider may either advance or undermine the strategy as depicted in the 
table below. For this reason, the contribution of Spoiler is added to the 
Framework as the only category with a predominantly negative impact on 
the efforts to achieve the strategy goals. While Assistant, Implementer, 
Supporter and Driver are positive categories advancing the strategy with 
their respective levels of predominantly positive contributions, Spoiler is 
the sole category undermining the strategy by providing a predominantly 
negative contribution.  
 
Figure 11 - Range of Contributions across Stages (2) 
 
In addition, the category of Spoiler hierarchically corresponds to 
the category of Driver, with the difference of the prevailing negative value 
of contribution, as only the Spoiler has the potential to ‘spoil' the strategy.4 
This creates additional dimension to the framework as by defining the 
                                                          
4 Prevailing negative value of subject’s contribution in the category of Assistant, Implementer 
and Crucial Supporter will slow down and complicate the process of achievement of the 
strategy, but a subject in any of these categories does not have the influence to prevent 
accomplishment of the strategy or directly impact on the potential to achieve the strategic goal 
of the mission.  
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contribution of Spoiler as a reflection of the contribution of Driver only 
with negative prevailing value, the framework distinguishes between two 
large contribution categories: constructive and destructive. While the 
contributions of Assistant, Implementer, Crucial Supporter and Driver can 
be occasionally undermining of the US military’s capability to achieve its 
strategic goal, the overall value of the contribution is constructive, hence 
enhances the US military capability. In this case it means that the 
occasional negative contribution does not have enough importance to 
significantly hinder the US military’s capability to pursue its mission or 
influence the overall feasibility of the mission.  
Therefore, while the categories of Driver and Spoiler have the  
potential to have a detrimental impact on the US military capability to 
achieve the strategic goal of a mission, Assistant, Implementer and Crucial 
Supporter have only an impact on the implementation of the strategy 
pursuing that goal. In simple terms, while Assistant, Implementer and 
Crucial Supporter influence how the mission will be implemented to 
varying degrees through their impact on the size of the deployable force, 
available timeframe and desired objectives of the individual operations, 
the achievement of the strategic goal cannot be accomplished without the 
Driver, and will not happen with the Spoiler. As such, based on the 
Conceptual Framework, PMSI can be assessed as to whether it assisted, 
implemented, crucially supported, drove or spoilt the US military’s 
capability to pursue Phase IV Operations in Iraq, covering the full 
spectrum of categories of the potential PMSI contribution to the US 
military’s capability in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. 
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IV.II. The Contribution Framework 
Building on the preceding paragraphs, this section introduces the 
Contribution Framework, its five distinct categories and explains their 
characteristic traits. Informed by the Hayes and Wheelwright Four-Stage 
Model, this framework features five distinct contribution categories – 
Assistant, Implementer, Crucial Supporter, Driver, and Spoiler – and can 
be presented on three levels: 1) contribution level, 2) significance of the 
provided service, and 3) observable indicators of the significance of the 
provided service for the strategy. Each of these levels are intrinsically 
linked to each other and are a drill-down approach to the core of the 
framework. These are explained individually in turn in the following 
paragraphs.  
 
Contribution Level 
The framework distinguishes between two levels of contribution – 
main contribution and additional contribution. While Assistant, 
Implementer and Crucial Supporter belong to the category of ‘additional’ 
contribution, Driver and Spoiler sit in the ‘main’ contribution category. 
The logic behind this distinction is based on the assumption that the 
additional contributions do not have the potential to have a detrimental 
impact on the US military capability to achieve the strategic goal of the 
mission, but they have both positive and negative impacts on the 
implementation of the strategy how to achieve its strategic goal. 
Therefore, while the Driver’s and Spoiler’s presence and activities have 
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direct impact on whether the strategic goal of the mission can be achieved, 
the Assistant, Implementer and Crucial Supporter can only influence the 
means how this goal is to be achieved indirectly. The major distinction 
between these two levels is depicted below. 
 
Table 5 - Two Levels of Contribution 
 
Therefore, in alignment with the descriptions of the characteristics 
of the individual contributions informed by the Hayes and Wheelwright 
framework and introduced in the section above, this thesis proposes a 
distinction between two separate levels of contributions – the first has an 
impact solely on the strategy (how the strategic aim will be achieved), 
while the second influences both the strategy and the strategic goal itself. 
The first level includes the contributions of Assistant, Implementer and 
Crucial Supporter as contribution categories with significant impact only 
on strategy. On the second level, encompassing the categories of Driver 
and Spoiler, the subjects in these categories have impact on both the 
strategy and on the achievement of the strategic goal of the mission. As 
such, within this framework, the main instrument corresponds to the 
contributions of Driver and Spoiler, as they are the only two contributions 
that have the potential to impact on success or failure of the mission in 
long-term. The whole framework is thus based on a simple distinction of 
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two main types of contribution categories of contractors in US military 
operations – to have an impact on the process of how a strategic goal is to 
be achieved (additional instrument), or both how a strategic goal is to be 
achieved and what can be achieved as a strategic goal (main instrument).  
 Starting from the assumption that the US military was the main 
instrument of US military operations driving the US military strategy in 
Iraq5, the puzzle of this thesis is to assess how the PMSI compared to the 
US military in terms of its contribution. Answering this puzzle will then by 
default shed some light on the issue of to what extent the PMSI 
supplemented the US military in its operations.  In this context, to 
supplement means to amplify force capabilities by being an additional 
instrument of US military strategy and taking responsibility over some 
aspects of the strategy. A supplement, therefore, takes over a share of the 
total effort to achieve the strategy by generating and applying capabilities 
to sustain the effort and effectiveness of the main instrument. By contrast, 
to substitute is an extreme end on the supplement scale and signifies 
taking over the responsibility for the main aspects of the strategy and 
becoming the single main instrument, the Driver. Of course, the question 
of whether PMSI have made additional or main contributions, 
supplemented or substituted soldiers, is not an either-or issue, but should 
be viewed as a continuum. Although highly unlikely, if the US military 
                                                          
5 Despite the evolution in the US military doctrine on Stability Operations recognising their 
importance in modern warfare, ground troops remain an indispensable element of such 
operations and the majority of avenues for a conflict resolution within the 3-07 Stability 
Operations Manual directly or indirectly requires the involvement of ground troops (US Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2008). Note that requiring the involvement of ground troops does not 
necessarily mean requiring combat operations.  
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troops were to be 100 per cent substituted by PMSI, it would mean that 
the US military is no longer the Driver of the strategy and that its duties 
and responsibilities for accomplishing the strategic goal have been 
delegated entirely to the PMSI. Clearly, these two distinct functions – to 
supplement or substitute - have diametrically opposed implications for the 
execution of the strategy and achievement of the strategic goal of a 
mission. That is why the distinction between the main instrument and the 
additional instrument needs to be developed further.  
  
Significance of the provided service 
The main criterion for the assessment of the contribution is the 
significance of the provided service for the achievement of the strategic 
goal of the mission. This thesis differentiates between ‘optional additional 
services’, ‘essential additional services’, ‘indispensable additional services’ 
and ‘indispensable main services’; each of which corresponds to a different 
contribution category. The following table clarifies which characteristic 
corresponds to which contribution. 
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Table 6 - Significance of the Provided Service and Corresponding 
Contribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assistant provides optional additional services that advance the 
strategic goal. Owing to its small input, the optional additional services 
may or may not be provided without affecting the potential to achieve the 
strategic goal. In case of Implementer, the significance of the service 
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provided is elevated one step higher to essential additional services, 
where the type of services is no longer optional; instead they represent 
important services that advance the achievement of the strategic goal. One 
step above Implementer is Crucial Supporter which is the highest level of 
significance of services in the ‘additional instrument’ category. The service 
provided by Crucial Supporter is classified as indispensable additional 
services. The indispensability of the service is also a common feature for 
the Driver and Spoiler category, however, the contribution itself differs, as 
the Driver's and Spoiler's indispensable services correspond to the service 
of the main instrument. Unlike in the case of Crucial Supporter and 
indispensable additional services, Driver and Spoiler perform 
indispensable services that form the backbone of the whole strategy.  
In Iraq, for example, Single Digits, iDirect Government Technologies 
and DRS Technical Services, Inc. were involved in ensuring that soldiers 
had access to a variety of communications, including personal email, 
chatting with family and friends at home, browsing the Internet, and in 
some locations using Web cameras (iDirect, no date). Although in today’s 
technological era it may be seen as indispensable, 24/7 internet access for 
troops in the middle of a warzone was introduced only about a decade ago. 
Prior to 2003, a soldier’s only means of staying connected with loved ones 
were letters or the occasional phone call. In situations such as military 
deployments in Iraq or Afghanistan, where separation from family was 
usually for a year at a time, introducing facilities managed by contractors 
can positively stimulate the soldier's mental condition therefore, 
advancing the strategy of boosting troops’ morale on a battlefield. As a 
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result, while the provided service is relevant for the fulfilment of the 
mission, it remains optional, since troop morale is neither directly nor 
wholly dependent on the provision of the service. The PMSCs responsible 
for this service are an example of Assistant type of contribution and are 
thus replaceable with no or only minor changes to non-core aspects of the 
strategy because their absence equates solely to less manpower involved 
in the pursuit of the strategic goal on the ground. 
Implementer is one step above Assistant. Owing to the significance 
of its services, it cannot be replaced or eliminated without major changes 
to the non-core aspects of the strategy. Non-core aspects of the strategy 
for this contribution correspond to the size of the mission (the level of 
manpower) and the length of its duration over a period of time.  As such, 
the significance of the service provider for the contribution of 
Implementer, is ‘replaceable with major changes to non-core aspects of 
the strategy’ which means that the absence of a service provider in this 
category would impact on both the size and timeframe of the mission. If 
the provider of the services offers essential additional services and can be 
replaced only with major changes to non-core aspects of the strategy, in 
this case both the size and timeframe of the mission, it provides the 
contribution of Implementer.  
In the same context and with the same strategic aim in mind, it 
could be argued that the PMCs responsible for the provision of hot meals 
twice per day (or managing dining facilities in general) provide the 
contribution of Implementer. As is the case with 24/7 internet access, 
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access to hot meals twice per day for troops in conflict zones was 
introduced with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meals Ready to Eat 
(MRE), originally introduced in 1982, have been subjected to a wave of 
criticism regarding the quality of food following the First Gulf War. Since 
then, the Pentagon has been working relentlessly on improving the quality 
of food provided to troops, which was seen as an important factor of 
boosting their morale and enhancing their performance (Kilborn, 2003). 
While the introduction of hot meals within the US military bases in Iraq 
and Afghanistan does represent a significant improvement from MREs and 
it is an essential type of service, it can hardly be assessed as being 
indispensable. Note the difference between two hot meals per day and no 
meal at all, which would, without a doubt, elevate the contribution of the 
food contractors to Crucial Supporter.  
Crucial Supporter, which occupies the position between 
Implementer and Driver within the Contribution Framework, provides 
Indispensable Additional Services.  Replacing or eliminating it thus results 
in major changes to the core aspects of the strategy. Core aspects of the 
strategy for this contribution category correspond to the combination of 
three elements: the size, timeframe and objectives of the mission. If the 
provider of the services offers Indispensable Additional Services and can 
be replaced only with major changes to the core aspects of the strategy, 
the size, duration and objectives of the mission, it provides the 
contribution of Crucial Supporter.  
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PMSCs providing maintenance services to US military vehicles on 
their expeditionary operations serve as an excellent example of Crucial 
Supporter. While these services are seemingly not provided directly to the 
troops but their equipment, the quality and reliability of their services in 
high-risk environment is critical. The lives of troops are directly 
dependent on the availability and condition of military equipment, 
serviced by PMSCs, when on duty. A lack or malfunction of such equipment 
could lower not only the morale of the troops, but also their operational 
readiness, to such an extent that it may become impossible to complete the 
mission.  
The two remaining contribution categories to be explained are the 
categories which potentially substitute the main instrument of foreign 
policy - Driver and Spoiler. Driver, which is the main instrument of the 
strategy, provides indispensable main services and is irreplaceable if the 
strategic goal is to be accomplished without altering the whole strategy.  
As such, the significance of the service provider for the contribution of 
Driver is reflected in the size, timeframe, objectives and feasibility of the 
mission, since the type of the services provided, indispensable main 
services, are at the core of the mission itself.6 While the Crucial supporter 
                                                          
6 Although Phase IV Operations in Iraq were adopted as a decisive phase for a dignified US 
military withdrawal, they were largely overlapping with Phase III (Dominate) Operations. 
Previously often mistakenly simplified as two different types of operations - conflict and post-
conflict operations, the Iraq scenario demonstrated the cohesion of the two phases. Even more, 
the Phase III operations were often a pre-condition for the Phase IV to take place, preserving 
the leading role of the US military as the Driver of the US strategy. As the COIN Field Manual 
FM 3-24 specified, in a COIN environment, it is vital to adopt appropriate and measured levels 
of military force and apply that force precisely avoiding unnecessary loss of life or suffering 
(Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2006: 1-25). In this regard, the manual clearly 
identifies the significance of the military as a key element of the strategy – Driver. 
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is still replaceable and the strategy's goal cannot be achieved in its absence 
without major changes to the strategy, Driver is simply irreplaceable 
without changing the strategy completely, because without its services 
and its input, the strategy ceases to exist. In this regard, the US military 
represents the contribution of Driver as in its absence, the Phase IV 
Operations in Iraq would cease to exist.  
In this depiction Spoiler sits separately from all the other potential 
contributions, as it is the unique category where the prevailing value of its 
contribution is negative. Sharing all the other features with the 
contribution of the Driver, Spoiler is an alternative to Driver where the 
negative impact of its presence and activities prevails over the positive. 
This condition is unique to Driver as it is the only contribution category 
where, if its impact is predominantly negative, it undermines and 
ultimately prevents the achievement of the strategic goal. In other words, 
the presence Spoiler directly inhibits the achievement of the strategic goal. 
In contrast, if the prevailing impact of Assistant, Implementer, or Crucial 
Supporter turns out to be negative, it only has the potential to infringe on 
the strategy how the goal will be achieved but it does not prevent the 
achievement of the goal per se. This means that for a service provider to 
become a Spoiler, it first needs to be the Driver of the strategy, because 
only in a situation where the Driver has a prevailing negative contribution 
to the strategy will it become Spoiler. In other words, Spoiler is Driver 
which pulls the strategy away from the strategic goal, unlike Driver who 
directly contributes to it.  
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As such, the higher the significance of the provided services, the 
greater the risk for the subject to become a Spoiler. While the subject in 
the category of Assistant has a very small potential to prevent the strategy 
from being fulfilled even if providing a predominantly negative impact, the 
subject in the category of Driver (being irreplaceable and providing 
Indispensable Main Services) poses a high threat to the strategy, should it 
create a predominantly negative impact. For that reason, Spoiler is an 
undesirable contribution category for PMSI regarding the US military 
strategy in Iraq, as, by definition, it works against the achievement of the 
strategic goal, and its presence and activities on the ground have a largely 
negative impact on the US military’s capability in Phase IV Operations in 
the established timeframe.  
 
Observable indicators of the significance of the provided service for the 
strategy   
The same way there are different degrees of substitution of the 
services delivered by the US military from 1 to 100 per cent, the same way 
distinction between ‘optional additional services’, ‘essential additional 
services’, ‘indispensable additional services’ and ‘indispensable main 
services’ is a broad spectrum of undefined lines and depends on the 
perspective. In order to streamline the framework as much as possible and 
provide some guidance how to filter the available evidence, each of the 
individual contribution categories has been defined using the same 
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criteria across the spectrum of contribution categories in order to define 
some observable indicators which would enable a meaningful analysis.  
Selecting any type of metrics for centralised quantitative 
assessment is tricky, if not impossible and can be hugely misleading. Not 
only the metrics needs to be directly relevant to the desirable outcome of 
the analysis, but the data for assessment using such metrics has to be 
available, reliable, and verifiable. In complex expeditionary operations 
such as Iraq 2003 – 2011, the availability and reliability of data is limited 
and can be considered a major obstacle to fully operationalize the analysis 
according to the Conceptual Framework. At the same time, even having 
had access to unlimited, reliable and variable data and selecting a set of 
core metrics to measure the contribution of any type of contractors to 
eight-years long dynamic engagement of the US military in Iraq, would not 
likely provide any more clarity or noteworthy lessons learned for future 
US military engagements.  
Lack of centralised control over the collection and reporting of data 
on the activities of the PMSI in such complex, dynamic and diverse 
environment inherently diminishes the reliability of any measurement and 
the validity of potential findings. Breaking through the complexity of 
stability operations reporting with aim to provide useful analysis is thus 
extremely challenging. This does not mean that such subject is not worth 
the efforts; it only means that the friction points between theory and 
reality shall be acknowledged and needs to be approached with caution. In 
this regard, this framework cannot and does not seek to measure, prove or 
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determine the contribution that the PMSI has made to the US military’s 
capability in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. Instead, it seeks to analyse the 
available data to present a plausible association between the presence and 
activities of the PMSI and the development the US military strategy in 
Phase IV Operations in Iraq underwent from 2003-2011.  
Rather than developing quantitative metrics, inherently 
impracticable for complex expeditionary operations, this thesis uses a set 
of indicators of change at the theatre level which remain intentionally 
vague and serve to highlight the difference contractors made to the US 
military’s capability, rather than seeking to measure their impact or 
evaluate their performance in Phase IV Operations. These four criteria for 
characterising the contribution categories are the size of the deployable 
force, available timeframe, objectives and the strategic goal of the mission, 
and are based on the analysis of key elements of Phase IV Operations 
applied to the Iraq war case, discussed in detail in chapter 2.  
In a broad overview, the Assistant contribution category is 
characterised by provision of optional additional services, which represent 
only small input in efforts to achieve the strategic goal. This means that 
although the Assistant´s provided services are seeking to advance the 
achievement of the strategic goal, should the services become unavailable, 
only the size of the deployable force (understood as manpower) will be 
affected. That also means that neither the expected length of the mission, 
its objectives nor the strategic goal will be significantly influenced.  
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In the case of Implementer, the significance of the service provided 
is elevated one step higher to essential additional services, where the type 
of services is no longer optional; instead they represent important services 
that advance the achievement of the strategic goal. This means that 
although in its absence the objectives and the overall strategic aim is likely 
to remain intact, the lack of the services will be reflected in smaller size of 
force utilized to accomplish the goal and will also make a difference to the 
expected timeframe of the mission. In the absence of the services of the 
Implementer, the most likely consequence, next to decreased size of the 
deployable force, would be the extended duration of the operation as there 
would be a strain on the human resources to take on additional 
responsibilities to accomplish the mission based on the original strategic 
plan.  
One step above Implementer is Crucial Supporter which is the 
highest level of significance of services in the ‘additional instrument’ 
category. The service provided by Crucial Supporter is classified as 
‘indispensable additional services’ which suggests that the provided 
services provided critical contribution to the strategy to achieve the 
mission’s strategic goal. This means that in the absence of these services 
not only the size of the force and expected timeframe for the 
accomplishment of the goal would be adversely affected, but also the 
objectives of the operation which constitute the mission would be 
compromised and would have to be altered.  
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The indispensability of the service is also a common feature for the 
Driver and Spoiler category, however, the contribution itself differs, as the 
Driver's and Spoiler's indispensable services correspond to the service of 
the main instrument. Unlike in the case of Crucial Supporter and 
‘indispensable additional services’, Driver and Spoiler perform 
indispensable services that form the backbone of the whole strategy. In 
essence the services provided by Driver and Spoiler are the critical 
activities that seek to execute the strategy according to the strategic plan. 
The only significant difference is that in the case of Driver, these activities 
enhance the likelihood of achieving the strategic goal, while in the case of 
Spoiler they in fact prevent the achievement of the goal. While elevating 
the PMSI or any of its particular sector to the contribution of Driver, 
including delegating it the full responsibility for certain types of 
operations, can have huge benefits for the US military, it is also 
accompanied by many risks. One of them is simply that it becomes the 
main instrument of the US government to pursue a particular type of 
operation and it may ultimately render the military dispensable in certain 
contexts and environments. In addition, being on the same level as the US 
military implies the PMSI would be an independent alternative foreign 
policy instrument that the US military does not have any control over. 
Finally, and most importantly, assuming the position of Driver of a 
strategy in a particular operation on behalf of the US military, bears the 
inherent risk of possibility to become the Spoiler. 
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Table 7 - Characteristics of the Provided Service 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In a broad overview, the Conceptual Framework for assessment of 
the contribution of an instrument (in this case the PMSI) to the US military 
strategy in Phase IV Operations in Iraq is composed of three interlinked 
levels – the level of contribution, the significance of the provided service of 
the instrument to the employed strategy, and observable indicators of the 
significance of the service provided by the instrument to the strategy.  The 
Contribution Framework, therefore, is based on the assessment of the 
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significance of the provided service to the US military capability to pursue 
the planned strategy in order to achieve the desired strategic goal. The 
following table provides an overview of the levels and links between them 
within the Conceptual Framework typology of contributions of the PMSI 
towards the Phase IV Operations in Iraq. 
 
Table 8 - Contribution Framework Summary 
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IV.III. Conceptual Framework Application 
In order to apply this Framework accordingly, it is necessary to 
extrapolate the key questions that the ensuing empirical chapters will seek 
to answer. This thesis applies the Conceptual Framework on two 
particular case studies – Base Support Contractors and Armed Private 
Security Contractors. The specific service represents the narrowest scope 
of analysis, while the Base Support Contractors represents the widest 
scope of analysis of the contribution of contractors on the modern 
battlefield, based on the experience in Iraq. The reason to examine the 
contribution of APSCs is that they are a specific service that can be 
uniquely defined in terms of its nature of responsibilities within the 
context of Phase IV Operations. They provide armed static security, convoy 
security and personal details, and although they are a subsection of a 
broader Security Sector, the APSCs provide a unique type of services 
within the sector and within the industry in general, as they are the most 
similar to combat troops and they are the only subject of the PMSI 
authorised to use force under certain circumstances (Isenberg, 2009: 151-
152). On the other side, the much broader category of Base Support 
Contractors, a representative of the logistics sector, was continuously the 
largest type of service engaged in Phase IV Operations providing support 
services for the US military efforts (Thibault et al., 2011: 23). 
While the general characteristics and justification for the selection 
of these particular cases are dealt with in the respective introductions of 
these chapters, it is important to provide an insight in how the framework 
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will be applied. Similar to the approach applied to the APSCs, the broader 
sector level analysis seeks to highlight the significance of logistics services 
to the US military capability to pursue its strategy in Iraq. By illustrating 
the specific characteristics of the Phase IV operations, which require a 
lengthy and resource-intense support, both empirical chapters focus on 
the ability of the contractors to complement the US military force 
capabilities and effectiveness of the US military during US expeditionary 
operations. Having presented the US military expectations for the size, 
duration, objectives and strategic goal at the start of the Phase IV 
Operations in Iraq in the Chapter II of this thesis, the ensuing empirical 
chapters focus on answering the following questions in the context of the 
developments the US strategy underwent, taking into consideration the 
operational circumstances encountered on the ground: 
 
The first empirical chapter, the Base Support Contractors chapter, 
takes the research question and adapts it particularly to its case. In this 
sense the question becomes: ‘What kind of contribution have the Base 
Support Contractors made to the US military capability to pursue Phase IV 
Operations in Iraq?’ 
1) Have the provided Base Support services made a significant, 
constructive or destructive, contribution to the size of the deployable force 
in US Phase IV Operations in Iraq? 
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2) Have the provided Base Support services made a significant, 
constructive or destructive, contribution to the available timeframe in US 
Phase IV Operations in Iraq? 
3) Have the provided Base Support services made a significant, 
constructive or destructive, contribution to the desired objectives in US 
Phase IV Operations in Iraq? 
4) Have the provided Base Support services made a significant, 
constructive or destructive, contribution to the desired strategic goal in US 
Phase IV Operations in Iraq? 
 
Likewise, the second empirical chapter, the Armed Private Security 
Contractors chapter, takes the research question and adapts it particularly 
to its case. In this sense the question becomes: ‘What kind of contribution 
have the Armed Private Security Contractors made to the US military 
capability to pursue Phase IV Operations in Iraq?’ 
1) Have the provided Armed Security services made a significant, 
constructive or destructive, contribution to the size of the deployable force 
in US Phase IV Operations in Iraq? 
2) Have the provided Armed Security services made a significant, 
constructive or destructive, contribution to the available timeframe in US 
Phase IV Operations in Iraq? 
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3) Have the provided Armed Security services made a significant, 
constructive or destructive, contribution to the desired objectives in US 
Phase IV Operations in Iraq? 
4) Have the provided Armed Security services made a significant, 
constructive or destructive, contribution to the desired strategic goal in US 
Phase IV Operations in Iraq? 
  
Answering these questions will shed light onto the type of 
contribution these contractors made, as well as what type of foreign policy 
instrument they represented.  
 
IV.IV. Conclusion 
The Hayes and Wheelwright Model from the operations 
management area which provides a number of transferable elements 
which are crucial in answering the research question of this project. 
Derived from the understanding of Operations Strategy as ‘the total 
pattern of decisions and actions that position the organisation in its 
environment and that are intended to achieve its long-term goals’, it can 
be applied to the US military strategy in Iraq as a combination of decisions 
and actions that the US military undertakes in a particular environment 
(Phase IV Operations) to achieve an overarching goal (creating the long-
term stability to allow a dignified exit) for the US military (Pycraft et al., 
2000: 71). While Operations Strategy ‘concerns the pattern of strategic 
decisions and actions which set the role, objectives, and activities of that 
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operation,’ the US military strategy in Iraq concerns the pattern of 
strategic decisions and actions which set the role, objectives, and activities 
of the US military (Main instrument), but also other subjects (Additional 
Instruments) that are part of the effort (Slack, Chambers and Johnston, 
2010: 89-90). These additional instruments include other Coalition forces, 
US civilian forces, Host Country forces, and US outsourced forces as the 
four most prominent partners of the US military in pursuing the US 
military strategy in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. 
The aim of this chapter was to establish a conceptual platform upon 
which an empirical investigation can be launched. The Hayes and 
Wheelwright Four Stage Model, creates a solid base for developing a 
typology framework for the assessment of contribution of the PMSI in 
Phase IV Operations in Iraq. The descriptive, organisational, and 
explanatory potential it offers fits very well with the purpose of this 
research and provides an original insight into the dynamics of the 
relationship between the US administration and the PMSI as an additional 
tool of its foreign policy and how it played out in the unique operational 
circumstances of the Phase IV Operations in Iraq. Moving beyond the 
literature on positive and negative impacts of the PMSI on military 
operations based on simple good-or-bad, black-or-white labelling of the 
industry, this is the first study that articulates a specific typology of 
contribution categories for the PMSI and its smaller segments (particular 
sector or service) to be utilised to offer a fuller insight into the potential 
purposeful employment of the private sector in US expeditionary 
operations.  
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Chapter V. The Institutional Factors Shaping the 
PMSI Contribution in Phase IV Operations in Iraq 
 
Few administrations have embraced the undying belief in the 
efficacy of conventional military power as strongly as the G. W. Bush 
administration at the start of the second millennia (Brigham, 2006: 
149). Although the American experience during the Cold War, Vietnam 
in particular, proved the limits of the US military power vis-a-vis 
complex protracted military conflicts, the Bush administration insisted 
that America’s promotion of democracy in the Middle East was part of a 
larger strategy to maintain US great power positon in the post-cold-war 
system and many of his close advisers believed this could be achieved 
through military means only. Nevertheless, despite its capacities to 
benefit from the overwhelming force, technological superiority, and 
rich investment into military programmes, the US invasion of Iraq 
evolved into a political and military nightmare where the US found itself 
struggling to end the war on acceptable political terms (Dodge, 2010). 
By rejecting the lessons of Vietnam and pursuing a war of choice in Iraq, 
the United States was relearning the same lessons from decades ago the 
hard way. Despite the hype about re-learning how to operate in 
complex civilian-populated zones of conflict, these lessons were not 
constrained to ‘how to operate in Counterinsurgency missions’ only, in 
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fact, they concern much broader, institutional limitations that have an 
impact on the use of US military power in the realm of foreign affairs.  
Appearing already in the 1950s, after the end of the Korean War, 
and strengthened following the termination of the Vietnam War in the 
mid-1970s, both the US military and the US government were left with a 
cautious approach to counterinsurgency and stability operations (Ucko, 
2009: 25-46; Marston and Malkasian, 2008; Herring, 2000: 56-84). It 
became the prevailing opinion that the US must avoid prolonged, costly, 
unpopular and inconclusive military operations in the future (Nagl, 
2002: 191-212). Reinforced by the ill-fated US peacekeeping 
intervention in Lebanon in 1982-1983, which further exemplified the 
trap of an open ended approach to the use of military force, Caspar 
Weinberger, then Secretary of Defense, drafted a list of six tests to be 
considered when planning the use of US combat forces abroad (Herring, 
2000: 74; O’Sullivan, 2009: 30). Almost a decade after the presentation 
of the Weinberger doctrine in 1984, the same philosophy was 
reinforced by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and Weinberger’s former co-writer (Powell, 1992-1993). This 
doctrine, known as the Weinberger-Powell doctrine consists of the 
following pre-conditions to be considered in terms of a viable military 
operations. 
 Either the United States’ or its close allies’ vital national 
interests had to be at risk; 
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 Decisive force should be employed in the pursuit of 
clearly defined political and military objectives; 
 The war had to be fought ‘wholeheartedly, with the clear 
intention of winning’; 
 The US  must constantly reassess whether the use of force 
is necessary and appropriate; 
 There must be a ‘reasonable assurance’ of Congressional 
and public support; 
 Force should be used only as a last resort (Weinberger, 
1986; Record, 2007: 126). 
 
Far from being a rigid instruction on when to employ US troops 
on the ground, this doctrine was formulated as an insight into the US 
practical experience with expeditionary operations and the risks they 
encompass (Record, 2007: 117-129). Using the doctrine as the lens for 
understanding the PMSI contribution in Iraq highlights the dependence 
of the US military on contractors in the unpopular, protracted and 
mostly unconventional war (Hastedt, 2015: 327-328). Setting aside the 
first, fourth and sixth principle of the WP doctrine, which become 
irrelevant once the military engagement has commenced, there are 
three major principles that the PMSI helped to bypass: clear political 
and military objectives, wholehearted commitment, and support of the 
American people and the Congress.  
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Focussing on the bigger picture of the US administration’s 
overall ability to pursue its chosen strategy in Iraq, this chapter looks at 
the institutional limits imposed by the US short-sighted approach to the 
planning for the war, the lack of wholehearted commitment and 
considerable domestic scepticism and opposition towards the war, as 
the main reasons for the indispensability of the PMSI as an additional 
foreign policy tool in Iraq. In particular, this chapter argues that the 
significance of the PMSI in the Phase IV Operations in Iraq resulted 
from the US government deliberately disregarding historic lessons 
learned in Korea, Vietnam, and Lebanon, all contained in the 
Weinberger-Powell doctrine from 1992. As a consequence, the PMSI 
became a major supporting tool in the hands of the US administration, 
which effectively enabled the US to avoid the full weight of the 
consequences of its otherwise politically and operationally 
unsustainable military presence in Iraq from 2003-2011.  
In order to support this argument, the rest of the chapter is 
structured as follows. Section I, Clear Objectives, opens the discussion 
by pointing out the short-sighted approach of the US administration to 
the Iraq war as the key factor for the chaotic situation that emerged 
shortly after the invasion, and the lack of US capacity to respond to it 
adequately.  Section II, Wholehearted Commitment, presents the lack of 
manpower and various specialised capabilities that the US went to war 
with and how the PMSI filled in the gap and helped the US to sustain its 
operations despite its limited resources. Section III, Support of 
American People and Congress, analyses how the anonymity of 
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contractors’ casualties provided a political advantage to the US 
administration in presenting the mission both domestically, as well as 
internationally. A brief conclusion (Section IV) discusses why the WP is 
still relevant and why its lessons are likely to be relearned by the US in 
the future.  
 
V.I. Clear Objectives 
Within the DoD, the responsibility for the planning for the Iraq 
war was granted to central command (CENTCOM), led by General 
Tommy Franks (Franks and McConnell, 2004: 441). As explained 
earlier, the CENTCOM plans for the Iraq war consisted of unrealistic 
political and unspecific military objectives (O’Hanlon, 2004-2005). The 
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, had a clear vision about the 
war, informed by views about the modern nature of military power, 
which were supported by many thinkers in and out of the US 
Government and the armed services (Franks and McConnell, 2004: 
441). As a result, the military campaign in Iraq was designed based on 
the principles of ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) which promoted 
swift, smooth and a highly technological style of warfare, with the aim 
of destroying the enemy’s capabilities with minimum losses to the 
intervening force (Cordesman, 2003: 58).  
This style of warfare - a reliance on speed and air power, smaller 
and more agile forces, a rapid deployment without long build-ups, and a 
desire to avoid lengthy and costly occupations - had been tested 
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previously in the First Gulf War against Iraq (Operation Desert Storm), 
in 1991, and in the eyes of many senior DoD officials proved successful 
(Clodfelter and Fawcet, 1995). The low cost military campaign in 
Afghanistan in 2001, and the perceived success of putting together a 
post-Taliban government to lead the country, appeared to be even more 
persuasive and encouraged Rumsfeld to believe that the same could be 
replicated in Iraq (Metz, 2008: 131).  
This RMA approach to the Second Gulf War did not envisage any 
need to prepare for Phase IV Operations and, therefore, most likely did 
not anticipate any unusual level of contractors  either (Bensahel et al., 
2008: 5-17). A number of senior military personnel became outspoken 
since the beginning of the DoD Iraq war planning, arguing that the 1991 
experience was not likely to be replicated under the 2003 
circumstances, with significantly different mission goals. Colin Powell 
famously warned that, ‘[w]hen you take out a regime and you bring 
down a government, you become the government’ (Mitrovich, 2014). 
The main difference was then that unlike in 1991, the mission in 2003 
was to create a democratic regime from the rubble of a destroyed and 
defeated dictatorship (Galbraith, 2006: 81-82).  
There was detailed military planning for, and assessment of, a 
regime change scenario in Iraq. In late April 1999, CENTCOM led by 
Marine General Anthony Zinni (rtd.), conducted a series of war games 
known as Desert Crossing (OPLAN 1003-98) to assess potential 
outcomes of a military intervention and a regime change in Iraq 
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(Galbraith, 2006: 89; Fitzgerald, 2013: 123; Bensahel et al, 2008: xviii, 
6-10). The planning outlined the need for close to 400,000 soldiers to 
take part in the war and retain control of Iraq after the end of major 
combat operations, to enable political processes leading to a democratic 
regime, to take place (Galbraith, 2006: 89; Fitzgerald, 2013: 122-125). 
Although it is unknown to what extent the plans relied on the support 
of contractors, due to the historical reliance of the US military on 
civilian support during expeditionary operations, it is reasonable to 
assume that the Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) 
III from 1997 was part of the picture (Congressional Budget Office, 
2008: 2-12).  
Shortly before the war in 2003, during his testimony before 
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Army’s Chief of Staff 
at that time, General Eric K. Shinseki, said that several hundred 
thousand American troops could be required to provide security and 
public services in Iraq after a war to oust Saddam Hussein and disarm 
his military (Schmitt, 2003). Distinguishing between liberating a 
country and occupying it, as two different missions, he argued that 
‘(w)e’re talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography 
that’s fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead 
to other problems’ (Ibid.). Therefore, although the vision of a quick, 
smooth and victorious regime change in Iraq relying mostly on the 
capabilities of modern military technology was shared among many 
within the inner circle of the president Bush, there were many voices 
warning against the overly optimistic view of the prospect of the war.  
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Despite the misgivings about no planning for the nation-building 
being made prior to the invasion, a number of government agencies 
committed resources to several post-conflict Iraq war initiatives that 
considered potential difficulties in implementing a quick and smooth 
transition between the two extremely different political regimes within 
a short period of time (Fitzgerald, 2013: 122-125). They were either 
disregarded or simply not taken seriously enough. The Future of Iraq 
Project, Parade of Horribles memo, Eclipse II, The Perfect Storm; all 
were attempts at deliberations about the post-war Iraq, however, with 
no impact on the actual Phase IV planning (Special Inspector General 
for Iraq Reconstruction, 2008: 13-15). The Parade of Horribles memo, 
from October 15, 2002, is particularly noteworthy. Also known as ‘Iraq: 
An Illustrative List of Potential Problems to be Considered and 
Addressed,’ the brief memo spelled out twenty-nine potential problems 
to be encountered if the President authorized military action in Iraq, 
including ethnic strife among Sunni, Shia and Kurds; requiring a 
commitment of up to 10 years; or being perceived as war against 
Muslims. Although ignored at the highest levels of DoD prior to the war, 
‘[i]n retrospect, the memo proved remarkably prescient’ (Special 
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2008: 13-15). 
Dismissing such views, the senior DOD officials adopted a vision 
that once the war would be over, originally expected to last no more 
than a few months, the Iraqis would establish a new democratic regime 
with the help of the United States quickly without any major obstacles 
(Galbraith, 2006: 87). The US vision for Iraq was that after removing 
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Saddam Hussein, the US would assist the new pro-American Iraqi 
government in creating a neo-liberal state with a minimal presence in 
society and the economy (Dodge, 2010: 1277). This orientation is in line 
with the US National Security Strategy from 2002 which boldly states 
that ‘[the US] will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, 
development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world’ 
(The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002: 
1). Nevertheless, these objectives came into conflict with Iraqi realities 
as the aftermath of the regime change delivered very different 
consequences to what had been expected. Although the strategic goal of 
the US administration for Iraq remained unchanged from the invasion 
through the first years of the US presence on the ground, the individual 
objectives how to achieve this end state changed in major ways.  
Indeed, since the early stages of planning the Iraq War, the US 
administration, the senior DoD officials in particular, adopted a narrow 
vision of a swift military operation where the US would be welcome as 
liberators, and Iraq would naturally develop into an exemplary 
democratic regime without the need for an extensive nation-building 
mission. The non-existing strategy for the employment of contractors 
can only be seen as a practical outcome of this approach. As Gates 
(2014: 223-224) observed in his memoir, contractors presence 
developed in Iraq only after the original invasion and ‘grew willy-nilly 
as each US department or agency contracted with them independently’. 
In addition, he notes ‘(t)here was no plan, no structure, no oversight, 
and no coordination’ (Ibid.).   
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The US military planners assumed that the Iraqi Security Forces 
would remain on duty and maintain public order (Metz, 2008: 132). 
However, once the regime in Baghdad fell and the US post war 
administration began to assert itself, the first weeks of its presence 
were very chaotic and ineffective. Once the Ba’ath Party was ousted 
from power, a vacuum of political authority and disorder in the streets 
emerged. In the atmosphere of lawlessness, most of the infrastructure 
was destroyed, sabotaged and systematically looted while the American 
troops stood by (Diamond, 2005: 10). As many as 17 out of 23 Iraq 
government’s central ministry buildings were completely destroyed 
and the total cost of the damage was estimated equivalent to one-third 
of Iraq’s annual gross domestic product, around $12 billion (Dodge, 
2010: 1279). Considering that Iraq had been subjected to 13 years of 
crippling UN sanctions before the war in 2003, the mass looting and 
ensuing anarchy represented a major blow to the state’s nationwide 
institutional capacity (Ibid.). Although the US quickly put in place the 
Coalition Provisional Authority to act as the occupation administration, 
it had already failed in restoring and maintaining order in the first 
weeks of its occupation which had long term irreversible consequences 
for the rebuilding of the political institutions later on.  
Although the LOGCAP III, awarded exclusively to Halliburton/ 
KBR in 2001 to support GWOT, was already well in place by that time, 
the involvement of contractors in the early Iraq war went very much 
under the radar until later in 2003. Prior to that, the use of contractors 
by the US military was rather associated with the government’s highly 
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controversial Plan Colombia aiming to combat Colombia’s role in the 
cocaine trade. Due to the limits placed by the Congress on the number 
of US personnel permitted to operate in Colombia, the government 
resorted to contract several large PMSCs, including MPRI and DynCorp 
to assist the Colombia’s security forces (Mathieu and Dearden, 2006: 
11). Only later in 2003, the media became flooded with accounts of the 
abuse and torture of prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in which 
some contractors were implicated (Schwartz et al, 2010: 15-20).  
The US had never seriously considered the possibility of an 
extended occupation or a potential need to rebuild Iraq prior to the 
intervention. Rather, the expectations were limited to a swift military 
intervention to remove the regime followed up by a fairly quick power 
handover to an Interim government led by Ahmed Chalabi and other 
pro-democracy exiles who would ultimately establish the new pro-US 
oriented government (Packer, 2005: 127; Chandrasekaran, 2007: 34, 
57). Nevertheless, in the face of the worsening security situation on the 
ground, the US was forced to abandon its strategy for a quick 
withdrawal and had to change its plans into much more robust ones 
including a few years long occupation to restructure and revive the 
Iraqi nation. As Rumsfeld pointed out in May of 2003, facing the 
realities on the ground, the US would have to engage in ‘hands-on 
political reconstruction’ of Iraq in order to achieve the stated US 
objectives (Dobbins et al., 2009: 40).  
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Following his appointment as the occupation civilian 
administrator in May 2003, despite being hastily assembled, Bremer’s 
plans for the Iraq transformation were surprisingly ambitious. As he 
contends in his memoir, next to the military and political aspects of the 
rebuilding process, he believed that a stable Iraq will need a vigorous 
private sector, moving economy, and solid civil society in order to turn 
it into a functioning democracy (Bremer, 2006: 19). He outlined his 
‘seven steps to Iraqi full sovereignty’1 plan publicly in the Washington 
Post in September 2003 and boldly asserted that  
 
‘[Iraq faces many problems, including 
decades of under-investment in everything from 
the oil industry to the sewer system. Security 
issues are a matter of grave concern. There are 
other problems as well, but knowing how to turn 
Iraq into a sovereign state is not one of them’ 
(Bremer, 2003).  
 
Nevertheless, facing the widespread insecurity mostly caused by 
the rising terrorist, insurgent and criminal violence and frustration with 
the slow paced economic reconstruction, the confidence in the Interim 
Government was very low and the Iraqi frustration with the minimal 
                                                          
1 These seven steps are: 1) creation of a 25-member Governing Council broadly 
representative of Iraqi society; 2) nomination of a preparatory committee to devise a way 
to write a constitution; 3) nomination of 25 ministers to put day-to-day operation of Iraqi 
government in the hands of Iraqis; 4) writing Iraq’s new constitution;  5) popular 
ratification of the Iraq’s new constitution; 6) election of a government; 7) dissolution of 
the Coalition Provisional Authority (Bremer, 2003). 
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progress made became obvious. At that point, there was no appropriate 
military strategy, and there were no tangible political goals (Bensahel, 
2006: 453-462). The consequences of underestimating the importance 
of Phase IV planning, the unrealistic expectation about the security 
environment, and the dissolution of the Iraqi Military and Security 
Forces after the removal of the Baathist regime, resulted in unexpected 
consequences for the US military.  
Politically motivated violence spread rapidly across Iraq in 2003 
and in July of that year the insurgency began to use roadside 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) against the US military vehicles 
and convoys (Hashim, 2003: 8-9). The rising number of US casualties 
forced General John Abizaid, the then American general responsible for 
the Middle East, to admit that the US was facing a ‘classical guerrilla-
type campaign’ in Iraq (Packer, 2005: 302). The increasing US casualties 
and an US presidential election a little over a year away led to the US 
government decision to hand back the Iraqi sovereignty to Iraqis in 
June 2004 to seemingly limit the involvement of the US troops in Iraq 
without compromising the original strategic objective of a new 
reformed pro-American Iraq (Feldman, 2004: 114). Following intense 
discussions in Washington, it was decided that the Coalition Provisional 
Authority will hand power to the new Interim Government of Iraqi 
exiled politicians on 28 June 2004 with aim to secure the reform of Iraq 
through them. (Dodge, 2010: 1282). 
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One month before the June handover, Bush shifted the 
responsibility for Iraq from the DOD to DOS and named an American 
Ambassador John Negroponte as the new highest US representative in 
Iraq in order to preside over the new developments. Working together 
with General George Casey, they both sought to shape the US military 
strategy in order to achieve the strategic goal. In mid-June 2006, Casey 
drafted a new joint campaign plan which mandated three-stage transfer 
of power in Iraq: 1) stabilization to early 2007, 2) restoration of civilian 
authority to mid-2008, and 3) support to self-reliance through 2009 
(Woodward, 2008: 32). Dubbed ‘the leave-to-win strategy’, the new 
plan sought to limit the number of US casualties and stop the expansion 
of the security vacuum by rapid training of the Iraqi army and handover 
of the battlespace control to Iraqi forces by the end of 2006 (Dodge, 
2010: 1283).  
Next to the US military casualties, the numbers of Iraqi civilians 
killed was rising steadily from 2003 to 2005, increased rapidly at the 
start of 2006 and reached a peak in October 2006 (Dodge, 2007: 89; 
Ricks, 2009: 33). The public announcement of ’The New Way Forward’ 
by Bush in a televised speech in January 2007 heralded a major 
rethinking in Washington and a complete change in US strategy in Iraq. 
It became clear that the US military strategy in Iraq was failing and 
there was a pressing need to review the applied policies to fill the 
security vacuum and stop Iraq’s decent into a civil war (Mansoor, 2013: 
54-56). The centrepiece of the new strategy was the surge of the US 
troops in and around Baghdad by little over 20,000 men with the aim to 
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apply the strategy of ‘clear, hold and build’ to rebuild the institutional 
capacity of the Iraqi state (Petraeus, 2013; Woodward, 2008: 32). 
Anchored in the rediscovered counterinsurgency doctrine and the 
army’s new COIN manual, the new approach was the last serious 
attempt to bring a halt to the downward spiralling situation in Iraq and 
avoid the almost certain defeat that loomed in 2006. 
Although the number of the documented civilian deaths dropped 
down significantly in the second half of 2007, the effect of the surge 
remains ambiguous. For the most part, it remains to be seen above all 
as an attempt to draw down the violence temporarily and let the Bush 
administration hand the problem off to his successor (Bolger, 2014: 
352-353).2 As Walt (2009) pointed out ‘Washington never had a 
plausible plan for reconstructing a workable Iraqi state once it 
dismantled Saddam’s regime — and it will be up to the Iraqi people to 
work it out amongst themselves.’ Under such circumstances, the U.S. 
military forces began to withdraw from Iraq in December 2007 with the 
end of the Iraq War troop surge.  
Bush’s successor in the White House, Barack Obama, opposed 
the war before it began and made clear that he believed that the war 
was a grave mistake and distraction from the fight against Al Qaeda and 
the Taliban (Obama, 2008). Although by the time he entered the Office 
in January 2009, the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq had 
begun in December 2007 with the end of the infamous Iraq surge, he 
                                                          
2 For different perspectives on the success of the surge, see Petraues (2013), Walt (2009), 
Beinart (2015), Kingsbury (2014), and Bolger (2014). 
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extended the original date of withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq of 
30 June 2009 for an additional 10 months, to 31 August 2010 (Obama, 
2009). By doing so, Obama sought to pursue the strategy dubbed as 
‘responsibly ending the Iraq war’ which consisted primarily of the 
paced removal of US combat brigades from Iraq and ending the combat 
mission by 31 August 2010, accompanied by supporting the Iraqi 
government and training, equipping, and advising its Security Forces in 
taking absolute lead in securing their country in order to remove all U.S. 
troops from Iraq by the end of 2011 (Obama, 2009). 
In regards to the WP doctrine and the necessity of establishing 
clear, unambiguous and military achievable objectives, this section 
presented that the US military strategy in Iraq had a wide range of 
objectives that had to be adapted in the face of the many unfavourable 
circumstances on the ground. The deepening quagmire set in motion by 
the US intervention and accelerated by widespread looting, disbanding 
the Iraqi security forces and purging of the civil service of the senior 
members of the Ba’ath party, required a gradual withdrawal in order to 
prevent a strategic backlash (Dodge, 2010: 1286). The lack of 
preparedness, clear achievable objectives and capacity to get the 
worsening situation under control, led to US government to ultimately 
seek ways to terminate its involvement over an extended period of time 
and without having achieved its strategic goal.  
.  
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V.II. Wholehearted Commitment 
Often understood as the principle of ‘overwhelming force’, the 
requirement of wholehearted commitment is tightly linked with the US 
experience in Korea and Vietnam where the US military believed its 
chances to win were fatally undermined by various politically 
motivated constraints placed upon the military by the US government  
(Snow et al, 2015: 297). For the fear of triggering a direct confrontation 
with China, the US military did not have its full capacity and 
unrestricted use of force available which in retrospect was by many 
viewed as ineffective prosecution of hostilities which made such wars 
longer and end without the desired outcome (Ibid, p. 297-298; Herring, 
1994: 34). Clausewitz wrote that: 
 
‘Superiority of numbers admittedly is the 
most important factor in the outcome of an 
engagement, so long as it is great enough to 
counterbalance all other contributing 
circumstances. It thus follows that as many troops 
as possible should be brought into the 
engagement at the decisive point’ (Clausewitz, 
2001: 194-195).   
 
Although this insight was well understood in the aftermath of 
the Vietnam War, it was often ignored due to wider political and 
strategic reasons. In the case of Iraq in 2003, the US force was 
undermanned throughout the operation deploying as a maximum 150 
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000 troops, despite the estimates that around 400 000 were needed 
(Hughes, 2013). While it may be argued that the WP principle of 
overwhelming force is counterproductive and inappropriate to guerrilla 
warfare, the issue is more complex. Although excessive use of power is 
likely to create resistance, new recruits for the insurgents, and may 
undermine domestic support for the war by creating large scale civilian 
casualties, it is mostly associated with overwhelming kinetic force 
(Crane, 2010: 70). The concept of overwhelming kinetic force on its 
own, seen through the lens of application of firepower, is not suitable in 
the context of counterinsurgency (Ibid.).  
However, large numbers of troops are needed in combating the 
early stages of an insurgency, by policing the population and generally 
demonstrating the power and resolve of the authorities (Pirnie and 
O’Connell, 2008: 49-52, 69, 80). The usefulness of large numbers of 
troops may dwindle over time as consent for occupation decreases, and 
large numbers of troops may in fact prove a burden as the native armed 
forces and government tend to rely more on outside assistance than 
they do on developing their own institutions and capabilities (Paris and 
Sisk, 2007: 4-5). However, an overwhelming presence in the early 
stages of insurgency has been viewed as a mitigating factor, preventing 
insurgency from spinning out of control (Hughes, 2013, Brooks, 2013).  
It is not by coincidence that one of the key approaches applied 
with the COIN strategy under the leadership of General David Petraeus 
was ‘Clear-Hold-Build’ (Ucko, 2009: 74, 84; Pirnie and O’Connell, 
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2008:37). This strategy was successfully developed by the British in 
Malaya, less successfully applied by the Americans in Vietnam and re-
applied in Iraq in 2007 (Ucko, 2009: 74, 84). The logic behind the 
strategy dictates that one has to stay behind and maintain peace and 
security to create a positive long-term legacy. Such endeavour 
necessarily requires a massive use of personnel (Ibid.: 84.) 
The numbers supplemented by PMSI to compensate for this 
critical insufficiency are not clear. The official source on DoD 
contracting in Iraq, CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports, has 
been reporting consistently the level of contractors in Iraq from August 
2008 (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 
Materiel Readiness, no date). The available data from this source cover 
only contractors operating under DoD contracts, nevertheless, these 
made the absolute majority of all US-agency funded contracts overseas 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2008: 3, 8). Including the levels of the US 
military in Iraq in the picture, the following graph demonstrates the 
level of DoD contractors in Iraq from 2007-2011.   
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Figure 12 - Number of Contractor Personnel in Iraq versus Troop 
Levels 
Source: Schwartz and Swain, 2011: 15.  
 
The PMSI contribution was immense and provided indispensable 
support. While the Bush administration did envisage a large scale 
involvement of various military contractors in the support of the US 
strategy in Iraq to enable big companies to get big profits, the rest, were 
seen as optional supplements for the US strategy, not the building 
stones (Biddle, 2013, Brooks, 2013). It was only in the early stages of 
the post-conflict situation that the necessity of the contractors was fully 
revealed and their relevance has dramatically altered the 
understanding of how the United States military is dependent on 
support of the PMSI in modern war (Kinsey, 2009: 22, 71; Tonkin, 2011: 
1).  
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The proportions of the services are not static and they mirror the 
developments of the levels of the troops and the strategy of the US 
military in Iraq across time (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, no date). The graph bellow shows 
the development of the various services contractors provided from 
2008 until the US military withdrawal in 2011.  
 
Figure 13 - Trend analysis of DoD Contractor Personnel Working 
in Iraq (by Service Type), 2008-2011 
 Source: Schwartz and Swain, 2011:26. 
 
The industry encompasses a number of different types of 
services, including base support, transportation, logistics/maintenance, 
security services construction, translator/interpreter, communication 
or training (Schwartz and Swain, 2011:26). For instance, the 
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counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq created a large demand for the 
linguist and military-interrogators’ services, that the US military could 
not provide (Zachary, 2007; Simpson, 2007). As the US military’s need 
for these services became particularly acute due to the reliance on 
population-centred counterinsurgency, human intelligence became a 
critical component (Cassidy, 2006: 162; Ackerman, 2013). The US 
troops were not equipped with Arabic language skills and depended on 
the contracted linguists to accompany them in civilian neighbourhoods 
provide (Zachary, 2007; Simpson, 2007) The Congressional Research 
Service estimated that there were 9,128 translator/interpreter 
contractors in Iraq as of June 2009, or 8% of the total contractor 
personnel there (Fontaine and Nagl, 2009: 8; Schwartz, 2009: 6). 
As it will be elaborated in the ensuing empirical chapters, the 
PMSI provided critical support in sustaining the US military operations 
well beyond the expected scale, timeframe and objectives, and in 
‘ending the Iraq war responsibly’ (McMahon, 2013; Hammes, 2013; 
Diamond, 2005: 13-14). Following from the previous section about 
Clear Objectives, it is clear that the US troops were unprepared for 
pursuing the nation-building strategy which required them to broaden 
their understanding of the operational environment. Without any 
specialised training, they were sent on patrols into neighbourhoods 
with the aim of better intelligence gathering, increasing the perception 
of security and possibly to gain the trust of the locals. But no matter 
how brilliant the manual, counterinsurgency policy was implemented 
by average American soldiers who were predominantly trained for 
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combat operations and not to patrol as community policeman in the 
middle of a war zone in a country whose language or culture they did 
not understand (Ricks: 2007: 267, 272). In other words, the objectives 
in presidential speeches and military doctrines were not necessarily 
clear for the individual troops on the ground and the lack of clear 
translation of those objectives into straightforward military tasks had 
serious and unintended consequences.  
But perhaps most importantly, one of the major obstacles for the 
US military in Iraq was its hesitant approach to embrace Stability 
Operations as these were perceived as going against the US military 
culture (Guttieri, 2006: 219-222). The US military is based around a 
strict division between the military and civilian world together with 
cultural differentiation between military personnel and civilians. Until 
recently, the main US military mission was understood as to fight and 
win wars, which reflects a deeper seated set of convictions about how 
the world works. This perceptual dichotomy of the military versus 
civilian world became apparent when military staffs were to translate 
policy goals into military objectives and pursue these goals in the 
civilian realm of stability operations (Ibid.: 220). The US troops in Iraq 
were geared and trained to fight and kill the enemy and the 
multinational, multi-dimensional efforts of small units of operating 
within the civilian population present special problems for the US 
military (Ibid.: 223). 
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In regards to the following section, US domestic and 
Congressional support, the links between all three sections appear to be 
straightforward. Both Public and Congressional Support and 
Wholehearted commitment are more likely to be amassed around ideas 
that can be clearly put across, have a clear purpose and appear feasible 
given the tools available for their pursuit (Clear Objectives). As these 
two sections have demonstrated, the US objectives in Iraq underwent 
major transformations in the face of the operational circumstances on 
the ground and went well beyond the US military comfort zone of the 
type of operations it trained for. As a consequence, the US military 
found itself unprepared, understaffed and at unease about how to 
achieve them. As the following section will elaborate, the lack of US 
domestic and Congressional support represented the last of the three 
major institutional factors which had constraining impact on the US 
military capability to pursue its strategy and resulted in the need of 
contribution by the PMSI to sustain its efforts.   
 
V.III. Support of the American People and the Congress  
Traditionally, Congressional and public support throughout any 
military campaign has been deemed essential for a number of reasons – 
the troops’ morale, the war’s legitimacy and the availability of resources 
committed to the war by the nation (Howell and Pevehouse, 2007). 
According to the democratic peace theory, public opinion is central in 
regards to a decision to go in war as the perspective of unsuccessful war 
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and related electoral penalty acts as a powerful restraint against it 
(Chan and Safran, 2006: 137). Before the US- led invasion was launched 
on March 19, 2003, 57 per cent of those Americans surveyed were in 
favour of the war and 38 per cent were against (Ibid.: 138). Although in 
many other states, the popular opposition to the war commanded a 
majority, it did not stop the US and UK from asserting a unilateral right 
to pre-emptively strike another sovereign state, without the approval of 
the United Nations (Ibid.) 
Based on dubious intelligence that has since been widely 
discredited, the Iraq war gradually lost the US domestic support and 
according to a Pew Research Center survey, by 2008 an increasingly 
large proportion said that the initial decision to go to war was wrong 
(Public Attitudes Toward the War in Iraq: 2003-2008, 2008). While in 
the first two years of the conflict (until February 2005) a clear majority 
of the surveyed Americans backed the decision to use force in Iraq, 
during the third and fourth year (from February 2005 until mid-2006) 
public opinion on this question was divided and from early 2007 the 
increasing majority was against the Iraq War (Ibid). The evolution of 
the US domestic public opinion in regards to the decision to go to war is 
depicted below. 
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Figure 14 - Public Attitudes Toward the War in Iraq: 2003-2008  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Schwartz and Swain, 2011:26. 
 
According to Chan and Safran (2006: 137), there is a tendency 
for the public to decrease its support for conflict if it becomes 
protracted and when its financial and human costs begin to mount. In 
the case of the US, ever since the Vietnam War, the US public has been 
extremely cautious about the use of its military in high risk 
environments, and neither the public, nor the military were prepared to 
sacrifice a large number of its soldiers or reintroduce the draft in a war 
of choice vaguely related to the US national interest (Hinnebuch, 2006; 
Kriner and Shen, 2010: 161-165). In order to circumvent this 
constraint, the US government resorted to an extensive reliance on 
contractors which provided an important political advantage of 
speeding policy response while limiting public input into the policy-
making process (Krahmann 2010: 238-240).  
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While the public support for the Iraq war was strong at the 
beginning, it waned throughout the years, making it harder for the US 
government to maintain support for the operation (Newport and 
Carroll, 2005). The Congressional support of the war was similarly 
elusive. While at the start only a few were against, with increasing years 
and further complications, many argued against sustaining the war and 
the commitment of further resources (Kriner and Shen, 2014). The 
second Bush administration was forced to fight a series of political 
actions to repel Congressional attempts to tie further funding of the war 
to a specific time frame for withdrawal (Baker, 2007). Therefore, as the 
insurgency grew, the US mobilised private forces with little or no public 
knowledge, let alone consent (Avant and de Nevers, 2013: 136). As the 
negative reaction for a mere 20 000 troops for the 2007 surge suggests, 
the president may well not have been able to deploy additional 
personnel if he had been required to assess exact needs and obtain 
Congressional permission earlier in the operation (Shanker and Myers, 
2008; Coll, 2008; Lendman and Asongu, 2007: 185-191). 
Although the security situation in Iraq was central to the plan, it 
was framed within the broader outlook of the US mission in Iraq in the 
face of declining US domestic support for the war (Fitzgerald, 2013: 
143). General Casey in June 2005 wrote that the military campaign’s 
‘centre of gravity’ was US public opinion, rather than increased security 
in Iraq (Ibid.). Casey’s worry about public opinion stemmed directly 
from a certain set of lessons from Vietnam that were deeply anchored 
in the WP doctrine and which sought to limit the numbers of US soldiers 
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killed in action (Gelpi et al, 2009: 23-66). As such, the small number of 
US deaths of uniformed personnel in Iraq (less than 4,500 in eight-year-
long war) was a result of the increasing emphasis on force protection 
and the extent to which other allied forces and contractors participated 
in the war alongside the Americans (Burns, 2007). While the US 
military carefully counted its uniformed dead in Iraq and human faces 
of each of these individuals appeared in the US media throughout the 
war, a full and accurate accounting of killed contractors was not done 
by the Pentagon, Department of State or USAID, although the Congress 
had instructed those agencies to do so (Schooner, 2008: 78; Lutz, 2013: 
2).  
The most reliable data on contractor fatalities in Iraq were 
collected by the US Labor Department, based on insurance claims if the 
family or employer of a killed contractor seeks insurance compensation, 
(Schooner and Swan, 2010: 17). Although it is seen as a positive step 
towards increasing the public’s awareness of contractor casualties, in 
reality the actual number of contractor fatalities was estimated to be 
much higher than reported (Miller, 2009). This misperception thus led 
to a false impression that the war has been far less costly in human 
terms than it in fact has been. As Schooner noted: ‘The public continues 
to fail to understand how contractors’ personnel are increasingly 
making the ultimate sacrifice alongside, or in lieu of, service members’ 
(Schooner and Swan, 2010: 16). 
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As a result the use of PMSI in support of US Phase IV in Iraq 
allowed the US government to mislead the public and hide the accurate 
tally of the true human toll of this conflict (Schooner and Swan, 2012: 3, 
Singer, 2007: 4). As the military assigned more contractors to perform 
dangerous yet vital tasks, contractors were inevitably bearing a larger 
proportion of the casualty rate without the public being aware of it. 
Contractors have thus increasingly absorbed the most significant cost of 
the US misadventure in Iraq – the ultimate sacrifice (Ibid.: 7). The fact 
that private security solutions could be amassed quickly and without 
the need for oversight and approval if they cost up to $50 million made 
them even more attractive (Kinsey, 2006: 137). 
In addition, to keep the political and economic cost of 
contracting at the minimum, the DoD’s contingency contractor force 
comprised largely of non-US citizens (Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, no date). Therefore, 
should they have become injured or kill, there was a much lower risk 
that they would have been a US citizen, as these represented a minority 
of the contracted force. The international profile distributions for the 
DoD’s contractor employees in Iraq reported by CENTCOM provides 
some evidence.3  
 
                                                          
3 The individual details on the levels of DOD Contractor Personnel in Iraq divided according 
to nationality is available through CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports (Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, no date). 
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Figure 15 - Number of DoD Contractor Personnel in Iraq (by 
Nationality), 2008-20114 
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics & 
Materiel Readiness, no date. 
 
This is very important because, as the United States now 
operates an all-volunteer armed force, it is hard to see the kind of mass 
public reaction that was seen in response to US policy in Vietnam. 
During Vietnam the US Armed Forces met its manpower requirements 
due to a draft. This meant that, at least in theory, every US male 
between the ages 19 and 25 had an equal chance of being drafted to 
serve in the US military (Congressional Budget Office, 2008: 5). This 
gave a vast part of the population a direct stake in what US policy 
towards Vietnam was, as it did not only concern the people who served 
                                                          
4 For the background values of this graph, see Appendix F.  
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but also their families and friends (Ibid.). Today, despite the fact that 
the US military has recently been engaged in the longest period of 
sustained conflict in the nation’s history, just one-half of one percent of 
American adults has served on active duty at any given time (The 
Military-Civilian Gap: Fewer Family Connections, 2011). In the context 
of all volunteer army, the individual citizen is as involved in national 
defence as he or she chooses to be. According to a survey of a 
nationwide representative sample of 510 adults age 18-24 in the 
continental United States from 2006, six in ten individuals could not 
find Iraq on a map although the U.S. troops had been involved in a 
major war there since 2003 (National Geographic-Roper Public Affairs, 
2006: 8). 
 In a sense, the biggest act of protest again US policy was the 
decreasing rate of recruitment rather than the kind of massive protests 
that characterised the Vietnam War era. The voluntary system meant 
that the vast majority of the American public had not had an experience 
of what military life is like beyond the mediated experience of reading a 
newspaper or watching television news. This means that, although the 
public may be sympathetic towards the troops and the sacrifices they 
make, they have little to no understanding of what these sacrifices 
mean in a practical sense which has a clear political advantage. The 
surge in PMSI numbers, which preceded the US troops' 2007 surge, was 
barely noticed by the general public, as the data and coverage of the 
PMSI numbers and activities in Iraq were sporadic. In addition, the 
deaths of private contractors, for reasons mentioned above, were not a 
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politically sensitive issue, in contrast to troops' casualties. Therefore 
while the US troops were strengthened enormously by the private 
sector, it all went under the radar of the US media and the public in 
general, as reinforcing the troops by other troops was not really 
deemed an option.   
 
V.IV. Conclusion 
Among the cases when the international community was called 
upon to rebuild a shattered state and build a nation after a conflict, Iraq 
stands out as a state which has not collapsed due to a civil war or 
internal conflict but as a consequence of an external military 
intervention which had sought to change its regime (Diamond, 2005: 9). 
Every post-conflict environment is unique and evolves based on the 
particular circumstances on the ground shaped by political, economic, 
religious, and social context of the environment, nevertheless, there are 
significant institutional factors that shape the intervention on the side 
of the intervening force as well. In the post 9/11 strategic environment, 
the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, as a collection of basic principles for 
future military expeditionary operations based on the lessons learned 
from Vietnam in particular, was cast aside and the invasion of Iraq went 
ahead without any serious consideration of any of its six principles. It is 
an irony that it was General Colin Powell who gave the UN Security 
Council speech on February 2003 arguing for the Iraq war which was at 
odds with the principles that the doctrine, named after him, spelled out 
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a decade earlier (Schwartz, 2013). This fundamentally flawed thinking 
about future war set the US up for many of the difficulties it would 
encounter in the Iraq war, where PMSI became an immediate and short-
term remedy to the blatant failure on the highest levels. 
The robust sustainment capability provided by PMSI gave the US 
military increased capability, adaptability and agility to sustain Phase IV 
Operations for as long as it takes and to continue operating without 
running out of necessary items or services. Not only they replenished 
items such as food, fuel, and ammunition, but they also provided 
communication, linguist services and training – all types of services 
critical to the success of the civilian part of Phase IV Operations. 
Although the views on success or failure of the US military operations in 
Iraq are open for debate, it is reasonable to argue that the Phase IV 
Operations would not have taken place without the extensive support 
of the PMSI and that the PMSI became the vehicle of adaptability (and 
continuity), enabling the US military to sustain its presence and 
activities on the ground in Iraq for eight years, when the original 
military plans were shattered shortly after the invasion. The PMSI 
became a backbone of the US efforts to bring the intervention to an 
acceptable conclusion and, ultimately, a dignified exit, by providing the 
means to adapt to the dynamic situation on the ground. To this end, the 
PMSI became an indispensable supportive asset of US foreign policy 
which effectively enabled the US to bypass the WP doctrine and avoid 
the full weight of the consequences of otherwise politically and 
militarily unsustainable operation.  
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Chapter VI.  Base Support Contractors and Their 
Contribution in Phase IV Operations in Iraq 
 
 The previous chapter discussed the institutional factors 
shaping the PMSI contribution in Phase IV Operations in Iraq and pointed 
out that the indifference to the lessons learned from the US military 
operations during the Cold War led the US government to extend its 
commitment in Iraq beyond the expected size, timeframe, objectives and 
even the strategic goal of the mission. This chapter concerns the category 
of Base Support Contractors (BSCs)1, as a large body of PMSCs specialised 
in logistical support services and the largest type of service contractors 
operating in Iraq from 2003-2011 along the US troops. And seeks to 
provide answer to the adapted research question: ‘What kind of 
contribution have the Base Support Contractors made to the US military 
capability to pursue Phase IV Operations in Iraq?’  
                                                          
1 This thesis distinguishes between three sectors: reconstruction, logistics and security. This 
categorisation corresponds to the three major contingency-contracting areas identified by the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (Thibault et al, 2009: 8). It must 
be noted that any clear-cut distinction between the sectors is only a theoretical exercise as 
many activities belong to more than one sector and most companies provide a wide range of 
services across the three sectors. In addition, companies tend to expand or contract their 
activities depending on their financial situation and instantaneous opportunities, therefore, 
any fixed distinction between the sectors would be unrealistic (Kinsey, 2009: 6). 
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In line with the Conceptual Framework (Chapter IV), this chapter 
argues that the BSCs represented the contribution of Crucial Supporter as 
they became a critical asset to the US military’s capability to adapt its 
strategy to end Iraq responsibly and leave with dignity as opposed to a 
hasty withdrawal in the middle of a civil war. This contribution is 
characterised by three main features: 1) provision of indispensable 
additional services; 2) being replaceable only under the condition of major 
changes to the core aspects of the US government’s strategy, including the 
size, length and objectives of the military mission; and 3) creating a 
prevailing positive impact. 
To frame the discussion accordingly, Section I of this chapter 
explains the choice of logistics for this chapter analysis. Section II shows 
the breadth and depth of the services provided by the BSCs and explains 
their significance for the US military strategy in Iraq. Building on the 
analysis of the importance of the BSCs services, section III provides an 
assessment of the significance of BSCs as an alternative instrument in US 
Phase IV Operations. It explains the specific position of KBR, as the major 
logistics providers in Iraq, where other alternative sources for provision of 
such services were very limited, if not non-existent.  In section IV, 
discussing both the positive and negative aspects associated with the large 
scale employment of logistics contractors in Iraq, it is argued that, 
although large PMSCs have exploited the US government’s contracting 
system through fraud, mismanagement, and misappropriation of 
government funds, the BSCs have not undermined the overall effectiveness 
of the US fighting forces. Indeed, it provided prevailing positive 
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contribution in making the Phase IV Operations sustainable across an 
extended period of time. Finally, the conclusion discusses why the 
contribution of Crucial Supporter is the most fitting category for BSCs in 
the given context and creates a bridge to the next empirical chapter.  
 
VI.I. Context of the Analysis 
The CWC reported that two-thirds of the US government spending 
on contingency contract support in Iraq and Afghanistan was for services 
(Thibault et al, 2011: 23). As an illustration, for instance, in 2006, out of 
the total of $295 billion DoD awarded 48% to equipment and supplies, 
13.5% to research development testing and evaluation, and 28.5%  to 
‘other services’, understood as military services (Perlo-Freeman and 
Sköns, 2008: 8). Within this group, the top ten services, that the US 
government agencies obligated the most dollars for, account for 44% of 
total service obligations (Thibault et al., 2011: 23). While the Logistics 
support services clearly dominate the ranking in terms of government 
spending, the range of services provided by the whole industry is much 
broader. These top ten services performed in support of operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (FY 2002 through mid-FY 2011), and acquired through 
contingency contracts, are listed in the table below.  
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Table 9 - Top 10 Services Acquired through Contingency Contracts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Thibault et al., 2011: 23. 
 
Despite the popular image throughout the Iraq War (and its 
aftermath) implying that the US military was supported by an ‘army of 
contractors’ or an ‘army of mercenaries,’ such a portrayal is misleading 
(Bowman, 2011; Gordon, 2010). In the military sense, the term ‘army’ 
represents a large body of people organized and trained for land warfare, 
often understood as the entire military land forces of a country (Oxford 
Dictionaries, no date b). While the use of the term in the context of military 
outsourcing creates catchy titles, it also evokes the wrong image that 
contractors in Iraq were a large military-like, armed body of individuals 
engaged in combat.  
The official source on DOD contracting in Iraq, CENTCOM Quarterly 
Contractor Census Reports, has been reporting the level of contractors in 
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Iraq from August 2008.2 While it reveals that the number of contractors in 
Iraq surpassed the number of the Coalition forces in  2008 and again from 
2010 onwards, differentiating between the various types of provided 
services is key (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics 
and Materiel Readiness, no date).3 This is especially because the category 
of heightened controversy that came to represent the image of the 
industry - armed contractors, was in fact a minority (Brooks, 2013). As 
Stillman (2011) explains, it was an army of ‘hired hands’, rather than 
‘hired guns’ that formed the bulk of contracted support for the US military 
operations in Iraq.   
The example of the CENTCOM Contractor Census Report from 2011 
illustrates the variety of services within the PMSI, distinguishing at least 
eight different types (Schwartz and Swain, 2011: 16, Commission on 
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011: 233). These 
categories include base support, security, translator/interpreter, 
construction, transportation, logistics/ maintenance, communication, 
training and ‘other’ (Ibid.). The chart below shows the proportion of each 
of the service type based on the number of contractor personnel in Iraq at 
that time. From the graph it is clear that base support (61%) represents 
the majority of all services and its proportion is at least three times bigger 
                                                          
2 For the first three years of Operations Iraqi Freedom, the US government had no count of its 
contractors either in Iraq or Afghanistan. The approximate estimates of independent 
commissions and media vary widely, the CENTCOM reports represent the most insightful and 
consistent insight into DoD contracting for the period 2008-2011 (Isenberg, 2009b: 29). 
3 For a comparison of CENTCOM reported estimates of DoD total contractors and total troops 
between September 2007 and March 2011 in Iraq, see Appendix D. 
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than the second largest service type – security (18%) (Schwartz and 
Swain, 2011: 16). 
 
Figure 16 - Number of DoD Contractor Personnel Working in Iraq (by 
Service Type), March 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Schwartz and Swain, 2011: 16. 
 
Although the specific numbers may slightly vary depending on the 
exact definition of the service type, the CENTCOM reports for the period 
between March 2008 and March 2011 demonstrate that the proportion of 
the most controversial, armed contractors working for the US government 
in Iraq was only a small subsection of the overall contracted support 
(Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel 
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Readiness, no date).4 Instead, the largest proportion of contractors in Iraq 
provided base support services, which constitute the core of the Private 
Logistics Sector.  
Private Logistics Sector, (PLS), as understood in this thesis, is then 
an umbrella term for technical and service support contractors, sometimes 
referred to as logistical support companies or simply PMSCs (Kinsey, 
2009: 4). This chapter focusses on the three most prominent services 
within the PLS, which are base support, transportation and 
logistics/maintenance (Thibault et al., 2011: 23). As in practice these three 
types of services very often merge together, this thesis uses Private 
Logistics Sector (PLS) and Base Support Contractors (BSCs) 
interchangeably (Schwartz and Swain, 2011: 16). The main reason 
supporting the choice of PLS as the main object of analysis on the sector 
level is its sheer size, the breadth of the provided services, representing 
the largest sector in support of Phase IV Operations in Iraq in personnel 
proportion (Schwartz and Swain 2011: 26).  
Under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program III and IV (LOGCAP 
III and IV)5, programmes administered by the US Army to provide 
contingency support to augment the Army force structure, the US 
                                                          
4 For a comparison of CENTCOM reported estimates of DoD contractors based on the service 
type between March 2008 and March 2011 in Iraq, see Appendix E. 
5 The first LOGCAP contract (LOGCAP I) for combat support services in Iraq consisted of a cost-
plus-award-fee contract for one year followed by four option years, and was awarded in 1992, 
to Brown and Root Services, who later became Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR). This contract 
was used to support US operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Hungary, Saudi 
Arabia, Haiti, Italy and Rwanda. The second LOGCAP contract (LOGCAP II), a cost-plus award 
fee contract for one base year followed by four option years was awarded to DynCorp in 1997. 
This contract was used to support US operations in the Philippines, Guatemala, Colombia, 
Ecuador, East Timor, and Panama (Congressional Budget Office, 2005: 2-9; Grasso, 2010: 6-9; 
Mobley, 2004: 23; Grasso, 2007: 2-5).  
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outsourced a vast majority of support services required for its operations 
to contractors in Iraq. The LOGCAP III, awarded exclusively to 
Halliburton/KBR in 2001 was primarily aimed to support the Global War 
on Terrorism and the following LOGCAP IV from April 2008 widened the 
number of LOGCAP prime contractors, adding two more companies - 
DynCorp International LLC and Fluor Intercontinental Inc. (Congressional 
Budget Office, 2005: 2-9; Grasso, 2010: 6-9; Mobley, 2004: 23; Grasso, 
2007: 2-5). The more recent contract, LOGCAP IV, differed greatly from its 
three predecessors, in that multiple contracts were awarded, to KBR, 
DynCorp, and Fluor, and the three companies had to compete for task 
orders that represented particular services that the US Army needed 
(Ibid.).  
During the Phase IV Operations in Iraq, LOGCAP III provided the 
major instrument for the US military to acquire civilian contractors in 
order to support its Phase IV Operations. Halliburton/KBR became the 
LOGCAP III prime vendor and the main logistics contractor for the US 
government (Congressional Budget Office, 2005: 2-9). Initially, the 
contract was aimed at developing a contingency plan for extinguishing oil 
well fires in Iraq, but the actual responsibilities that Halliburton/KBR later 
performed included housing for troops, preparing food, supplying water, 
and collecting trash (Grasso, 2010: 8, Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction, 2006: 15-17).  
The way the company operated was to subcontract the bulk of its 
responsibilities to hundreds of other firms, many based in the Middle East, 
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but effectively all around the world (Stillman, 2011). This process was 
repeated by the Halliburton/KBR subcontractors to narrow down, divide 
or effectively outsource the large amount of workload they received. The 
subcontracting mechanism across a number of levels effectively created a 
web of ‘manpower agencies’ supplying the workforce from across the 
globe to meet the US government operational needs in Iraq (Ibid.). 
In accordance with the Conceptual Framework, this chapter 
proceeds with answering three main questions which help determine the 
contribution the BSC represented in the US Phase IV Operations in Iraq: 
Firstly, what type of services did the BSC provide to augment the US 
military capability in Phase IV Operations in Iraq? Secondly, to what 
extend did the US government depend on the provision of these services in 
order to sustain its military efforts in Iraq? Thirdly, what was the 
prevailing value of the BSC’ presence and activities in the context of the US 
efforts in Iraq?  
 
VI.II. The Nature of Base Support Contractors’ Services 
This section demonstrates that the BSC were Crucial Supporter due 
to the extent and value of the services, indispensable additional services, 
they provided under the contract to DoD to support US Phase IV 
Operations in Iraq. The main motivation behind the US government 
employment of logistics contractors was to supplement the US military by 
civilian forces to fill the gap between increasing mission requirements and 
limited military personnel levels on the ground (Lovewine, 2014: 9, 79; 
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Rostker, 2007: 5-10). With scarce military resources and an ever-
increasing counterinsurgency mission, the US military sought to increase 
its combat power by using logistics PMSCs in functions that were no 
longer perceived appropriate for the US troops (Brooks, 2013; Carafano 
and Rosenzweig, 2005: 37, Singer, 2003: 522).  
The BSCs became effectively a force multiplier, enhancing the US 
military fighting capability, while providing the flexibility to redirect 
limited assets to meet key mission requirements on the battlefield 
(Thibault et al., 2009: 60, 72; Lovewine, 2014: 10, 81; McMahon, 2013; 
Cotton et al., 2010: 45-47) One such example is the replacement of military 
transportation units in Iraq, usually responsible for delivering supplies in 
convoys, with PMSCs such as KBR and its subcontractors. Miller (2006: 
127) calls them ‘the unsung heroes’ of the war in Iraq and points out that, 
despite being an easy target for insurgents, more than seven hundred KBR 
trucks were operating daily on the dangerous roads around Iraq, 
providing fuel, water, food and many other crucial supplies for the US 
military.  
The breadth and depth of the range of services provided by 
contractors in Phase IV Operations was immense as they were involved in 
almost every aspect of the US government efforts in post-conflict Iraq 
(Hughes, 2013, Brooks, 2013). The CENTCOM reports illustrate the 
changing level of all DoD contracted support for the period of 2008-2011. 
Although the available data from this source cover only contractors 
operating under DOD contracts, these made up the absolute majority of all 
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US agency funded contracts overseas (Congressional Budget Office, 2008: 
3, 8). Figure 2 shows the various services contractors provided from 2008 
until the withdrawal in 2011 and highlights that the three main PLS 
services together – base support, transportation and 
logistics/maintenance - represent the largest proportion of all DoD 
contracted services from March 2008-2011.  
 
Figure 17 - Trend Analysis of DoD Contractor Personnel Working in 
Iraq (by Service Type), 2008 – 2011 
 
Source: Schwartz and Swain, 2011: 26.   
 
This graph also corresponds to the assessment of the amount of US 
government spending on contracted support in Iraq. According to the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan and its 
report in 2011, between 2002 and 2011, logistics support services were 
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on the top of the ten most acquired services through contingency 
contracts, performed in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan with 
$46.5 billion spent in that period (Thibault et al. 2011: 23). Construction 
followed second with $10.5 billion, and technical assistance services with 
$5.5 billion complete the top three services provided by contractors in 
Iraq in that period based on US government spending (Ibid.).  
The indispensability of the services provided by PLS can also be 
illustrated through the quantitative assessment of logistics contractors’ 
presence, where large numbers of contractors are perceived as sufficient 
evidence to indicate their utility. Depicted together with the levels of the 
total troops and total DoD contractor personnel in Iraq, the following 
graph illustrates the level of DoD PLS personnel in Iraq from 2009-2011. 
 
Figure 18 - Trend Analysis of Total DoD Contractor Personnel, DoD 
PLS Personnel and Total US Troops 
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel 
Readiness, no date.   
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In terms of specific PLS services, the two major logistics task orders 
relevant to US military operations in Iraq were LOGCAP III Task Orders 
130 and 151. Both task orders were awarded to KBR to provide support 
services to the Chief of Mission and Multi-National Force-Iraq personnel in 
Baghdad and other key locations across Iraq including Basra, Al Hillah and 
Kirkuk (Grasso, 2010: 20). KBR was responsible for facilities management, 
laundry, food service, sanitation, maintenance, power and water 
generation, fuel services, waste and sewage management and 
transportation (Thibault et al, 2009: 1).  
Next to this range of PLS services that the US military traditionally 
considered indispensable to operate, there is a significant number of 
services that the US military did not put much emphasis on in the past or 
simply did not exist. In Iraq, these services, often within the category 
‘morale, welfare and recreational activities,’ were perfected through the 
use of contractors. They represent additional services aimed at soldiers’ 
happiness to provide them with more pleasant warzone experience. These 
services include shopping areas, gyms, fast food vendors, cinemas and 
many others (Chatterjee, 2009: 7-9, 188-189, 213). The US military 
contracted such services because the operational environment of the Iraq 
war dictated that the war was less about intensive combat and more about 
the US military ability to sustain its presence across an extended period of 
time. In order to do so, the US military, operating as a voluntary force, 
tried to make the experience more likeable (Ibid.). 
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Following the Vietnam War and the abolishment of the draft, the 
relationship between the US military and contractors changed. Unlike 
during the draft, in the post-Vietnam War period, soldiers were not joining 
because they had to, but because they wanted to and the military began to 
feel the pressure to recruit them and also to make them stay (Rostker and 
Yeh, 2006: 5-10). 
The conditions of soldiers' everyday life began to improve in 1990s, 
following the complaints of soldiers serving in Operation Desert Storm 
during the 1991. The Army responded by putting more efforts and 
resources into finding out a better way to support troops in the field. One 
of the key stimuli which paved the way for contractors overtaking the 
logistics aspects of US military operations was the concept of 
prefabricated military bases, which would become a cornerstone of 
LOGCAP (Chatterjee, 2009: 57). Force Provider was a one-size-fits-all 
prefabricated base-in-a-box that could be shipped or airlifted anywhere in 
the world in a standard container. With instructions simple enough for 
anyone, the need for military engineering experts was eliminated (Ibid.). 
Providing capacity for 550 soldiers in comfortable climate-controlled tents 
with facilities including showers, kitchens, laundry rooms, and many 
others, these mobile bases in containers were the first step for contractors 
to immerse themselves into the wide possibilities of service contracting in 
contingency operations (Ibid.). 
Once the basic living conditions of soldiers improved, it unlocked a 
whole range of other improvements to make a volunteer soldier combat-
196 
 
ready and happy. One of them is certainly food. As Chatterjee described, 
not that long ago, during the First Gulf War in 1991, most troops lived off 
Meals Ready to Eat (MRE), which were ready meals in a pouch (Chatterjee, 
2009: x; Perry, 2003). In contrast, the dining facilities built and ran by KBR 
in Iraq offered a great variety of food and sizeable portions (Chatterjee, 
2009: xi, Smith, 2012: 85-86). The change in the way the US military fed its 
troops with the support of contractors in Iraq has been so dramatic that it 
became a running joke that while in the past troops lost weight on their 
deployment, in Iraq they gained it (Chatterjee, 2009: 6). 
In addition, while some troops lived among the local population, a 
large majority lived or even operated from the large number of US military 
bases in Iraq. Many of these bases also had a mini military mall selling a 
wide range of products. Major U.S. bases also included jewellery stores, 
souvenir shops, beauty salons and fast-food courts featuring Taco Bell, 
Subway, Pizza Hut, Cinnabon, Burger Kings, KFCs, McDonalds and many 
others (Stillman, 2011).  
Logistics contractors also provided a wide range of entertainment 
facilities for troops across Iraq, including open-theatre, video games, 
personal video-watching stations and movies, pool tables, table tennis, 
events nights with Latin dancing, and karaoke nights (Chatterjee, 2009: 6-
7). According to Susman (2007), the military considered retail centres and 
food courts crucial to boosting military morale, particularly in places such 
as Iraq, where every trip outside the military base was rife with risk. This 
led to the creation of small American towns in the middle of the Iraqi 
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desert, such as Camp Liberty, Anaconda or Balad Air Base (Ricks, 2006b; 
Stillman, 2011).  
This approach highly valuing soldiers’ welfare in warzone was 
criticized by many, including General Petraeus, as largely 
counterproductive and creating a gap between the troops and the local 
population. In contrast, many others within the military saw it as 
necessary to provide the troops with some level of comfort, hoping to 
make their deployment a positive experience, in order to retain them 
(Susman, 2007). Tim Horton, the former head of public relations for LSA 
Anaconda, provided a simple explanation that this was driven by a clear 
economic calculus where the US all-volunteer army operates as any other 
corporation seeking to recruit off the street and give soldiers a reason to 
stay in by providing all those extra services. While these services do not 
come cheap, as Horton added, it is better for the military to spend some 
extra money to keep a volunteer army happy, rather than spend another 
$100,000 to train every replacement soldier (Chatterjee, 2009: 10).  
In line with the Conceptual Framework chapter, this section 
highlights the differences between the supplement and substitute 
approaches in regards to the assessment of contractors’ contribution and 
makes clear that the responsibilities contracted to PLS were 
indispensable, but only additional, services to contribute to the US military 
capability to sustain its military mission in Iraq. As discussed above, 
throughout the period from 2008-2011, base support contractors 
represented the largest segment of contracted force in Iraq, accounting for 
198 
 
more than all other DOD contractors combined. Although they even 
outnumbered the US military at certain points, the majority of its services 
were only to increase the effectiveness and flexibility of the military and 
not to replace it by taking over its responsibilities. As such, the purpose 
and nature of the majority of PLS’ services is distinct from the purpose and 
nature of the US troops in stability operations and hence the BSC cannot 
challenge the US military to represent the contribution of Driver. As a 
result, PLS could only provide the contribution of Contributor, 
Implementer, or Crucial Supporter depending on the level of significance 
of the type service to the overall US efforts – from optional, through 
essential to indispensable additional services which is elaborated in the 
following section. 
 
VI.III. The Significance of Base Support Contractors’ Service for the 
Sustainment of the US Phase IV Operations In Iraq 
The potential significance of the Base Support Contractors as the 
main provider of the logistics services ranges from being ‘replaceable with 
no or minor changes to the non-core aspects of the strategy’ (Contributor) 
to ‘irreplaceable without major changes to core aspects of the strategy 
such as the size of the available manpower, available timeframe and 
desired objectives of the mission’ (Crucial Supporter). The level of 
significance is determined based on the assessment of how much the US 
military depended on the PLS in order to sustain its efforts in Iraq. In 
terms of the US Phase IV Operations in Iraq, KBR as the main logistics 
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provider stands out as a Crucial Supporter that proved replaceable only 
under the condition of major changes to the core aspects of the US 
strategy. This means that in its absence the US would most likely not have 
been able to sustain its operations in the face of the unexpected 
operational circumstances that unfolded on the ground soon after the 
invasion.  
Under the LOGCAP III programme, the Halliburton-KBR received 
the largest contract in the GWOT - to provide Iraq mission's logistics, as 
well as the efforts to restore the Iraqi oil system and build more than 60 
locations throughout the Middle East and South Asia (Singer, 2003: 136-
148; Thibault et al., 2011: 23). To put the extent of the US reliance on this 
particular contractor in perspective, no one has benefited more than KBR, 
who was awarded at least $39.5bn in federal contracts related to the Iraq 
war 2003-2011 (Fifield, 2013). By way of comparison, the amount paid to 
two Kuwaiti companies, Agility Logistics and the state-owned Kuwait 
Petroleum Corporation (the second and third-biggest winners based on all 
federal government contracts awarded for performance in Iraq and 
Kuwait), was reported $7.2bn and $6.3bn respectively (Fifield, 2013). 
Without these companies, the robust logistical support required to enable 
the US military to operate most likely would not exist. 
Without the large scale of support services provided by KBR and its 
subcontractors, the ability of the US military to perform certain functions 
would be severely limited, and possibly many important aspects of the 
mission would be significantly degraded. This fact was acknowledged in 
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the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, where civilian contractors are 
categorised as one of the four major components of US Total force 
together with its active and reserve military components, and its civil 
servants (Department of Defense, 2006: 75, 81; Report of the Commission 
on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations, 2007: 9; Schwartz and Church, 2013: 16). 
The need for the large number of logistics contractors and their 
services stemmed from the decision to deploy a small military force in a 
complex military operation and the subsequent aim to avoid the negative 
consequences of that decision. In order to provide the US military leaders 
the flexibility to redirect limited assets to meet the missions requirements 
and thus enable the US troops to focus on addressing urgent operational 
concerns,  the US military incorporated the PMSCs as substitutes for 
uniform military personnel (Petersohn, 2007:  4-5; Lovewine, 2014:  80). 
As Singer (2003: 244) points out, there were other options to resolve the 
problem of insufficient forces from - but they were politically problematic.  
Setting aside the option of a complete and immediate withdrawal of the US 
military in the face the increasingly complex post-major-combat situation 
in Iraq, there were three other unlikely alternatives to strengthen the 
Coalition force. These were to send additional regular troops, full-scale 
call-up of the National Guard and Reserves, or persuading other allies to 
send their troops (Ibid.). 
The obvious option would have been to send at least twice as many 
regular forces, beyond the original 135,000 soldiers. This would have 
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required a public admission of the administration's earlier miscalculations 
(Ibid.). The idea of such re-enforcement ignores the fact that the regular 
force was already stretched by the simultaneous war in Afghanistan and 
other global commitments (Ibid.). The broad opposition of the Congress 
and general unease for President Bush in obtaining the additional 21,500 
combat troops for the Surge in 2007, indicates the reluctance of the US 
Congress to commit any more troops to Iraq, even under critical 
circumstances such as the peak of the civilian violence in Iraq in 2006-
2007 (Shanker and Myers, 2008; Coll, 2008; Lendman and Asongu, 2007: 
185-191). This leads to a conclusion that to substitute the functions of 
PMSCs in their full extent by more US troops would have been politically 
non-viable.  
Furthermore, the US military did not dispose of such numbers of 
regular forces to be deployed to Iraq, even if the political constraints were 
not present. Upon his arrival in office in early 2009, President Obama 
articulated in his New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, that the War 
in Iraq drew the dominant share of US troops, resources, diplomacy, and 
national attention at the expense of the much needed US commitment to 
the War in Afghanistan (Lee, 2009). Ferguson observed that executing 
simultaneous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan exposed the US personnel 
deficit, citing the 500,000 deployable troop limit which he said was not 
sufficient to win ‘all the small wars’ the United States was waging and 
possibly would have to wage in the future (Fergusson, 2005). Already in 
2005 the US had approximately 137,000 troops in Iraq where 43% were 
drawn from the Reserves or the National Guard (Ibid.). This was a 
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sensitive measure as even larger-scale call-up of the National Guard and 
Reserves meant widespread outcry among the public as the war effects 
would have been on the shoulders of the US population (Singer, 2003: 
244).   
The last option was to negotiate additional troops from US allies to 
spread the burden. From the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 
2003 until the end of 2008, by which time most of the smaller contributors 
had withdrawn, ground troops from forty-nine countries deployed 
alongside U.S. forces (Beehner, 2007). Even at its most robust, many of the 
smaller allies committed only non-combat troops ranging from a few 
dozens to a few hundred for training and advisory purposes (Ibid.). Since 
the invasion of Iraq 2003 was highly controversial from its outset, lacking 
the UN specific endorsement for direct US military action, the little global 
support for the war is hardly surprising. Some of the traditional US allies, 
such as Germany, France and Turkey opposed the war and conformed to 
the prevailing opinion of their domestic audiences. Others, including, for 
instance, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain decided to go against the 
domestic opinion of their citizens and follow the US into the war 
(Hinnebusch, 2006: 454). The public resistance to the Iraq War was 
unprecedented and large-scale protests took place in many cities across 
the world before and after the invasion began. The media reported that 
during one particular weekend before the invasion, 15th and 16th February 
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2003, a collective protest of up to 30 million people took place against the 
impending war in Iraq (McFadden, 2003; Chrisafis et al, 2003).6 
In contrast, the PLS option offered to supplement the US military at 
almost no political cost (Singer, 2003: 245). It provided the additional 
manpower without any public outcry about when and where they would 
be deployed. Also, once the war already started PLS alleviated the 
pressure on the US government about the execution of the war. As 
Schooner points out, the US government was balancing the operational 
need for personnel against the gradual death toll among American troops 
that threatened to further diminish public approval for the whole military 
mission (Schooner, 2008: 78, 84, 89). As contractors casualties were not 
counted in official mission reports, the public had little awareness about 
the magnitude of their support and their losses (Singer, 2003: 245, 
Schooner, 2008: 78, 84, 89).  
It is worth noting that despite this arrangement between the 
government and the private sector, the US military was overstretched 
since the early stages just to maintain the U.S. presence in Iraq, resorting 
to extending tours of duty and retaining personnel due to be discharged 
(Fergusson, 2005). First, as early as in 2003 the media reported that the 
US army would extend Iraqi tours of The National Guard and Reserve 
troops to a year deployment. Signing up for service with the expectation 
that they would serve on weekends and for annual training, more than 
                                                          
6 For more details and individual insights into what motivated so many people to protest against 
the Iraq War on February 15, 2003, see the recent, highly acclaimed documentary by Amir 
Amirani, We Are Many (We Are Many, no date).  
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128,000 were assigned to active military duty both overseas and in the US 
(Cloud, 2007). Second, in 2007, then-Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, 
announced three months extension on the standard one-year tour for the 
Army active duty forces in order to help the US military supply enough 
troops for ongoing operations (O’Bryant and Waterhouse, 2008: 5; Jeffrey, 
2014).  
This meant that active-duty soldiers spent more time at war than at 
home - 15 months on deployment and 12 months at home.7 Gates justified 
this move as the only way to maintain force levels adequate to the US 
military commitments without having to resort to prevent many soldiers 
from having less than a year at home between combat tours, designed to 
rest, retrain and re-equip before having to go back (Cloud, 2007; Tyson 
and White, 2007). Years later in his memoir, Gates (2014: 58) reflects on 
the decision to extend the standard one-year tour to 15 months 
deployment and, although seen as necessary, he admits that he believes 
that these long tours significantly aggravated PTSD and contributed to a 
growing number of suicides among soldiers.   
In contrast to the early years in the war when the goal for active-
duty troops was to spend two years at home for every year deployed, this 
middle ground solution was preferred to shortening the ‘at-home period,’ 
risking to damage morale, undermining recruiting and retention efforts 
(Cloud, 2007; Tyson and White, 2007). By ordering longer tours for all 
                                                          
7 This measure was in place throughout the Surge until July 2008, coinciding approximately with 
the moment when the US combat troops began their withdrawal from Iraq in the context of 
the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement's negotiations that set the timeline for U.S. troop 
withdrawal (O’Bryant and Waterhouse, 2008: 5; Jeffrey, 2014). 
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active duty Army units, the Pentagon sought to maintain stable force levels 
and still give soldiers at least a full year at home (Ibid.). By outsourcing 
logistics on a large scale where the ratio of civilian contractors to US 
troops remained close to 1:1 (with base support, transportation and 
logistics/maintenance contractors representing more than 60%), PLS 
contractors supplemented the US military force and enabled it to sustain 
its presence and activities. In its absence, it is likely the US military would 
have had to change substantially its mission objectives.  
It is also worth pointing out that the decision to extend the length of 
Army military deployments came three months after President Bush put 
forth his new security plan for Iraq to deploy additional troops in support 
of the Surge (Gates, 2014: 56-61). It reflects the reality that the new 
strategy, counting on the support of PLS, was still ‘unfeasible’ without 
introducing longer Army tours (Tyson and White, 2007). According to 
O'Bryant and Waterhouse, originally, the additional forces needed for the 
Surge were to be accomplished primarily by a stepped-up pace of military 
unit rotations into Iraq and a delay for some personnel departures from 
that country (O’Bryant and Waterhouse, 2008). Nevertheless, this was 
circumvented by the extended deployment of the Army active duty forces 
(Cloud, 2007). Considering that the reported contractors' numbers at that 
time already surpassed the number of troops, with logistics representing 
as many as 150 000 depending on the stage of the war and the narrowness 
of the category's definition, it is possible to conclude that they were 
irreplaceable in terms of the US strategy in Iraq (Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, no date). Using 
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the categorisation of the Conceptual Framework from chapter IV, it is 
argued that they were irreplaceable without major changes to the core-
aspects of the US strategy, including the size, length and objectives of the 
mission.   
 
VI.IV. The Impact of BSCs on US Efforts in Phase IV Operations 
The two previous sections established that the services provided by 
BSCs were indispensable additional services and the US military could not 
operate without the BSCs in Phase IV Operations in Iraq, unless it was 
willing to compromise the size of available manpower, timeframe and 
objectives of its mission. This section focusses on the assessment of the 
prevailing value of its contribution through discussion of the potential 
impact of its presence and activities on the US strategy. 
Unlike the armed security contractors, the logistics sector is a 
broad area where contractors perform diverse activities that can have 
different potential impact. In contrast to the APSCs which through their 
performance of military-like activities have the potential to advance or 
undermine the US military strategy through affecting the US military 
standing among the local population, the PLS’ are not armed and hence do 
not have a direct lethal impact on the Iraqi population. Their added value 
is then demonstrated through their performance to increase the overall 
capabilities and effectiveness of the US military forces in terms of its 
overall capacity to execute the mission. As such their potential 
underperformance impacts directly the US military operational 
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capabilities and may have more significant and far reaching consequences 
on the feasibility of the mission then any alleged misconduct of the APSCs.  
The final report from the Commission on Wartime Contracting in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, evaluating the involvement of BSCs in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, concluded that although PMSCs performed vital tasks in 
support of the US military mission, its large-scale employment was 
surrounded by massive waste and fraud that damaged the US objectives in 
both countries (Thibault et al, 2011: 1-3). The authors of the report argued 
that their ‘sobering, but conservative estimate’ is that ‘at least $31 billion, 
and possibly as much as $60 billion, has been lost to massive contract 
waste, fraud and abuse in America’s contingency operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan’ (Ibid.: 1, 68-97). Poor planning, management, and oversight 
of contracts were identified as the main impediments of effective 
contingency contracting and ultimately threatening US objectives 
(Thibault et al, 2011: 1-3; Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition 
and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007: 1-5).  
Allegations of fraud, mismanagement, and misappropriation of 
government funds in regards to US contingency contracting in Iraq have 
been covered extensively by many authors (Chatterjee, 2009; Singer, 
2003: 151-168; Kinsey: 2009: 69-90; Rasor and Bauman, 2007; Miller, 
2006, Smith, 2012: 83-100). Among the contractors who provided logistics 
support in Iraq between 2003 and 2011, KBR gained the most money, 
$40.8 billion, and a particularly negative reputation (Thibault et al, 2011: 
25). The company was contracted to ensure the flow of supplies, such as 
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ammunition, fuel, and food, from the US military installations in Kuwait 
and Jordan into and throughout Iraq, but its performance was often 
associated with allegations of poor quality, bribery, fraud and false claims 
and the audit of KBR services in Iraq by the special inspector general for 
Iraq reconstruction revealed many drawbacks (Smith, 2012: 83-100, 141;  
Feinstein, 2011: 272; Hartung, 2011: 82; Thibault et al., 2011: 67-94). The 
investigation of KBR records and activities revealed a number of issues 
with respect to accountability of food, fuel and billeting (Hedgpeth. 2007) 
For instance, inspectors found that KBR could not account for items with a 
potential value of up to $100 million, maintained inaccurate billing records 
used to overcharge the government resulting in $221 million in excess 
KBR fuel payments, and also provided low quality services leading to 
death of at least twelve US soldiers by electrocution from KBR’s faulty 
equipment (Thibault et al., 2011: 83, 88; Risen, 2008; Bronstein, 2009) 
One of the major issues identified in regards to the large scale 
mismanagement of US government funds in Iraq by logistics contractors 
was the contracting system under which they operated (Thibault et al, 
2011: 1-3; Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007: 1-5). LOGCAP III was the 
single largest cost-plus award fee contract based on the system where 
contract fees rose with contract costs (Grasso, 2007: 26). Sometimes 
referred to as a ‘blank check’ from the government, under such contract, 
increased costs also meant increased fees for the contractor (Briody, 2004: 
185). Although widely criticised as an irresponsible practice, it was 
defended by others as it provided contractors with the necessary 
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flexibility to support operations in quick-pace environments where 
mission requirements changed fast and frequently (Singer, 2003: 141, 
Grasso, 2005: 25). 
Some contracts are impossible to be set in stone or with a concrete 
price due to the nature of the environment and factors that may influence 
it. The Gansler Commission (Report of the Commission on Army 
Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007: 
14-15) illustrates that, for instance, a service contract to provide food to 
war fighters in a remote and dangerous location must often be 
administered in a very short period of time, with very little information or 
local resources to rely on. Time is crucial in such situations and any 
substantial background research is often impossible. As he explains, ‘[t]he 
Soldier expects the food services to be provided where they are needed, 
when needed, and in the quantities needed’ (Ibid.: 15). As a result, service 
contracts that support contingency operations are more complex than 
service contracts in any other environment. In addition, because not all 
service contracts are the same even within one country, the process is 
further exacerbated by the diverse local circumstances that drive unique 
contracting requirements. As a result, the costs of services become 
unpredictable and they create an environment prone to overcharge by the 
companies for goods and services they provide. 
 However, there is also another, more human, aspect of potential 
negative impact of the logistics contractors in Iraq, which is human 
trafficking. Due to its nature, often relying on less qualified cheap labour 
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force as an integrated mechanism within the sector, logistics contracting 
can involve human trafficking and exploitation.8 Stillman (2011), who 
exposed the poor treatment of foreign workers on U.S. military bases in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, explained that tens of thousands foreigners lured by 
the promise of lucrative jobs, became victims of illegal and fraudulent 
employment practices. The workers, that Stilmann calls ‘hired hands,’ 
were primarily from South Asia and Africa and they represented more 
than 60% of the total contracting force in Iraq (Ibid.). According to her 
findings many of these third-country nationals (TCNs) were robbed of 
wages, injured without compensation, subjected to sexual assault, and 
held in conditions resembling indentured servitude by their subcontractor 
bosses (Stillman, 2011, Newman, 2012). Likewise, the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, reported that during its 
investigation in Iraq ‘uncovered tragic evidence of the recurrent problem 
of trafficking in persons by labor brokers or subcontractors of contingency 
contractors’ (Thibault et al., 2011: 159). At Camp Liberty, one of the small 
American towns built near Baghdad during the occupation, the 
contractors’ population at its peak surpassed 100,000 (Vicky, 2012). While 
they made up 59% of the workforce, handling vital services including 
catering, cleaning, and electrical and building maintenance, many 
described their living conditions as modern-day slavery (Vicky, 2012, 
Newman, 2012, Stillman, 2011, Ross, 2011). 
                                                          
8 For a detailed report on human trafficking related to the U.S. government contracts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, see Human Trafficking: Oversight of Contractors’ Use of Foreign Workers in 
High-Risk Environments Needs to Be Strengthened (Government Accountability Office, 2014). 
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Unlike in the case of armed contractors, PLS contractors do not 
have the daily opportunities to kill local civilians while on duty. Instead it 
is the vulnerability of the employees within a dysfunctional contracting 
system that could prove potentially corrupting the US efforts (Thibault et 
al., 2011: 92). Although increasing the capabilities and effectiveness of US 
forces at low cost by hiring TCN may seem a practical solution, the 
scandalous reports on how the modern day slavery enabled the US 
military to sustain its operations in Iraq are far from being without an 
impact. To say the least, it further undermined the United States’ 
reputation of the bearer of the free and democratic world (Thibault et al., 
2011: 92, Davidson, 2012; Newman, 2012).  
With reference to the Conceptual Framework, the prevailing value 
of PLS contribution must be viewed in a broader strategic context. Large 
scale mismanagement, fraud and underperformance by PLS in Iraq are 
undeniable and the investigations of KBR operations revealed excessive 
government costs and mismanagement of the allocated funds (Hedgpeth, 
2007). Nevertheless, no hard evidence has been found to prove that the 
above discussed areas of concern had the potential to cause the failure of 
the US mission in Iraq. While they are clearly unsettling, there is no 
substantial empirical ground to claim that the problematic issues related 
to contingency contracting discussed in this section were the primary 
cause of the US limited accomplishment in Iraq. In this regard, this section 
argues that the PLS did not have a prevailing negative impact on the US 
military efforts in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. Instead, there is a bulk of 
evidence that their support made a constructive contribution to the US 
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military capability to sustain its operations well beyond the expected 
scope.   
 
VI.V. Conclusion 
Setting aside sensational stories about APSCs, and focusing on more 
mundane examples of services that lie within PLS, this chapter has shown 
the centrality of contractor support to the conduct of the Phase IV 
Operations in Iraq. From the media perspective, base support, 
transportation and logistics/maintenance services may appear less 
exciting than armed contractors, but while the latter is an exceptional 
occurrence, the former has become standard fare and a central enabling 
factor for US global military deployments.  
As this chapter demonstrated, the decision to employ logistics 
contractors on such a grand scale came from the ever expanding 
operational needs of the US military efforts. Time and again the 
overstretched military faced a situation where a need cropped up that the 
military did not want to or could not divert limited forces to satisfy 
(Singer, 2003: 245). For this reason, PMSCs were hired to supplement the 
US forces to amplify their capabilities in their efforts. Although the 
majority of their services may be perceived as menial, the long and 
extensive military campaign proved that the ability to sustain the US 
military force logistically is a major task. In this sense, the PLS was the 
additional US government asset, which effectively sustained the US 
military in Iraq for eight years without a major logistical crisis. 
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The extensive outsourcing of wartime logistics—first put to the test 
during the Clinton Administration, in Somalia and the Balkans—was 
designed to reduce costs while allowing military personnel to focus on 
combat. In practice, though, military privatisation has produced 
convoluted chains of foreign subcontracts that often led to cost overruns 
and fraud as pointed out by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in its 
final report (Stillman, 2011; Thibault et al, 2011: 67-95). As the 
investigations into the overcharging, corruption and missing funds reveal, 
the inability of the US military to manage the activities of PLS contributed 
to the industry’s questionable actions during the operations in Iraq (Ibid.).   
In recent years, following the withdrawal from Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the US has been very careful not to get engaged in extended 
stabilisation efforts anymore. Despite the arguable need for stability and 
reconstruction operations in various countries around the world, the most 
recent military efforts, in Libya and Syria, have been executed as air 
operations with the explicit refusal to put ‘boots on the ground’ or to get 
involved in drawn-out stabilisation efforts, which appears to be the 
adopted approach for the near future. In such environment, the scope for 
logistics contractors’ involvement is unlikely to grow beyond what has 
been witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan where the utility of military force 
tended to be limited and extended civil-military operations were required 
(Kinsey and Pattersohn, 2012: 2). Should the current climate change, the 
US military will inevitably depend on contractors to assist them in 
conducting complex missions on the ground involving the whole spectrum 
of operations.  
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This dependence has been particularly manifested in the post 9/11 
Phase IV Operations. The DoD reported to Congress in April 2008 that the 
missions in Iraq and Afghanistan were the first expeditionary operations 
to reflect the full impact of the shift to heavy reliance on contractor 
personnel for critical support functions in forward operating areas 
(Department of Defense, 2008: 2, 10, 11). As such, despite serious 
shortcomings in the US contingency-contracting system, the federal 
government is unlikely to terminate its reliance on the industry, as it 
proved to be a crucial provider of supporting services that the coalition 
forces did not have the capacity to fulfil on their own (Kinsey and 
Pattersohn, 2012: 2). 
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Chapter VII.  Armed Security Contractors and Their 
Contribution in Phase IV Operations in Iraq 
 
This chapter concerns the contribution of armed security 
contractors in support of the US Phase Operations in Iraq. It argues that, 
according to the Conceptual Framework, APSCs represented the 
contribution closest to that of Crucial Supporter, which is characterised by 
three main features: 1) provision of indispensable additional services; 2) 
being replaceable only under the condition of major changes to the core 
aspects of the US government’s strategy, including the size, length and 
objectives of the military mission; and 3) creating a prevailing positive 
impact. 
This chapter begins by explaining the choice of APSCs as a subject 
for this chapter analysis and presents the range of activities that it became 
involved in in Iraq. It proceeds with an analysis of how the specific type of 
service provided by APSCs - armed security services - became 
indispensable to the US strategy in the context of the large scale civilian 
violence which erupted in the early stages of the post-major combat 
operations in Iraq. The chapter argues that APSCs occupied a special 
position where other alternative sources for the provision of armed 
security services were very limited, or even non-existent.  This chapter 
continues with a discussion of the third element of the contribution 
assessment: the impact of APSCs on the US efforts in Phase IV Operations 
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in Iraq. By comparing the conduct of the APSCs and the US troops, this 
section seeks to demonstrate that both APSCs and the US military followed 
an identical approach of putting force protection as the absolute priority in 
order to minimize casualties. As a result, it is argued that, in contrast to the 
portrayal in much of the literature on the subject, the misconduct of APSCs 
was not worse than the misconduct of the US military and thus APSCs did 
not have a distinguishable negative impact on the US Phase IV Operations 
in Iraq. The conclusion summarizes why the contribution of Crucial 
Supporter is the most fitting category for APSCs in this context and 
explains its implications.  
 
VII.I. Context of the Analysis 
During Phase IV Operations in Iraq, military outsourcing was 
undertaken across a wide range of activities in support of US military 
operations. Nevertheless, very few people outside the contracting industry 
paid attention to who these contractors were or what they did before 
March 31, 2004 (Carmola, 2010: 84-85; Dale, 2009: 64; Carafano, 2008: 
67). On that day four American security contractors accompanying a 
shipment of kitchen equipment were brutally killed and hung from a 
bridge by a cheering crowd in the city of Fallujah in central Iraq. This 
event represented a watershed moment in public awareness about the 
extent of military outsourcing in modern US military operations (Ibid.).  
The four men were employees of Blackwater USA, a private security 
company, which was providing specialised armed security services to the 
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US government, US military and numerous others actors in Iraq.1 This 
incident gained such importance because it was the first major reported 
lethal attack on US contractors in Iraq that revealed a fundamental shift in 
American warfighting as armed civilians found themselves in the middle of 
a warzone fulfilling responsibilities under fire on behalf of the US 
government (Fainaru, 2009: 70).  
For the purpose of this chapter, a distinction is made between 
Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), Private Security 
Companies (PSCs) and Armed Private Security Companies (APSCs). Private 
Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), defined in Chapter III, are 
understood as companies providing military support services related to 
warfare, including logistical support and technical assistance, and security 
services, including armed security services. Private Security Companies 
(PSCs) are a particular subset of PMSCs specializing in security services, 
land-mine clearance, military intelligence and/or military and police 
training (Holmqvist, 2005: 3-6). APSCs are a narrow sub-category of PSCs, 
who specialize in, or a significant bulk of their work is concentrated on, the 
provision of armed security services (Dunigan, 2011: 1-2).  The activities 
of the APSCs can be categorised as follows: the provision of armed 
personal security details, armed static security and armed convoy security 
(Thibault et al., 2011: 66; Ortiz, 2010: 6-7). 
In Iraq, APSCs were hired by many different actors. Next to the US 
Government, PSCs worked for many other different clients, including the 
                                                          
1 For a detailed account of Blackwater USA and its involvement in the Iraq War, see Scahill 
(2008). 
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British and Iraqi government, large corporations (providing logistics, 
reconstruction and others), non-governmental organisations, private 
companies doing business in Iraq, and even the media (Glantz and Lehren, 
2010). The DoD established two acquisition contracts, the Theater Wide 
Internal Security Services (TWISS) contract and Reconstruction Security 
Support Services (RSSS) contract (Lovewine, 2014: 9, Thibault et al., 2011: 
66-68).  
The key element of the TWISS contract was the contracting of 
armed static security services for US military installations and facilities 
throughout Iraq and Afghanistan, including many large and medium-sized 
Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). This contract was awarded to Aegis 
Defense Services, Limited, EOD Technology, Inc., Sabre International 
Security, Special Operations Consulting - Security Management Group 
(SOC-SMG) and Triple Canopy (Lovewine, 2014: 8). The RSSS contract, on 
the other hand, awarded to companies such as Aegis Defense Services and 
Global Strategies Group (Integrated Security), was primarily concerned 
with protection of non-military convoy movements and ongoing capacity-
building projects (Ibid).  
However, the security services that the contractors in Iraq became 
most well-known for were the armed protection services provided to DoS. 
The DoS history with security contractors goes back to in mid-1980s, 
when the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security began using 
civilian contract personal security specialists (PSS) at US overseas 
missions, including Haiti, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Israel and Iraq (Isenberg, 
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2009: 30). Recognising the persisting need, in 2000, the DoS developed the 
Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS) contract as a tool for 
using PSS on its missions in former Yugoslavia, the Palestinian Territories, 
and Afghanistan and for the US embassy in Baghdad, when it opened on 
July 1, 2004. Because the original and sole prime contractors, DynCorp 
International, was unable to meet the full requirements of the DoS’ 
expanding mission, two more companies were contracted to work the DoS 
– Blackwater USA and Triple Canopy (Ibid.).  
To reflect an increasing requirement for protective services 
throughout the world, in 2005, the DoS replaced its existing WPPS with 
WPPS II contract to provide personal security services for its employees in 
Iraq who were not under the protection of DoD (Dale, 2009: 1-6, 48-49; 
Elsea et al. 2008: 7).  The new contract with all three companies, 
Blackwater USA, Triple Canopy and DynCorp International, served for a 
provision of a narrow range of tactical duties, including protection of 
certain foreign heads of state, high-level US officials (including members of 
Congress) and US diplomats under Chief-of-Mission authority in places 
such as Jerusalem, Kabul, Bosnia, Baghdad, Basra, Al Hillah, Kirkuk and 
Erbil (Isenberg, 2009: 30). While these above named companies became 
the most prominent in Iraq as the DoD and DoS prime contractors, many 
others worked for these ones two, three, four or even more levels down 
the contracting chain (Ibid, 2009). The use of APSCs by the US government 
under the multiple contract vehicles (TWISS, RSSS, and WPPS) together 
with numerous subcontractors has made discriminating between the 
empirical data on individual APSCs virtually impossible. As such, the data 
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utilised in this chapter encompasses APSCs working across Iraq, looking at 
their services as armed security contractors, rather than classifying them 
according to their individual employer. 
It is important to note that while APSCs worked for both DoD and 
DoS there are important differences in the significance of this type of 
service for the individual departments. Majority of contractors in Iraq 
were employed by DoD; the Congressional Budget Office estimated that in 
2008 their number was approximately 149,400 contractor personnel 
(including subcontractors) (Congressional Budget Office, 2008: 9). Of this 
number, more than one-half of the contractors performed base support 
functions, 20 percent provided construction services and less than 10 
percent belonged to security services (Ibid., 8-10). In contrast, the DoS 
reported estimates from late 2007 highlight that about 40 percent of the 
approximately 6,700 contractors working for the department in Iraq were 
providing security, with the next highest percentages working for the 
police and correction advisors’ services and administration (Ibid.: 11). The 
two graphs below illustrate these proportions. They seek to demonstrate 
that while security services represent the main function among DoS 
contractor personnel, in the case of DoD they are only a small minority. 
Also, it is important to stress that not all Security services contractors 
provide armed security. In April 2008, 5,613 of DoD’s 7,259 security 
contractor personnel in Iraq were authorized to be armed (Ibid.: 19). 
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Figure 19 - Number of DoD Contractor Personnel Working in Iraq (by 
Function), 2008 
Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2008: 10. 
 
Figure 20 - Number of DoS Contractor Personnel Working in Iraq (by 
Function), 2007 
Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2008: 11. 
 
The reasons supporting the choice of APSCs as the main object of 
analysis is the unique nature of their services and the amount of detailed 
empirical data available on their specific activities. APSCs are the closest 
type of service resembling the regular military troops and as the only 
service-providers who are armed, they stand separately from the rest of 
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the outsourced services in Iraq (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2003).  
Owing to their unique position they also have the potential to kill or cause 
serious bodily harm in the line of duty. As such, they may make an impact 
on the efforts of the US military to create an environment favourable for 
military operations in Iraq, in particular, with respect to the strategy of 
‘winning hearts and minds’ of the local population (Lovewine, 2014: 17-
49; Hammes, 2011: 29-30; Elsea et al., 2008: 3).  
In accordance with the Conceptual Framework, this chapter 
proceeds with answering three main questions which help determine the 
contribution the APSCs represented in the US Phase IV Operations in Iraq: 
Firstly, what type of services did the APSCs provide to augment the US 
military capability in Phase IV Operations in Iraq? Secondly, to what 
extend did the US government depend on the provision of these services in 
order to sustain its military efforts in Iraq? Thirdly, what was the 
prevailing value of the APSCs’ presence and activities in the context of the 
US efforts in Iraq? 
 
VII.II. The Nature of Armed Private Security Contractors’ Services 
According to the Conceptual Framework, the significance of the 
provided service can be differentiated in two steps. To start with, a 
distinction between additional service (to supplement the US military) and 
main service (to substitute the US military) must be made. Next, the level 
of significance can be determined based on the assessment of whether the 
service provided was optional, essential or indispensable. 
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Both the nature and type of services provided by APSCs were 
fundamentally distinct from the main services provided by the US military 
in Phase IV Operations. APSCs’ main duties were to provide armed 
protection for convoys, to safeguard a heavy presence of diplomats and 
reconstruction experts, and to offer static security for facilities across Iraq, 
including US military bases (Brooks, 2013). By contrast, the core of US 
military’s involvement in Phase IV Operations in Iraq consisted 
predominantly of activities such as foot/mounted patrols, checkpoints, 
raids, and house-to-house searches in civilian neighbourhoods in order to 
find specific individuals and/or to collect evidence of conspiracy by the 
locals against the US military presence, which was deemed as supporting 
the insurgency (Mortillo, 2008; Hicks, 2008; Hurd, 2008; Kochergin, 
2008). Such responsibilities were located at the heart of the 
Counterinsurgency strategy (activities equal to ‘Main services’) and were 
never entrusted to APSCs (Brooks, 2013; Thibault et al., 2011: 66; Ortiz, 
2010: 6-7). Therefore, APSCs did not act as a substitute for the services of 
the US military; instead they supplemented them.  
As a result, APSCs could only represent the contribution of 
Contributor, Implementer, or Crucial Supporter depending on the level of 
significance of their service to the overall US efforts – from optional, 
through essential to indispensable additional services. The significance of 
the outsourced armed security services during Phase IV Operations in Iraq 
is to be found in the provision of the three vital additional services in a 
high risk environment: protection to convoys, personal security details, 
and static security for facilities across Iraq. 
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The main reason for the significance of the armed security services 
in Phase IV Operations in Iraq was the high level of violence that spread 
across the country soon after the end of major combat operations (Brooks, 
2013; Hughes, 2013; Hammes, 2013). The US government envisaged and 
prepared for the involvement of a reconstruction and logistics force, since 
it assumed that Iraq would need large scale reconstruction after the 
conflict. However, the US did not envisage the high risk environment that 
unfolded after the fall of Baghdad. The US had prepared for a peaceful 
reconstruction of Iraq with a ‘light footprint’; the complete opposite of the 
extremely dangerous environment it found itself in (Ibid.). 
Until the end of 2003/ beginning of 2004, the US was in insurgency 
denial mode. The military’s main goal was to capture or kill terrorists, 
while the US government was pressurising reconstruction companies to 
do their job of rebuilding the Iraqi infrastructure (Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2008: 276-278). As such the major 
problem this strategy was facing was how to proceed with the 
reconstruction when operating in a high risk environment where 
widespread violence occurred daily. The increased insecurity became a 
major challenge for aid workers and private contractors operating in Iraq, 
raised unease about personal safety and created delays in the progress of 
work (Brooks, 2013).  
At the same time, it was the US government’s policy that contracts 
needed to be delivered, in spite of the insecurity as completed civilian 
projects were seen as a pre-requisite to mitigate the insurgency (Brown: 
225 
 
2005: 761-763). The political climate and the level of violence were seen 
as being directly related, as uncompleted reconstruction projects left 
Iraqis frustrated and sceptical of the aims of the US occupation, and of the 
legitimacy of the new provisional government (Hughes, 2013; Bremer, 
2013). 
In response to the fragile security, the US military responded with 
efforts to ensure safety by requiring the contractors working for the US 
government to coordinate all trips with the American military and be 
escorted by military vehicles or private security companies. Because of the 
overwhelming need for security all over Iraq, this was not always feasible 
(Hammes, 2013; McMahon, 2013). It quickly became apparent that 
criminal gangs were kidnapping foreigners and selling them to terrorist 
groups. Fearing for their lives, many of the contracted employees left or 
refused to work outside the military bases, which had a limited positive 
impact on the life of ordinary Iraqis (Flaherty and Spinner, 2004). 
According to the USAID reports, between May 2003 and 2004 the number 
of contractors decreased by 30% and, although the exact data is 
unavailable, this estimate reflects the reality that contractors in Iraq were 
a high target (Ibid.). The insecurity of contractors was acknowledged as a 
serious issue both for the various companies operating in Iraq but also for 
the US military relying on their services (Hammes, 2013; Brooks, 2013) 
This led to a situation where, very early in the post-conflict 
environment money was being spent on security instead of reconstruction, 
which created a large number of opportunities for security services 
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contractors (Spinner, 2003). This was further stimulated by the fact the 
major US-funded rebuilding companies were required to provide their 
own security, and owing to their type of contract with the government, 
cost-plus type contract, money was not an obstacle (Grasso, 2010: 24-26). 
Smaller subcontracting firms were also hiring armed protection, which 
created more demand for the services. Soon the demand for security 
contractors was so high that companies were hiring employees from their 
competitors inside Iraq by offering them more lucrative pay (Scahill, 
2007). 
The major problem for the reconstruction contractors was that 
they were not permitted to carry weapons and the US military did not 
have the capacity to provide them with security (Congressional Budget 
Office, 2008: 19). Providing protection for agencies and contractors who 
were not DoD civilian personnel or who were not directly supporting the 
military mission has never been part of the US military's stated mission. 
On the contrary, the reconstruction contracts were agreed on the premise 
that the reconstruction contractors’ security would become their own 
responsibility. With increasing levels of violence, a large number of 
employees refused to work outside of bases. The lack of progress was 
detrimental to US strategy and its goal to leave Iraq in the hands of the 
new Iraqi government (Hammes, 2013, Bremer, 2013). 
Uninterrupted and completed reconstruction projects were 
deemed essential for the US strategy in Iraq, as an intricate part of the US 
efforts to stimulate Iraqi development towards an independently 
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functioning regime (Bremer, 2013; Hughes, 2013). For this reason, 
especially in the early stages of the post-combat environment, providing 
security to the large reconstruction endeavour was one of the major areas 
of APSCs employment, where the US efforts to rebuild Iraq were an 
inseparable part of the US military strategy. Thus, the provision of armed 
security services for the reconstruction projects had a direct relevance to 
the broader counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. As RAND’s Reconstruction 
under Fire report identified, the provision of essential services, specifically 
electricity and the associated critical infrastructure, was one of the three 
crucial interrelated foundation stones for the development of Iraqi society 
(Gompert et al, 2009: 117-118). Similarly, the US government and military 
studies shared the view that the lack of basic services, among other things, 
was one of the major obstacles towards a positive development 
(Henderson, 2005: 1-2). 
In this high-risk environment, reconstruction companies had no 
choice other than to subcontract and rely on the services of APSCs. 
Although the US military retained the responsibility for protection of its 
own personnel to a certain extent, its aim was to delegate the 
responsibility for armed security provision of a vast number of logistics 
and reconstruction contractors to other contractors. The unfulfilled 
expectations regarding the smooth transition into democracy, and a great 
misjudgement of the level of organized resistance following the fall of 
Baghdad, caught the US military by surprise, and APSCs became a fitting 
solution providing exactly what the US military was in need of.  
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Moving material for reconstruction and sustaining troops through 
highly insecure and actively hostile areas, providing close protection of 
civilian and non-government officials working on the rebuilding projects 
and sustaining the work on broader nation-building objectives, were the 
main reasons why the US resorted to the private sector for the provision of 
armed protection (Hammes, 2013; Hughes, 2013). Furthermore, from the 
military perspective, this was welcomed, as it freed up the regular troops 
from such responsibilities. From the beginning of Phase IV Operations in 
2003, a number of US commanders expressed their frustration with the 
insufficient manpower that was available on the ground and delegating 
some of the military responsibilities provided a much needed relief for the 
overstretched US military forces (Mayer, 2013; McMahon, 2013). 
Similarly, in the logistics sector, the companies were largely 
dependent on the services of APSCs. The US Army’s Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) managed the use of contractors by the 
DoD in logistics support to contingency mobilizations (Lovewine, 2014: 
102-104; Singer, 2008). DynCorp International, Fluor Corporation, and 
KBR were the prime LOGCAP contractors that were also responsible for 
providing for their own security, which led these companies to 
subcontract the armed security services on a lower level (Brooks, 2013). 
In terms of convoy security, APSCs such as ArmorGroup with its 9000 
men, provided protection for about one third of all non-military supply 
convoys in Iraq (McKenna and Johnson, 2012). 
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This overwhelming demand for armed security services was 
mirrored in the growth of the whole sector of the industry, which saw 
many small or medium companies develop into major corporations 
between 2003 and 2005 (Brooks, 2013). Many established companies in 
other sectors reacted to the opportunity by focussing on armed private 
security services or adding them to their list of services. One example was 
DynCorp International, a 60-year-old firm that diversified into armed 
security with the war in Iraq (The Economist, 2013). Several others, such 
as Triple Canopy, were founded to take advantage of the Iraq situation as 
the demand for security services was unprecedented (Ibid.). 
In Iraq it was Blackwater which gained most attention through 
protecting high-profile people such as Paul Bremer, the head of the 
transitional authority after the invasion of Iraq, and other senior State 
Department employees. On their visits to Iraq, then Senators Joe Biden, 
Chuck Hagel, John Kerry and Barrack Obama, during his presidential 
candidate trip to Iraq were all protected by Blackwater (Prince, 2013: 
254). While Blackwater was not the only service provider available, it 
became the preferred armed security contractor for the US government 
for high-profile visits. This was even the case for high military-ranking 
officials (Scahill, 2007). As such, the APSCs provided indispensable 
additional services that underpinned American efforts to subdue 
resistance and establish control in Iraq.  
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VII.III. The Significance of Armed Private Security Contractors’ 
Services for the Sustainment of the US Phase IV Operations In Iraq 
According to the Conceptual Framework, the significance of the 
provider ranges from ‘replaceable with no or minor changes to the non-
core aspects of the strategy’ (Contributor) to ‘irreplaceable without major 
changes to core aspects of the strategy such as the size of the available 
manpower, available timeframe and desired objectives of the mission’ 
(Crucial Supporter). The significance of APSCs is determined based on the 
assessment of the extent to which the US government/ military depended 
on the APSCs providing those services in order to sustain its efforts in Iraq. 
The unrealistic expectations of the US government about the post-
major combat environment in Iraq was the main reason for the lack of 
preparedness of the US military and the pressing need for the armed 
security services in order to sustain the US rebuilding efforts (Biddle, 
2013; Hammes, 2013, Brooks, 2013).  The lack of an adequate number of 
US troops on the ground in Iraq, the incapability of Iraqi military and 
security forces, and the limited support offered by the Coalition members 
are identified as the main reasons why the APSCs became irreplaceable 
unless the US military was willing to alter its strategy (Ibid.). APSCs as a 
Crucial Supporter were one step above being a mere Contributor or 
Implementer, as their services were indispensable to the rebuilding 
efforts, but, at the same time, they did not carry out the indispensable 
main services provided by the US military. Therefore, while the 
replacement of the APSCs as main providers of armed security services 
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was possible, the US military could not operate without the APSCs in Phase 
IV Operations in Iraq, unless it was willing to compromise the size of 
available manpower, timeframe and objectives of its mission, therefore 
having to make major changes to the core aspects of the strategy. 
APSCs became a Crucial Supporter because the US lacked adequate 
numbers of combat troops to execute a full military occupation (McMahon, 
2013). The US military planning for the Iraq war did not consider the 
scenario of a military occupation as realistic and gave preference to 
planning for a light intervening force implementing the strategy of rolling-
start deployment which envisaged equally quick withdrawal once the Iraqi 
regime fell (Bensahel, 2006: 453-462). In the face of the worsening 
security situation, US military commanders became outspoken about the 
difficulties to get  the situation under control with the limited numbers of 
US forces available (McMahon, 2013; Hammes, 2013; Diamond, 2005: 13-
14). 
The US military had two other options regarding the APSCs: to 
substitute them with Iraqi military and security forces, or with combat 
troops from other Coalition forces. Neither of these was possible.   
The first option, using Iraqi military and security forces, proved to 
be a non-viable option as none of Iraq’s pre-war security forces or 
structures were left intact or available for duty after major combat 
operations (Hughes, 2013). US pre-war planning had foreseen an 
immediate and practical need for law enforcement as some challenges to 
law and order were expected after the collapse of the old regime. 
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However, pre-war planning had erroneously assumed that Iraqi local 
police forces would be available to help provide security for the Iraqi 
people (Ibid.). The US military pre-war planning assumed that Iraqi 
military units would be available for recall and reassignment after the war, 
and included options for using some of these forces to guard borders or 
perform other security tasks (Dale, 2008: 61).  
Instead, on May 23, 2003, the Coalition provisional Authority issued 
CPA Order Number 2, which dissolved all Iraqi military services, including 
the Army. It remains unclear why this decision was made as there are 
contrasting views on its source and intended purpose (Bremer, 2013; 
Hughes, 2013). Ultimately, the consequences of that decision had resulted 
in unintended consequences which hampered the option of unit recall to 
support security or reconstruction activities, or to rebuild a new Iraqi 
army (Dale, 2008: 75). In response to this, the development of the ISF and 
the ministries of Defence and Interior to oversee them became a critical 
component of the US Strategy in Iraq evolving according to events on the 
ground (Ibid.).  
Recognizing the pressing need for security providers in Iraq, the US 
military launched police training initiatives, initially in the form of three 
week courses, with the goal of quickly deploying newly trained Iraqi 
personnel at least on temporary basis (Ibid: 76). In his Iraq memoirs, 
Ambassador Bremer, quotes Doug Brand, the Senior Adviser to the 
Interior Ministry, during one of their meetings to discuss police training. 
When describing the situation, Brand said that under the order from the 
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highest military levels, ‘(t)he Army is sweeping up half-educated men off 
the streets, running them through a three-week training course, arming 
them, and then calling them ‘police’’ (Bremer, 2006: 183). As a result of 
this approach, in 2008 DoD reported that there were approximately 
615,000 members assigned to the Iraqi Security Forces (Dale, 2009: 93). 
Although the significant numbers of ISF personnel are revealing in terms 
of the quantity of potentially available security providers, some qualitative 
insight is needed to provide a more complete picture of the complexity of 
building independent and self-sustaining Iraqi security forces.  
Based on the 2007 Congressionally-mandated report by the 
Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq (Independent Commission on 
the Security Forces of Iraq, 2007), it appears that while there was a 
continuous improvement in ISF readiness and capability, it was not seen 
as being able to operate independently.2 Troubled by corruption, 
desertion and sectarianism, and mostly seen as a hollow army, the Iraqi 
Security Forces were largely unfit to replace the APSCs in their 
responsibilities (Cordesman, 2011: 3-4). 
Additional Coalition forces as an alternative to APSCs were not 
feasible owing to the limited interest of the US Coalition partners to 
contribute troops on the ground.  The original list of countries who 
supported, militarily or verbally, the military action and subsequent 
military presence in Iraq included 49 members (The White House, 2003). 
The contributions of the Coalition forces in terms of the number of 
                                                          
2 For details on Iraqi Security Forces and their development, see Cordesman et al. (2013) and 
Cordesman and Baetjer (2006). 
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countries and troops reached its peak in the early post-major combat 
period when thirty-eight countries supplied around 25,000 forces 
(Beehner, 2007). Since then, the size and scope of the coalition was 
continuously diminishing across time. Prior to some major withdrawals in 
2008, the most significant allies in terms of the size of their troops’ 
contribution, ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand troops, were 
the United Kingdom, Italy, South Korea, Poland, Australia, Georgia and 
Romania (Ibid.). The largest and longest non-US Coalition partner 
throughout the operations was the UK, which at its peak contributed 7100 
troops, which by summer 2009 were down to 400 soldiers (Ibid.). In 
addition, most of the allies operated in a non-combat function and 
focussed on other supporting activities such as training of Iraqi security 
forces or assisting with reconstruction efforts (Ibid.). The high number of 
APSCs compared to the contributions of coalition partners highlights the 
irreplaceable nature of the contractors in the US military’s mission in Iraq.  
In the case of DoS, the magnitude of its mission in Iraq, assessed as 
‘the largest nation-building effort since World War II’, overwhelmed its 
capacity to provide security for its own personnel and preference was 
given to APSCs as an immediate solution to the problem (Brennan, 2013: 
v; Elsea, 2008: 6-7). Even when allegations of APSCs’ misbehaviour in Iraq 
appeared and the Iraqi government demanded ban on the use of APSCs in 
Iraq, the US government continued to entrust them with responsibilities 
(Shane, 2008). DoS could not operate without them as in their absence, 
DoS personnel could not leave the military bases and the DoS had to stop 
its activities outside the security of military installations (Kramer, 2007). 
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The disparity between the public condemnation of those companies by the 
US government and their continuous employment illustrates ‘how 
hamstrung American civilian officials were in Baghdad without private 
security contractors’ (Ibid.) 
 
VII.IV. The Impact of APSCs on US Efforts in Phase IV Operations 
The first section demonstrated how the specialised services of 
APSCs were indispensable especially in the early stages of Phase IV 
Operations due to the hostile nature of the environment. The second 
section illustrated the dependence of the US strategy on the APSCs as 
exclusive providers of those services due to the limited availability of 
other alternatives for their replacement. This section looks at the impact of 
the companies as the agents of these services on the ground, 
acknowledging their controversial reputation that many believe put US 
efforts in jeopardy.  
Their impact can be assessed through the lens of their conduct on 
the ground in comparison to that of the US regular troops, whose efforts 
they were to support. Differentiating between conforming to (advancing 
the US military efforts) or deviating from (undermining the US military 
efforts) the behaviour of the US military makes possible to assess the 
impact of APSCs’ activities according to the Conceptual Framework.3 This 
section provides evidence that both groups, often deliberately and 
                                                          
3 It needs to be acknowledged that this thesis refrains from any assessment of the US military 
conduct per se, as it is not the focus of this thesis. For discussion of the US military conduct in 
Iraq and its implications, see Maestrovic (2009) and Kennard (2012). 
236 
 
consciously, took advantage of the benevolence of the accountability 
system in place, which impacted negatively on the Phase IV Operations 
operational environment.  
The contrast between the potential operational benefits and risks 
of contracted services, could not be seen any more starkly than in the 
narrow scope of activities of APSCs in Phase IV operations. Like regular 
troops, these companies operated most of the time outside of the relative 
security of military bases, were equipped with firearms, and most of them 
were in direct daily contact with the local population (Hammes, 2011: 29-
31). Thus, their responsibilities led them to work in a high risk 
environment full of civilians, where their main aim was to protect a 
person, a site or an object, and, ultimately, their own life. Similar to the 
troops, their conduct outside of the relative security of the military bases 
was much more significant for the US military effort than the professional 
conduct of any other type of services contracted by US government. 
As the chapter on research context outlined, from the US military 
perspective COIN is a population-centred strategy, where winning the 
moral ground (and thus the sympathy of the local population) is the centre 
of gravity. As Kilcullen (2006: 8) noted ‘counterinsurgency is armed social 
work; an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while 
being shot at.’ In such environment, restraint is considered an important 
element of military operations due to the increased potential for an 
individual soldier’s actions at the tactical level to have magnifying political 
consequences at the operations and strategic levels (Ruffa et al., 2013). 
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The COIN strategy is based around the principle that the side supported by 
the population, will be the side that eventually prevails and losing the 
moral ground in COIN appears to be a core problem of modern warfare 
(Pennekamp, 2013: 1633; Department of the Army, 2006: 7-2). 
Although APSCs did not provide combat services in Iraq, the focus 
of their activities often placed them in harm’s way in order to fulfil their 
contract and allowed them to be armed and use lethal force in their 
defence (Elsea, 2010: 6). In this respect, APSCs arguably had the potential 
to influence how the occupation force was perceived through their 
everyday activities among the local population, which sometimes led to 
civilian casualties. Often described as brutish and amateurish, some 
observers raised concerns about these actors being an impediment to the 
success of the operations they were meant to support (Hammes, 2011; 
Glantz and Lehren, 2010; Singer, 2007: 2). Pointing out examples of their 
misbehaviour in Iraq, many observers argued that their reckless 
behaviour puts US military objectives at risk as the local population did 
not make any distinction between armed contractors and the US military 
(De Nevers, 2009: 183; Elsea et al., 2008: 36; Dale, 2008: 72). As a result, 
armed contractors were largely condemned as operating without any 
concern for the US larger strategic goals and having detrimental negative 
impact on the US mission in Iraq (Fainaru, 2007).  
The media, in particular, fuelled this negative perception by 
providing detailed accounts of individual cases of contractor abuses in OIF 
and linking them  the mercenary companies of the Cold War years, such as 
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the now defunct Executive Outcomes and Sandline, which were hired for 
military operations in Africa during the 1990s (Murphy, 2004; Burns, 
2007). Their alleged lack of restraint and cultural sensitivity toward the 
local population gained them a reputation of being trigger-happy, firing 
first in the majority of their ‘escalation of force’ incidents (Ryan, 2007). 
Blackwater had the worst reputation, which may have resulted from it 
providing security for many very important individuals and operating in 
more dangerous areas than its competitors, notably in central Iraq 
including Baghdad. However, other contractors have similar records. 
Reports about bullying, abuse, intimidation and even killing of local 
civilians by APSCs appeared regularly in the media covering the situation 
in Iraq. For example, in August 2007, an employee of Triple Canopy was 
accused of shooting at two civilian cars in Baghdad the previous year, after 
telling his colleagues that he wanted to ‘kill somebody’ before leaving the 
country on vacation (Burns, 2007) 
As Hammes (2011: 5) argues, the fact that the US armed and 
authorized them to use deadly force in its name had a serious negative 
effect during counterinsurgency operations. In his view, which is shared 
by many others, the lack of effective control over the quality of the 
contractors and their actions led to the local population perceiving the US 
government as being responsible for everything the contractors did or 
failed to do (Ibid.). Any possible misdeeds on behalf of the contractors 
then arguably worked against the goals of the military forces, rather than 
helping and enforcing them (Ibid.). They arguably caused the military 
239 
 
force to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the local population resulting in anti-
American sentiment being directed towards the troops (Ibid.).   
This view echoes Singer's earlier observations that the use of 
contractors have hindered rather than helped US counterinsurgency 
efforts in Iraq (2007: III). As he explains, contractors ‘inflamed popular 
opinion against, rather than for, the American mission through operational 
practices that ignore the principles of counterinsurgency’ and they 
‘participated in a series of abuses that have undermined efforts at winning 
the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Iraqi people’ (Ibid.). 
In contrast to these views, this chapter contends that the whole 
logic of the argument that the presence and activities of APSCs threatened 
the US strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’ is flawed. The proposition 
that APSCs had the potential to make substantial negative influence on 
how the US military was perceived in Iraq suggests that the local 
population had either positive, or at least neutral, feelings towards the 
occupying forces in the first place. In this regard, it implies that as a 
reaction to the APSCs activities the population may have swung away from 
the Coalition forces to side with the insurgents instead. Only under this 
condition could the population possibly be alienated and antagonized. 
Most importantly, it stipulates that the professional conduct of the APSCs 
was significantly different (worse) from the one adopted by the US 
military. This chapter shows that neither of these assumptions can be 
proven. 
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There have been a number of reported misconduct incidents on the 
side of APSC; most of them went unnoticed and caused little attention until 
September 2007. The Nisour square incident became an iconic moment in 
terms of the face of military outsourcing, had long-term consequences on 
the US-Iraqi relations, and was allegedly the cause why the Iraqi 
government did not grant the US troops legal immunity after 2011 (Risen, 
2014). For many people it came to represent the characteristic behaviour 
of private armed contractors during the Iraq war and it anchored the label 
of ‘mercenaries’ for the whole industry, which the industry found very 
difficult to get rid of. It would appear that the Nisour Square incident must 
have been the biggest, bloodiest, or the most unusual incident of 
misconduct in Iraq; however, it was not. While it remains the most 
notorious incident and in the view of many people it characterises the type 
of APSCs’ behaviour, its general significance to the war effort is 
overestimated. 
The Nisour Square incident has been described as the most 
controversial incident due to the numerous accounts about what 
happened that day. According to the most recent trial, the essence of the 
story is as follows: Four Blackwater security contractors killed seventeen 
civilians and wounded dozens during a shooting at a Baghdad road 
junction on September 16, 2007. The shooting followed an explosion of a 
bomb which coincided with the contractors’ convoy approaching the 
junction at Nisour Square. The four Blackwater guards claimed they 
believed they were under attack by an insurgent car bombing attempt, 
however, no weapons or explosives were found on any of the dead Iraqis, 
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despite an extensive FBI investigation.4 Instead, the official US 
investigation led to three men facing manslaughter charges, one being 
accused of murder, and a fifth admitting the manslaughter and testifying 
against his former colleagues (Roberts, 2014).  It is not the purpose of this 
chapter to analyse how and why this particular incident happened. 
Instead, this chapter argues that it is just a drop in the ocean of APSCs 
incidents of misconduct in Iraq. More importantly, this type of misconduct 
was not exclusive to the APSCs. 
While it is one of the incidents that caused a media frenzy and 
sparked a heated debate in the US about who the APSCs and the rules they 
were governed by were, the incident remains one of many similar or 
worse ones perpetrated not just by APSCs, but by the US military as well.  
A closer look into the reported misconduct incidents and the testimonies 
of Iraqi veterans analysed in this thesis shows that the APSCs did not have 
the negative strategic impact which was often assigned to them. 
Comparing the US military and APSCs conduct, there is one 
important difference to be noted. On the whole PSCs do not seek to 
conduct combat operations or catch insurgents (Brooks, 2013). They are 
not assigned to potentially lethal military operations and their biggest risk 
to cause civilian casualties is when escorting convoys or important people 
(Ibid.). As a result, the main difference is that the US military, while 
executing its mission of capturing and defeating insurgents, actively seeks 
and plans for confrontation. As part of their duties, US patrols intentionally 
                                                          
4 It needs to be added that a thorough investigation and collection of evidence from the scene 
by the US government did not start less than 2 weeks after the incident (Dickinson, 2011: 60).  
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and routinely drive through or are sent to high-risk places in an attempt to 
capture particular insurgents or catch them planting bombs or when 
involved in other suspicious hostile activities (Hamilton, 2008; LeDuc, 
2008; Childers, 2008). In contrast, APSCs’ primary responsibility is to stay 
away from potential danger and complete the mission with an unharmed 
client (or undamaged goods) (Brooks, 2013).  
Therefore, the operational logic of the two groups is significantly 
different. One seeks out a potential hazard, the other tries to avoid it 
completely. Also, once confronted, the military is likely to move in and 
attempt to capture the insurgents for intelligence purposes, while APSCs 
are trained to move away from any suspicious activity as fast as possible, 
using covering fire, if needed (Ibid.). It is usually this covering fire, in 
highly populated areas, that leads to allegations that they are reckless.  
The general US military’s approach was to pursue the enemy 
following an ambush (Washburn, 2008; Turner, 2008; Lemieux, 2008). 
One such example was when US troops responded to an IED explosion by 
raiding a nearby complex of civilian houses on November 19, 2005 in 
Haditha, a city in the western Iraqi province of Al Anbar. The incident, in 
which 24 unarmed Iraqi men, women and children were killed by a group 
of US Marines, was later referred to as ‘Haditha Massacre’ (Ricks, 2006). 
The biggest controversy surrounding this incident is that the dead 
included several children and elderly people, who were shot multiple 
times in the head and chest at close range, execution style (Ibid.). It has 
been alleged that the killings were retribution for the IED attack, which 
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had killed one of their comrades as they were driving in a convoy in close 
proximity to the civilian houses (Poole, 2006). 
The most noteworthy point about this incident is that it went 
largely unreported until March 2006, when Time magazine wrote that ‘the 
details of what happened that morning in Haditha are more disturbing, 
disputed and horrific than the military initially reported’ (McGirk, 2006). 
The subsequent media coverage revealed that the Marine officer in charge 
of the battalion involved in the Haditha killings did not consider the deaths 
unusual and it took several months for the U.S. military chain of command 
to react to the event and initiate an inquiry (Ricks, 2006). In addition, 
following years of investigations, all the charges against the eight Marines 
involved in the Haditha killings were dropped, except in case of Staff Sgt. 
Frank Wuterich, who was the only defendant to stand trial for the killings. 
Even in his case the charges of assault and manslaughter were ultimately 
dropped and he was convicted only of negligent dereliction of duty 
receiving a rank reduction and pay cut as a punishment (Perry, 2012). The 
most interesting aspect of this whole case is that the many in the military 
viewed such incidents as unfortunate consequences of the Marines 
following ‘the rules of engagement during a difficult day on a chaotic 
battlefield’ (Ricks, 2006). This has been echoed in many of other US 
military veterans who acknowledged that similar incidents were common 
and took place daily.5 Jason Hurd (2008), an Iraq veteran, added, ‘We act 
out of fear and cause a complete and utter destruction.’ 
                                                          
5 Iraq vet, Clifton Hicks, described an incident when a military Humvee gets ambushed by an 
IED, and the Marines proceeded with raiding a house nearby, killing many civilians, including a 
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Similar observations about the US military approach on the ground 
in Iraq were derived from other investigations of US military conduct in 
OIF (Hoffman, 2006). Garfield (2006: 18, 23-25) in his comparative study 
of British and US approaches to stabilisation and reconstruction overtly 
criticized the US approach and pointed out its deficiencies in terms of its 
cultural awareness, use of minimum force, and winning the support of the 
local people. The report, based on British interviewees comments, 
described the US troops in Iraq as employing excessive lethal force, with 
woefully inadequate cultural understanding and stated that they did not 
fully accept the limits of military power against an asymmetric adversary, 
which was reflected by an overly aggressive attitude from individual 
soldiers and they showed elitist behaviour towards all foreigners not just 
Iraqis (Ibid.: vii). 
Based on other testimonies of some UK personnel serving alongside 
the US military troops in the early stages of the Iraq war in Iraq, 
problematic behaviour including ‘over-aggressive tactics, indiscriminate 
shooting in residential areas and a quick reliance on lethal force’ was 
observed in the conduct of US soldiers from the beginning of the 
operations (Human Rights Watch, 2003). It appears that the problematic 
character often ascribed to APSCs was shared by the US military, which 
considered ‘force protection’6 an absolute priority. The increasing level of 
                                                          
seven year old girl. After the killing, following the instructions of their commander, they just 
rode off (Hicks, 2008). 
6 An approach valuing the saving of American lives above avoiding risk to innocent civilians, 
which has its origins in Vietnam, where the appalling American combat losses left succeeding 
generations of American commanders with an instinct to apply rapid increments of firepower 
– what the military calls ‘escalation of force’ – with the goal of sparing American casualties 
(Burns, 2007). 
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security threats led to a ‘force protection’ approach being adopted as the 
principal mission of US forces in Iraq (Kenneth et al, 2011: 77-79). 
The adoption of this force protection principle is, however, not new 
or exclusive to the Iraq environment. According to Egnell (2009: 59), the 
US military has been criticised for its conduct in other peace operations, 
such as Bosnia, Somalia, and Kosovo for its inflexibility, overemphasis on 
force protection and an indifference to mission success. The US operations 
in these countries were characterised by a propensity for the maximum 
use of force, an over-reliance on technology, and an aversion to military 
casualties, which are all rather typical elements of US expeditionary 
operations in the post-Cold War era (Ibid.)7  
This perception was widely echoed in the testimonies of the Iraq 
veterans in their experiences on the ground. Steven Mortillo (2008) said, 
‘(t)here was an understanding that we were gonna do anything we could 
to take everyone else back home.’ According to Clifton Hicks (2008), this 
meant that the only thing to do to survive was ‘to put them in dirt before 
they put you in dirt.’ While one may argue that this is unsurprising or not 
unusual in a war situation, such an approach is certainly problematic in 
urban warfare, such as Iraq, where the US mission was based on the 
population supporting the US military instead of backing the insurgency.  
As some observers pointed out, the Fallujah ambush and killing of 
four American Blackwater employees had a very negative effect on the 
                                                          
7 For more discussion on the US ‘force protection’ approach in other conflicts, see Gentry 
(2012), Mocktaitis (2004), and Cassidy (2004). 
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whole situation in Iraq. The brutality of the attack intensified the 
perceived threat posed by Iraqi civilians and both APSCs and the US 
military approached all Iraqis as potentially highly dangerous. This led to a 
paradox situation where both the Coalition forces (especially the 
Americans) and APSCs adopted a high-alert approach where their own 
security was a priority and every potentially dangerous situation was 
solved through a disproportionate reliance on firepower and other 
military means (Chatterjee, 2004: 116).  
This was confirmed in the testimonies of a number of US veterans 
who had served in Iraq, who described the Rules of Engagement (RoE) as 
broadly defined and loosely enforced to protect the soldiers at the expense 
of Iraqi civilians to the extent that they ‘could shoot anyone who came 
closer to [them] than [they] felt comfortable with’ (Lemieux, 2008; Turner, 
2008; Laituri, 2008; Washburn, 2008). As many pointed out, this vicious 
circle of alienating the local population through protecting oneself in an 
irresponsible manner, led to increased hostility and more attacks on both 
contractors and Coalition forces (Emanuele, 2008). This approach was 
widely encouraged by the chain of command, according to many of the 
Iraqi veterans, and carried out even in so called ‘staged killings of Iraqi 
civilians’8 as common practice when soldiers killed civilians unjustifiably 
either by mistake or simply for entertainment (Washburn, 2008; Turner, 
2008).  
                                                          
8 Staged killing of Iraqi civilians was described by US veterans as placing a weapon or a shovel 
on a body and make them look they were the insurgent (Washburn, 2008). 
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APSCs’ main duties were personal security detail, convoy 
protection and the static protection of fortified positions. The military’s 
responsibilities, including patrols, checkpoints, raids and house-to-house 
searches, by contrast, were most likely much more risky and under the 
circumstances given in Phase IV Iraq much more lethal to the civilian 
population. As the Iraq veterans recalled, these activities were another 
example how they terrorised the local population and of the many 
incidents of misconduct which occurred. As Hart Viges, testified: ‘We never 
went on a raid where we would have got the right house, much less the 
right person. Not once’ (Viges, 2008).  
This was echoed in the testimony of another two Iraq veterans, 
Steven Casey (2008) and Matthew Childers (2008), who explained that the 
US military routinely went on night raids at around 3 a.m. in the morning 
in civilian neighbourhoods, scaring civilians, destroying their houses with 
no respect for anything and barely ever finding anything. Casey added that 
such raids ‘were not an isolated incident.’ Jon Turner (2008), another Iraq 
veteran, summarized the approach of the US military during the raids as 
follows: ‘What we would do is to kick in the door and terrorize the 
families.’ As Maestrovic (2009: 36) describes, those incidents reveal more 
than instances of misconduct of a few young soldiers in a combat zone. 
More likely, as is shown in the testimonies of many of the Iraq veterans, 
the troops were not prepared for the reality of guerrilla type warfare. The 
prevalence of improvised explosive devices and near absence of actual 
combat engendered frustration, which some described as sitting and 
waiting to be blown up. Indeed, many veterans confirmed that most of the 
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time in Iraq nothing was happening for days or weeks and then for a few 
seconds ‘hell broke out’ (Hicks, 2008; Mortillo, 2008). This reportedly led 
to low morale and widespread misconduct (Mortillo, 2008). 
While operating in a highly dangerous and lethal landscape, 
Blackwater earned a reputation as a company that would take the most 
difficult assignments and could fulfil contracts fast. While some authors 
including Scahill (2008) and Fitzsimmons (2013) argue that Blackwater 
was the most aggressive and ‘mercenary-like’ company, it is important to 
add that, based on the DoS contract with Blackwater, Triple Canopy and 
DynCorp, Blackwater was the one that had frequently operated in the most 
violent area (central Iraq including Baghdad) and provided security to 
high-profile civilians and military persons, including Members of 
Congress, DoS personnel, even military generals. Starting with Paul 
Bremer, Blackwater was later awarded the contract to provide security to 
all of the State Department’s personnel in Baghdad. As John Poncy, the 
former chief executive officer of SOC-SMG, another PSC working in Iraq, 
stated ‘Blackwater was willing to go into places other people weren’t, and 
figure out ways to go in fast and in force, and they could bring a lot of 
resources to bear’ (Bennett, 2014) David Isenberg, an author who has 
written extensively on the PMSI believes that there was ‘a sort of 
hypocrisy with regard to the contractors’ (Ibid.). He claims that while the 
DoS pretended it is deeply concern for contractors to respect host country 
sentiments, they told privately to Prince to ‘(j)ust do what you have to do’ 
(Ibid.) 
249 
 
As this section illustrated, the US moral ground in Iraq was dubious. 
If there was any moral high ground, it was lost at the tactical level, owing 
to its widespread and systematic abuse of Iraqi civilians’ human rights. 
The reckless and insensitive type of behaviour that is often being 
associated with the conduct of APSCs, can be found in the accounts of Iraq 
military veterans, who stressed that this type of behaviour was 
demonstrated repeatedly throughout their deployments in Iraq (Viges, 
2008; Hicks, 2008; Casey, 2008; Mortillo, 2008; Hamilton, 2008; Kokesh, 
2008; Hurd, 2008; Emanuele, 2008; Kochergin, 2008; Washburn, 2008; 
Lemieux, 2008; Turner, 2008; Laituri, 2008; Reppenhagen, 2008; Totten, 
2008; LeDuc, 2008; Casler, 2008; Childers, 2008) While over-aggressive 
tactics, indiscriminate shooting in residential areas and a quick reliance on 
lethal force can be assigned to both contractors and the US military, 
terrorising and harassing people during raids, house-to-house searches, 
foot/mounted patrols and at checkpoints are types of activities that APSCs 
did not participate in. If the population had not been already antagonized 
by the conduct of the US military from the early stages of the post-conflict 
environment, the reported misconduct of APSCs was unlikely to have 
worsened the situation fundamentally.  
 
VII.V. Conclusion 
The US military never foresaw its role in policing Iraq or 
committing its military forces to anything other than combat (Brooks, 
2013; McMahon, 2013; Biddle, 2013). Instead, the US military’s planning 
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relied on the assumption that following the fall of Baghdad, security and 
maintaining order would be in the hands of the Iraqi military and security 
forces (Ibid.). Although the importance of APSCs was unpredicted, their 
number quickly grew and soon represented the second largest foreign 
security group in the country (Singer, 2007). Providing the contribution 
closest to Crucial Supporter, the US government, particularly the DoS, 
became dependent on APSCs as a supporting tool for the US efforts in Iraq. 
Without their support, the US government would have had to alter the 
core aspects of the US strategy, including the size of available manpower, 
timeframe and objectives of its mission.  
At the same time, criticism emerged regarding their conduct, 
notably in relation to human rights abuse and its implications for the US 
COIN in Iraq. As this chapter demonstrated, the view that APSCs 
significantly contributed to, or could have been responsible for, any anti-
American sentiment of the Iraqi population towards the troops as a result 
of their misconduct and human rights abuses, is overstated. The 
misconduct record comparison between the US troops and the APSCS 
indicates that the US military record of systematic abuse and misconduct 
towards the local population has been nowhere near the scale of 
occasional ‘bad apples’ in a good barrel. On the contrary, the available data 
suggests that both the military and the APSCs are guilty of carrying out a 
large number of human rights abuses and inflicting civilian casualties on 
the side of Iraqi population.  
251 
 
This chapter provides compelling evidence that large-scale 
misconduct was not an exclusive problem of APSCs and, therefore, they 
most likely did not have significant negative impact on the objectives of 
the US Military in Phase IV in Iraq. While the aim of this chapter is not to 
deny or trivialise the seriousness of the misconduct cases committed 
against the Iraqi population by the APSCs by any means, it is considered 
important to present the whole picture  in order to provide a balanced 
insight into the contribution of APSCs. Focussing solely on the misconduct 
attributable to the APSCs, as a potential game-changing factor for US Phase 
IV Operations in Iraq, is misleading. It gives a false impression that APSCs 
simply need to be held accountable or eliminated from the modern 
battlefield to make the US military more successful in its potential future 
expeditionary operations.  
In this respect, this chapter shows that the Iraqi population could 
not be further antagonized by the behaviour of APSCs, as the US forces 
already had committed and continued to commit the same, if not worse 
incidents of misbehaviour. While APSCs, such as Blackwater DynCorp 
International, Triple Canopy, Aegis Security and Erinys International were 
responsible for numerous cases of human rights abuse in Iraq, it seems 
that it largely mirrored the malpractice of the US military and that, as 
Tyler (2007) points out, ‘what is wrong with Blackwater may, most of all, 
mirror what is wrong with Uncle Sam.’ this chapter demonstrated that the 
significance of the armed security services within the Phase IV Operations 
context in Iraq exceeded being of ‘optional’ or ‘essential’ significance and 
represented ‘indispensable additional services.’ Therefore, the 
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contribution of APSCs is most closely relatable to the category of Crucial 
Supporter demonstrating the provision of indispensable additional 
services, being replaceable only under the condition of major changes to 
the core aspects of the strategy, and having a prevailing constructive 
impact. 
 
 
 
253 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
During the Cold War years, the security environment forced the US 
to place a strong emphasis on strategic deterrence, nuclear warfare and 
conventional interstate warfighting capabilities (Carafano and 
Rosenzweig,, 2005; Le Prestre, 1997). While the current post-Cold War 
environment demands that the US military remains capable of conducting 
large scale conventional operations, US national security interests require 
it to broaden the scope of its capabilities to include a wide range of 
missions and tasks grouped under the heading of Phase IV Operations 
(Taw 2012: 2, 36-37)  This new strategic environment envisions a world 
of increased uncertainty and complex situations, demanding military 
forces to anticipate and adapt rapidly to constant change, and apply 
selectively different capabilities based on the mission’s progress (Ibid.: 
60).  
The emergence of the PMSI in the Post-Cold War environment is 
the result of economic, military and political changes associated with the 
end of the old system. These changes paved the way for military 
outsourcing as an additional foreign policy tool in support of national 
militaries (Singer 2003: 49-60). The rise of non-state violence, the 
availability of military weapons for large scale violence among private 
actors and a declining willingness of the great powers to intervene in civil 
conflicts, are some of the most prominent factors that had a stimulating 
effect on the demand for private military and security services and the 
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establishment of PMSI early in the post-Cold War period (Kinsey and 
Patterson 2012: 3; Isenberg 2009: 1; Singer 2003: 49-60).  
Following 9/11, the US Global War on Terror presented an 
expanding set of security threats that the US, even supported by its allies, 
had limited resources to address (Department of Defense, 2006: 75, 81; 
Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management 
in Expeditionary Operations, 2007: 9; Schwartz and Church, 2013: 16). In 
such an environment, the nascent PMSI provided an instant remedy for 
the lack of planning for the complex military operations in Iraq and 
enabled the US military to adapt and sustain its presence for much longer 
than had been originally anticipated (Petersohn, 2007:  4-5; Lovewine, 
2014:  80).  
Drawing on the recurrent theme of the contribution of PMSCs in 
modern warfare in the literature on military outsourcing, this thesis 
argues that there is a lack of practical understanding of the contribution 
the PMSI made in Iraq from 2003 to 2011. Although a substantial body of 
literature has been developed to date, relatively little effort has been 
dedicated to investigate the contribution of PMSCs in Iraq in a deeper and 
systematic manner. This study sought to fill this gap by defining a typology 
of contributions and applying it to the presence and activities of PMSCs in 
Phase IV Operations in Iraq. 
Inspired by the Hayes and Wheelwright Four-Stage Model, this 
thesis developed the Conceptual Framework as a guiding tool for defining 
the contribution of a policy instrument within a particular strategy (Slack, 
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Chambers and Johnston, 2010: 89-90). This framework identifies the 
potential contributions of Assistant, Implementer, Supporter, Driver and 
Spoiler and its aim is to provide a policy-relevant insight into military 
outsourcing to create an avenue for better aligning contracting resources 
with the mission requirements of US expeditionary operations. Through 
this framework, this thesis provides an insight into the nature, dynamics 
and implications of the dependency of the US government on military 
outsourcing in expeditionary operations based on the case study of the 
contribution of PMSCs in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. 
 
VIII.I. Theoretical and Empirical Contribution of the Thesis 
This thesis increases the level of knowledge about military 
privatisation through both a theoretical and empirical contribution to the 
body of literature already available on this subject. Regarding the 
theoretical contribution of this thesis, there are three important areas to 
be highlighted.  
Firstly, this thesis expands and deepens the meaning of 
contribution attributed to it in the literature on PMSI. The available 
scholarship in the area of military privatisation can be viewed through 
four approaches towards the understanding of the industry’s contribution 
in modern military operations: as the characteristics of the military 
outsourcing trend, as an area of activity, as a specific occupation, or as a 
function (Avant, 2009: 104; Isenberg, 2009; Elsea, 2010; Schwartz, 2010; 
Pattison, 2014: 21). Unlike the previous efforts, which focus only on one 
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aspect of the presence and activities of PMSCs, the Conceptual Framework 
represents a three dimensional typology of five potential categories that 
considers: 1) the significance of the provided service(s), 2) the significance 
of the provider itself, and 3) the impact of the provider’s presence and 
activities on the main instrument’s strategy in a given context. The range 
of the five different contribution categories is thus differentiated 
according to these three dimensions where an individual characteristic is 
attributed to each particular contribution category.  
Assistant is the least important contribution. It is characterised by 
providing optional additional services, being replaceable under the 
condition of no or minor changes to non-core aspects of the strategy (size 
of the deployable force for the mission) and having a prevailing positive 
value in terms of its contribution to the achievement of the strategic goal. 
Implementer, one step above Assistant, is characterised by providing 
essential additional services, being replaceable under the condition of 
major changes to non-core aspects of the strategy (size of the deployable 
force for the mission and expected timeframe of the mission) and having a 
prevailing positive value in terms of its contribution. Crucial Supporter, 
the last category that completes the range of the three categories that 
supplement the main actor of the strategy, is characterised by providing 
indispensable additional services, being replaceable under the condition of 
major changes to core aspects of the strategy (size of the deployable force 
for the mission, expected timeframe of the mission, as well as objectives of 
the mission) and having a prevailing positive value in terms of its 
contribution.  
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The two remaining contributions of the Conceptual Framework, 
Driver and Spoiler, are the only two categories that correspond to the 
contribution of the main instrument of a mission and which respectively 
have the potential to drive, or spoil, the strategy. While both are 
characterised by providing indispensable main services and being 
irreplaceable without changing the whole strategy, they are complete 
opposites in the area of the prevailing value of their contribution to the 
achievement of the strategic goal. While Driver’s prevailing value of 
contribution is positive, therefore advancing the strategy, Spoiler’s 
prevailing value of contribution is negative, therefore, undermining the 
strategy. The most significant assertion this framework introduces is that 
in order for an instrument of a mission to become Spoiler, the instrument 
who undermines the strategy, its input must be equal to the one of Driver 
(Main instrument) to be able to spoil the mission, i.e. prevent the 
achievement of its desired strategic goal.  
In contrast to using the term contribution in a generic and 
undefined form, this framework provides a step towards a deeper 
understanding of how PMSI fits in a particular operational environment 
considering the nature of its services, its (ir)replaceability as the provider 
of those services, and the impact of its presence and activities on the 
strategy. Unlike previous approaches that have provided only two 
extreme, often undefined, opposites (force multipliers; peacemakers 
versus spoilers; messiahs versus mercenaries), this framework provides a 
range of types of contribution where individual categories can be 
compared and contrasted against each other based on the common 
258 
 
criteria (Cotton et al. 2010; Avant 2009; Brooks 2000). As such, this 
framework enables not only determination of the most likely contribution 
PMSCs made in a given context, but also highlights both the potential risks 
and benefits of using contractors in a particular set of circumstances. By 
doing so, it provides a platform for understanding how to actively shape 
the operational circumstances in order to achieve the desired outcome of 
using PMSCs in support of a military strategy in modern warfare.  
 
Secondly, this thesis makes an important theoretical contribution 
by bringing the context of PMSCs’ presence and activities to the forefront 
of its contribution assessment, while acknowledging that Iraq (2003-
2011) was a unique environment and any generally applicable lessons 
learned would be misleading. As a result, this thesis moves beyond the 
efforts to establish a universally valid denomination for all contractors, 
either positive or negative, and limits the assessment of their contribution 
to two types of services (Base Support Contractors and Armed Private 
Security Contractors) within the immediate circumstances of the 
environment that they are placed in.  
This thesis employs the existing US military doctrine on Stability 
Operations and the Weinberger-Powell doctrine as the key guiding 
principles that shaped the operational environment in Iraq. 
Acknowledging not only the post-Cold War changes and their impact on 
the establishment of PMSI, this thesis traces the broad implications of 
some former US foreign policy misadventures (Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon) 
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as the potential causes of setting the US on the path of large-scale military 
privatisation in modern warfare (Ucko, 2009: 25-46; Marston and 
Malkasian, 2008; Herring, 2000: 56-84). Including the WP doctrine and 
Phase IV Operations military manuals in the analysis uncovers an 
important link between some of the persisting US foreign policy guiding 
principles and the everyday operational challenges in Iraq, which the Base 
Support Contractors and Armed Private Security Contractors helped to 
overcome. 
 
Thirdly, despite the unavailability of lessons learned readily 
applicable to future contexts, the ultimate value and theoretical 
contribution of this framework is its potential transferability across a wide 
range of settings. Not only is it applicable as an insight tool into the 
contribution of PMSCs in other cases and different environments, it can 
also be applied to other actors. It could, for instance, be utilised to assess 
the contribution of humanitarian actors to peacekeeping operations, 
private intelligence contractors to national security, or maritime security 
contractors to preventing piracy. More broadly, it can be used in any other 
similar context where the point of enquiry is the contribution of an entity 
and its form of engagement within a clearly defined context. 
 
The empirical value that this thesis adds to the area of military 
privatisation is equally threefold.  
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Firstly, this thesis addresses directly the two most debated issues 
regarding the involvement of PMSI in US expeditionary operations: the 
level of US dependency on contractors and the potential negative impact 
their employment may create (Avant, 2009; Isenberg, 2009; Bruneau, 
2011; Pattison, 2014; Lovewine, 2014). Both of these issues are studied 
using the Conceptual Framework which demonstrates that across the two 
types of services studied in this thesis, Base Support and Armed Private 
Security, contractors became an indispensable additional asset with 
prevailing positive value towards the US military efforts to achieve its 
desired strategic goal.  
In particular, the first empirical chapter, concentrating on the Base 
Support Contractors, considers both the core support services, as well as 
some non-standard services to ‘keep soldiers happy’, and argues that BSCs 
became Crucial Supporter in the US Phase IV Operations in Iraq. The 
chapter illustrates that the services provided by PLS belonged to the 
category of indispensable additional services as the US military’s ability to 
sustain its operations to achieve its strategic goal was directly dependent 
on them (Shanker and Myers, 2008; Coll, 2008; Lendman and Asongu, 
2007: 185-191).  This significance stemmed from the US military’s 
operational needs in an extended low-intensity-combat military 
commitment where the sustainability of the mission was at the core of the 
US strategy (Nagl, 2002: 95-98; Ucko, 2013). Furthermore, as the sector 
directly responsible for ensuring the US military operational effectiveness 
by providing a wide range of services, including housing, food, and 
ensuring comfort for the US troops, the BSCs provided an irreplaceable 
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asset of the US strategy (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Logistics and Materiel Readiness, no date). Their monopoly on the large-
scale provision of these services, made it impossible to be replaced 
without having an adverse impact on the size of deployable force, available 
timeframe and potential to achieve desired objectives in Iraq. The US did 
not employ such measures.  
In addition, the analysis of the third dimension of the BSCs 
contribution, its impact, reveals that despite the enduring failure of some 
major logistics providers to fulfil their duties properly, their 
underperformance in the Phase IV Operations in Iraq did not limit the US 
military capability to prevent the US from achieving its strategic goal. 
Instead, the BSCs demonstrated a prevailing positive impact on the efforts 
of the US, vitally sustaining US military operations and enabling the US 
military to focus on what it considered its core responsibilities. As such, in 
line with the Conceptual Framework, BSCs became Crucial Supporter. At 
the same time, their services were not indispensable main services equal 
to the contribution of main instrument of the mission (Driver), the US 
military, and the BSCs were not irreplaceable in terms of the feasibility of 
the mission. Likewise, the BSCs cannot be identified as the Spoiler of the 
US strategy in Phase IV Operation, as in order to acquire the potential 
impact to become the major obstacle for the US to achieve its strategic 
goal, they would have had to acquire the position of Driver first. 
The second empirical chapter, concentrating on the contribution of 
Armed Private Security Companies (APSCs) in Phase IV Operations in Iraq, 
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illustrates that armed security services provided by APSCs belonged to the 
category of indispensable additional services in terms of the US military 
strategy. Their significance stemmed from the necessity to ensure 
protection for a wide range of actors and facilities within the high-risk 
environment of Iraq, including businessmen, NGO workers, construction 
workers, US government civilian personnel, and even high-ranking US 
military officials (Glantz and Lehren, 2010; Hammes, 2013; Hughes, 2013). 
Furthermore, identified as providers of a unique type of service which 
bears the greatest significance to the activities of US combat troops in a 
high risk environment, the APSCs became irreplaceable additional assets 
the US strategy because they allowed the US to pursue its strategy without 
having to diminish the size of deployable force, available timeframe, or to 
compromise the potential to achieve desired objectives in Iraq (Hammes, 
2013; Hughes, 2013).  
In addition, the analysis of the third dimension of the contribution 
of APSCs, their impact, reveals that despite their negative reputation 
perpetuated by the media, APSCs did not create a prevailingly negative 
impact on the US strategy as their alleged misconduct has not superseded 
the inconsiderate treatment of the local population by the US military. 
Therefore, despite the convincing allegations of misconduct by APSCs 
against Iraqi civilians, the impact of such misbehaviour cannot be 
considered more significant than the one reported in regards to the US 
military’ own conduct. As such, in coherence with the Conceptual 
Framework, APSCs became Crucial Supporter. As their services were not 
equal to the services associated with the contribution of the main 
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instrument of the mission, the US military, and they were not irreplaceable 
in terms of the feasibility of the mission, APSCs cannot be identified as the 
Spoiler of the US strategy in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. In order to 
acquire the potential impact to become the major obstacle for the US to 
achieve its strategic goal, they would have had to be in the position of 
Driver first. 
Secondly, this thesis provides a unique perspective approaching the 
research problem across different viewpoints. Focussing on the Base 
Support Contractors and Armed Private Security Contractors, it highlights 
the important differences that concern the wide range of contractors in 
military operations and highlights the complexity and diversity of the 
industry as a whole. The occasional difficulty of separating the PMSI into 
distinct sectors or individual services, experienced during the analysis, 
only confirms that the various elements of the industry are closely related 
to each other and should be studied together. 
 
Thirdly, this thesis relies on a wide range of primary and secondary 
resources, including official reports, semi-structured interviews and 
video-testimonies of US veterans as the source of new data and evidence 
for the assessment of the PMSI contribution in Phase IV Operations in Iraq. 
This project draws on a wide variety primary textual sources: 
• official documents and reports produced by various state 
agencies and nominated authorities, including the Coalition of Provisional 
Authority (CPA), Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), 
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U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), United States Central 
Command (CENTCOM);  
• records from proceedings in the US Congress and its various 
committees; 
• reports, hearings and analytical studies by a wide range of 
research and oversight bodies, including Commission on Wartime 
Contracting (CWC), Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), Government Accountability Office (GAO), Special 
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), U.S. Department of 
State Office of Inspector General, USAID Office of Inspector General, and 
U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General; 
In addition, international legal documents, including the Geneva 
Conventions and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, have 
been used. Also, this study uses information from numerous US research 
institutions, such as the Brookings Institute, Federation of American 
Scientists and RAND Corporation, since they provide key insights into the 
area and most of their publications are publicly available online. 
Next to these, the testimonies of the Iraq War veterans about the 
reality of the war on the ground through the eyes of individual soldiers, 
are immensely important with respect to the perceptions of PMSCs as 
spoilers or mercenaries. Portraying the everyday struggle and obstacles 
encountered by individuals (military personnel, contractors, and Iraqi 
civilians) by sharing their personal stories of authentic scenes, these 
veterans paint an honest picture of the complexity of war in a way which is 
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distinct from a policy analysis, military strategy or even an academic 
narrative of the conflict.  
Personal interviews with individuals who were involved in working 
with or alongside contractors in Iraq complement the range of original 
sources consulted for this research. Although text analysis remains the 
primary source of information, the use of testimonies and interviews is 
what sets this piece of research apart from the available literature on 
military privatisation. 
 
VIII.II. Areas for Further Research 
This thesis argues that the PMSI became Crucial Supporter of the 
US military efforts in Phase IV Operations in Iraq, representing an 
indispensable source of continuity that allowed the US military to endure 
an eight yearlong military engagement that would otherwise have been 
both politically and operationally impossible. By bypassing the WP 
principles stressing the necessity of clear objectives, wholehearted 
commitment and support of the American People and the Congress, the 
PMSI gave the US the necessary stamina, persistence and capacity to 
complete an otherwise non-viable military mission (Mayer, 2013; 
McMahon, 2013).  
This thesis confirms the unprecedented dependency of the US 
military on contractors and asserts that they were an integral and mostly 
positive component of the US military efforts in Iraq (Hammes, 2013; 
Hughes, 2013). The limited scholarly insight into this research problem, 
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further exacerbated by the media providing oversimplified and misleading 
information to create a worldwide sensation, inevitably led to false 
perceptions about the whole industry. By providing a more systematic 
insight into the contribution of PMSCs as an alternative tool of US foreign 
policy in this particular context, this thesis refutes these misperceptions 
and fills in the gap in the existing literature on military privatisation. 
The elevation of Phase IV Operations on to a par with the offence 
and defence capabilities of the US military, as well as the introduction of 
the Counterinsurgency doctrine as the silver bullet of modern warfare, 
were seen conceptually as the ultimate lessons learnt from US military 
involvement in Iraq (Nagl, 2002; Kilcullen, 2009: 294-305; Ucko, 2013). 
Although both Iraq and Afghanistan are now largely regarded as 
misadventures, at one point they symbolised the prototype of future 
warfare and the academic literature was preoccupied with concepts such 
as New Wars, Fourth Generation Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and 
Stability operations. Despite the lack of an outright victory, Western 
military thinking appeared to be adopting at least portions of the lessons 
learned and adapting its forces for potential similar military engagements 
in the future.  
Today, it is clear that the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts did not 
become the prototypes of how to carry out potentially similar operations 
more effectively in the future. Instead, they became negative experiences 
of what the US military appears to never want to repeat (Allin and Jones, 
2012: 96-98). While this does not mean that the use of military force is 
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necessarily off the table entirely, it seems that the non-conventional, 
lengthy, and resources intensive military commitment was largely 
discarded. This could be observed with the non-intervention policy, in 
terms of boots on the ground, in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, 
Syria, and Iraq. Current military thinking, shaped by the experience in Iraq 
and Afghanistan in particular, demonstrates a new direction seeking to 
remedy America’s strategic overextension and features considerable 
internal resistance to potential future counterinsurgency operations, 
viewing them as highly problematic (Linn, 2011: 40-41, Allin and Jones, 
2012: 96-101).  
While under the current climate, it is difficult to imagine the US 
military becoming involved in a conflict of choice that would be anywhere 
close to the magnitude and nature of the Iraq misadventure, PMSI is 
unlikely to depart from the international stage and will remain a critical 
component in times of war and peace. In fact, the withdrawal of forces 
from Afghanistan in 2014 is likely to have accelerated the diversification of 
industry activities into new geographical regions and services. Today, the 
majority of international organisations, NGOs, private voluntary 
organisations and private companies find it difficult, if not impossible, to 
operate in many high-risk areas without the involvement of PMSCs (Avant, 
2009). As one of the post-Iraq example of PMSI employment, off the 
Somali coast, for instance, private security companies proved essential in 
preventing pirate attacks on Western cargo vessels navigating through 
that area (Isenberg, 2012).   
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More recently, the crisis in Ukraine confirms, that the focus on 
Western PMSCs is more relevant than ever, as it was reported that there 
was ‘evidence’ that individuals from Western European countries were 
involved in the conflict on the side of the Ukrainian military forces 
(Sengupta, 2014). Although the approach of this thesis is limited to 
offering a unique insight into the research problem of the contribution of 
PMSCs in Phase IV Operations in Iraq, this study could be a starting point 
to explore the contribution of contractors in different contexts in which 
they are used. The Conceptual Framework provides a platform to be 
applied to other settings and situations around the world to assess the 
involvement of various instruments in pursuit of a clearly defined strategy. 
There is every reason to believe that US armed forces will 
eventually face situations in which the requirements of war and peace 
cannot be separated. In the light of the recent events, including the Arab 
Spring, the rise of the Islamic State and the war in Ukraine, all of which are 
potentially relevant to US strategic interests, there is good reason to 
believe that the close cooperation of the US with the private military and 
security industry will continue. It is, therefore, advisable to study further 
the contribution contractors make across different levels of analysis and a 
wide range of contexts to create a better understanding of the risks and 
benefits that partnering with these actors entails. 
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Appendices 
 
A. List of interviewees 
Biddle, Stephen 
Adjunct Senior Fellow for Defence Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, 
Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington 
University, interviewed in Washington, DC, 24 October 2013. 
 
Bremer, Paul 
American diplomat, former Administrator of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority of Iraq 2003-2004, interviewed in Washington, DC, 23 October 
2013. 
 
Brooks, Doug 
Consultant, President Emeritus, International Stability Operations 
Association, interviewed in Washington, DC, 8 October 2013. 
 
Hammes, Thomas X 
retired U.S. Marine officer, distinguished research fellow at the Institute 
for National Security Studies, National Defense University, interviewed in 
Washington, DC, 14 October 2013. 
 
Hughes, Paul 
Col. (Ret.), former senior staff officer for the Office of Reconstruction and 
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and later with the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) in Iraq, United States Institute of Peace, interviewed in 
Washington, DC, 11 October 2013. 
 
McMahon, K. Scott 
Senior Defence Research Analyst, RAND, interviewed in Washington, DC, 
17 October 2013. 
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B. List of Iraq Veterans Against the War 
Casey, Steven, Specialist, United States Army 
Casler, Bryan, Corporal, United States Marine Corps 
Childers, Matthew, Corporal, United States Marine Corps 
Emanuele, Vincent, Private First Class, United States Marine Corps 
Hamilton, Jesse, Staff Sergeant, United States Army Reserve 
Hicks, Clifton, Private, United States Army 
Hurd, Jason, Specialist, Tennessee Army National Guard 
Kochergin, Sergio, Corporal, United States Marine Corps 
Kokesh, Adam, Sergeant, United States Marine Corps Reserve 
Laituri, Logan, Sergeant, United States Army 
LeDuc, Michael, Corporal, United States Marine Corps 
Lemieux, Jason Wayne, Sergeant, United States Marine Corps 
Mortillo, Steve, Specialist, United States Army 
Reppenhagen, Garett, Specialist, United States Army 
Totten, Michael, Specialist, United States Army 
Turner, Jon Michael, Lance Corporal, United States Marine Corps 
Viges, Hart, Specialist, United States Army 
Washburn, Jason, Corporal, United States Marine Corps 
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C. Essential Stability Tasks - Field Manual No. 3-07: Stability 
Operations 
ESTABLISH CIVIL 
SECURITY 
 
 Enforce Cessation of Hostilities, Peace 
Agreements, and Other Arrangements 
 Determine Disposition and Constitution of 
National Armed and Intelligence Services 
 Conduct Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration 
 Conduct Border Control, Boundary Security, 
and Freedom of Movement 
 Support Identification 
 Protect Key Personnel and Facilities 
 Clear Explosive and Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, and Nuclear Hazards 
ESTABLISH CIVIL 
CONTROL 
 
 Establish Public Order and Safety 
 Establish Interim Criminal Justice System 
 Support Law Enforcement and Police Reform 
 Support Judicial Reform 
 Support Property Dispute Resolution 
Processes 
 Support Justice System Reform 
 Support Corrections Reform 
 Support War Crimes Courts and Tribunals 
 Support Public Outreach and Community 
Rebuilding Programs 
RESTORE 
ESSENTIAL 
SERVICES 
 
 Provide Essential Civil Services 
 Tasks Related to Civilian Dislocation 
 Support Famine Prevention and Emergency 
Food Relief Programs 
 Support Non-food Relief Programs 
 Support Humanitarian Demining 
 Support Human Rights Initiatives 
 Support Public Health Programs 
 Support Education Programs 
 
SUPPORT TO 
GOVERNANCE 
 
 Support Transitional Administrations 
 Support Development of Local Governance 
 Support Anticorruption Initiatives 
 Support Elections 
272 
 
SUPPORT TO 
ECONOMIC AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Support Economic Generation and Enterprise 
Creation 
 Support Monetary Institutions and Programs 
 Support National Treasury Operations 
 Support Public Sector Investment Programs 
 Support Private Sector Development 
 Protect Natural Resources and Environment 
 Support Agricultural Development Programs 
 Restore Transportation Infrastructure 
 Restore Telecommunications Infrastructure 
 Support General Infrastructure 
Reconstruction Programs 
INFORMATION 
ENGAGEMENT 
TASKS 
 
Source: Field manual No. 3-07: Stability Operations (Department of the 
Army, 2008: III-1-59). 
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D. CENTCOM reported estimates of DoD total contractors and total 
troops in Iraq between September 2007 and March 2011  
 
 
Quarter 
Ending  
Total 
Contractors 
% Total 
Contractors 
Troop 
Levels   
% Troop 
Levels 
Sep. 2007  154825 48% 169000 52% 
Dec. 2007  163591 50% 165700 50% 
Mar. 2008   149388 48% 160500 52% 
June 2008 162428 51% 153300 49% 
Sep. 2008 163446 53% 146800 47% 
Dec. 2008 148050 50% 148500 50% 
Mar. 2009 132610 48% 141300 52% 
June 2009  119706 47% 134600 53% 
Sep. 2009 113731 47% 129200 53% 
Dec. 2009  100035 47% 114300 53% 
Mar. 2010  95461 50% 95900 50% 
June 2010 79621 47% 88320 53% 
Sep. 2010  74106 60% 48410 40% 
Dec. 2010  71142 60% 47305 40% 
Mar. 2011  64253 58% 45660 42% 
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports (Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, no date) 
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E. Number of DoD Contractor Personnel in Iraq by Type of Service 
Provided  
 
 
Date B S T/I CS TP TN CM L/M Other 
Mar.2008 53,7% 4,9% 5,4% 20,0% 5,2% 0,0% 3,4% 0,0% 7,4% 
June 2008 55,2% 5,7% 5,2% 22,3% 4,7% 0,0% 2,5% 0,0% 4,4% 
Sep. 2008 55,3% 7,7% 5,4% 18,1% 4,8% 0,0% 1,8% 0,0% 6,9% 
Dec. 2008 54,7% 5,7% 6,3% 14,0% 4,5% 0,0% 0,5% 0,0% 14,4% 
Mar.2009 58,6% 7,9% 7,0% 15,0% 1,8% 0,0% 1,1% 0,0% 8,7% 
June 2009 60,0% 11,0% 7,6% 8,4% 1,3% 0,0% 1,8% 0,0% 9,8% 
Sep. 2009 57,8% 11,2% 7,7% 8,7% 1,2% 0,0% 2,6% 0,0% 10,8% 
Dec. 2009 61,7% 11,1% 8,4% 3,4% 2,1% 1,5% 2,4% 6,1% 3,4% 
Mar.2010 65,3% 12,2% 8,0% 2,3% 1,9% 1,0% 1,1% 3,9% 4,5% 
June 2010 61,9% 14,3% 6,5% 1,7% 2,2% 0,7% 0,8% 0,6% 11,3% 
Sep. 2010 59,0% 15,7% 6,2% 3,7% 1,5% 0,8% 0,9% 0,6% 11,6% 
Dec. 2010 59,6% 17,9% 6,2% 1,6% 1,5% 0,8% 0,7% 0,6% 11,0% 
Mar. 2011 60,6% 16,3% 6,4% 1,3% 1,9% 0,9% 0,8% 0,5% 11,3% 
 
B – Base Support    TP- Transport 
S - Security      TN - Training 
T/I - Translator/Interpreter  CM - Communication 
CS – Construction    L/M – Logistics/Maintenance 
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports (Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, no date) 
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F. DoD Contractor Personnel in Iraq, Aug. 2008 – Oct. 2011 by 
Nationality 
 
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports (Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, no date) 
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